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The feeling that an attachment figure is available and responsive when needed (also 
referred to as attachment security) is an important factor in the activation of the fear 
system such that attachment security is thought to decrease fearfulness. To date, no 
study has examined whether attachment security causes decreased fearfulness. Adult 
attachment researchers have used priming techniques to investigate whether increased 
security causes improvement in various adult psychosocial outcomes (for a review 
see Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007) and priming techniques have been useful in research 
with children. As such, attachment security priming may be a valuable research tool 
to determine whether attachment security reduces children’s fear reactions. In 
addition, mothers’ negative and unsupportive responses to children’s negative 
emotions are associated with poor socio-emotional outcomes for children (Eisenberg 
et al., 1998). As such, maternal negative and unsupportive responses may be linked to 
children’s fear responses. Child temperament is also an important factor in children’s 
  
fear reactions such that temperamentally more fearful children may be more 
influenced by the effects of attachment security and maternal responses to child 
distress. The present study was designed to extend attachment security priming 
methods to research with children between 6- and 7-years-of-age by employing a 
multi-method experimental approach to examine (a) whether experimentally induced 
attachment security causes less fearful reactions to fear-inducing tasks in children, 
and (b) whether maternal emotion socialization is associated with the fear reactivity 
of children randomly assigned to the neutral control group. Additionally, the present 
study also seeks to examine (a) whether the effects of experimentally-induced 
attachment security on children’s fear reactions vary as a function of children’s 
temperamental fearfulness, and (b) whether the link between maternal emotion 
socialization and children’s fear reactivity is moderated by children’s temperament 
fearfulness.  After having been exposed to subliminally presented attachment security 
picture primes, six- and seven-year-old children had lower physiological fear 
reactions during observations of fear-inducing pictures than children exposed to 
subliminally presented happy or neutral picture primes. There were no links between 
maternal responses to child distress and children’s fear-reactions. Results did not 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Influence of Experimentally Induced Attachment Security  
on Children's Fear Reactions 
Fear is a universal emotion with evolutionary significance (Darwin, 1872). 
Everyone experiences at least some degree of fear at one time or another and it 
motivates us to act in ways that increase our chances of survival. The universality and 
adaptive value of fear underscores how it is entrenched in the human experience, and, 
for this reason alone, makes fear an important topic of research inquiry that cuts 
across research disciplines. Research on the normative expression and experience of 
fear both across people and within the individual has been crucial to our 
understanding of fear, including how it manifests in our facial expressions and body 
posture (Rosenberg & Ekman, 2005) to how it ebbs and flows across development 
(Camras et al., 1994). In addition, research on individual differences in the expression 
and experience of fear has yielded important insight into the role that fear plays in the 
individual’s biological, psychological, and social adjustment. For example, both 
overwhelming fear and a lack of a fear response can signal psychopathology as is the 
case for anxiety disorders which are characterized by pervasive and/or acute fear, 
anxiety, and worry, and for antisocial personality disorder which is often 
characterized by a lack of a fear response when one would normally be expected. 
Attachment researchers have been especially interested in fear reactions 
because the fear and attachment systems are thought to have evolved together 
(Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973). According to attachment theory, the biological function 




increased likelihood of danger, including darkness, loud noises, sudden looming 
movements, loss of physical support, aloneness, and novelty (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 
1973). These “natural clues to danger” activate the fear system and the attachment 
system, such that the experience of fear initiates avoidance and withdrawal from fear-
provoking stimuli and approach toward an attachment figure. The intertwining of the 
fear and the attachment systems in this way increases the likelihood of survival 
(Bowlby, 1973).  
Another behavioral system that is closely linked to both the fear and 
attachment systems is the exploratory system. The exploratory system is thought to 
have evolved because it provides a survival advantage by supporting the acquisition 
of important information about the world (Bowlby, 1969/1982). The exploratory 
system and the fear system are closely linked such that novel and complex stimuli 
elicit both exploratory behavior and fearful behavior (Bowlby, 1969/1982). This 
conflict between the exploratory and fear systems also provides a survival advantage 
because “unbridled exploration with no attention to potential hazards can be 
dangerous,” (Cassidy, 2008, p. 8). Thus, the fear system is antagonistic to the 
exploratory system such that fearfulness decreases exploration. Novelty and 
complexity, however, permeate children’s daily lives. Therefore, just as unbridled 
exploration can be dangerous, unbridled fearfulness can also be dangerous. 
Specifically, unbridled fearfulness in the face of novel and complex stimuli with no 
attention to opportunities for exploration would severely limit the child’s ability to 
extract important information from the environment—information that would provide 




The presence of an attachment figure can reduce this tension between fear and 
exploratory behaviors. Specifically, fear activates the attachment behavioral system 
and increases proximity to attachment figures. In turn, proximity to an attachment 
figure ensures protection from potential dangers which assuages fear and facilitates 
learning to effectively negotiate the environment by supporting exploratory behaviors 
(Marvin & Britner, 2008). Thus, the presence and availability of an attachment figure 
is an important factor in the activation of the fear system, such that an available and 
responsive attachment figure decreases fearfulness. 
In addition, individual differences in the organization of the attachment 
behavioral system contribute to the activation of the fear system (Ainsworth, Blehar, 
Waters, & Wall, 1978; Bowlby, 1969/1972). Specifically, the attachment behavioral 
system is organized based on experiences with an attachment figure. According to 
attachment theory, those who have experienced their attachment figures as available 
and responsive to their attachment behaviors tend to develop a sense of secure 
confidence that their attachment figures will be available and responsive if needed, 
and they are thought to carry this sense of security with them into their interactions 
with the world (Bowlby, 1969/1982; Shaver & Fraley, 2000). If, however, attachment 
behaviors are met with rejection, inconsistent responsiveness, or 
frightening/frightened behaviors on the part of their attachment figures, a sense of 
insecurity about the availability and responsiveness of one’s attachment figures is 
likely to develop which is then carried forward into new interactions. Thus, it is 
thought that attachment security, or mental representations of one’s attachment 




attachment insecurity (i.e., mental representations of one’s attachment figures as 
rejecting, inconsistently responsive, or frightening/frightened when needed). 
Consistent with theory, research indicates that attachment security is linked to 
less fear and anxiety. Recently, research also indicates that the link between 
attachment security and children’s fear reactions may vary as a function of 
temperamental or genetic factors (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, 
& Linting, 2008; Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & van der Veer, 
2008; Gilissen, Koolstra, van IJzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van der Veer, 
2007). There are two substantial gaps in this body of literature. First, this body of 
literature is limited to correlational research; there have been no experimental 
investigations of the influence of attachment security on fear. Second, most research 
that has examined the link between attachment security and fear or anxiety has done 
so with children eight-years-of-age or older (Borelli, Crowley, David, Sbarra, 
Anderson, & Mayes, 2010; Borelli, David, Crowley, & Mayes, 2010; Brumariu & 
Kerns, 2008, 2010; Cunha, Soares, & Pinto-Gouveia, 2008; Duchesne, Ratelle, 
Poitras, & Drouin, 2009; Lee & Hankin, 2009; Muris, Mayer, & Meesters, 2000; 
Muris & Meesters, 2002; Muris, Meesters, van melich, & Zwambag, 2001; Tremblay 
& Sullivan, 2010). There have been only three studies examining the link between 
attachment security and fear or anxiety during infancy and the preschool years 
(Kochanska, 2001; Shamir-Essakow, Ungerer, & Rapee, 2005; Stevenson-Hinde & 
Shouldice, 1990) and only four studies that have investigated the link between 
attachment security and fear or anxiety during early childhood (i.e., ages five to 




IJzendoorn, & Linting, 2008; Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & 
van der Veer, 2008).  
This paucity of research on attachment security and fear in early childhood 
also extends to investigations of maternal emotion socialization factors that may 
predict children’s fearfulness. The primary attachment relationship provides children 
with their first exposure to emotion socialization experiences which influence 
children’s emotional capacities—that is, social experiences that shape children’s 
understanding, experience, and expression of emotions. Understanding the 
socialization of fear is particularly important to understand because of the role that 
fear plays in children’s psychosocial outcomes, including social competence, self-
regulatory capacities, and mental health (Himle, Fischer, Lee, & Muroff, 2006; 
Schmidt & Schulkin, 1999). Research supports the idea that mothers’ emotion 
socialization is an important predictor of children’s emotional development 
(Eisenberg, Cumberland, & Spinrad, 1998), but no study yet has examined how 
mothers’ emotion socialization influences children’s fear in particular. Given the role 
that fear plays in children’s psychosocial functioning and psychopathology, it is 
important to investigate maternal factors that may influence children’s fear reactions.  
Given the lack of experimental research on attachment security and children’s 
fear reactions, the dearth of research investigating this link in early childhood, and 
little research on maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear, the present study 
seeks to fill these gaps in the literature. Specifically, the present study seeks to: (a) 
determine whether experimentally induced attachment security causes decreased fear 




children's fear reactions. In addition, given the growing body of evidence that 
suggests that children who have high levels of negative emotionality may be more 
influenced by the quality of their caregiving environment, the present study will also 
examine whether these links are moderated by child temperamental fearfulness within 
the context of the differential susceptibility hypothesis. 
Overview 
In the remainder of this introduction, I provide a review of the empirical 
literature on attachment security and fear reactions in infancy, toddlerhood, and 
childhood. Then, I briefly discuss research that has used priming to experimentally 
increase attachment security in adults, which has allowed researchers to examine 
causal links between experimentally induced attachment security and improved 
psychosocial functioning. I follow this with a review of research that has used 
priming methods to examine how children’s mental representations drive their 
responses to social information. (A comprehensive review of this literature is 
provided in Chapter 2.) Next, I review research examining the links between mothers’ 
emotion socialization and children’s emotional development. In the last part of this 
chapter, I describe the present study including the hypotheses and research questions.  
After I outline my hypotheses and research questions, I provide a 
comprehensive review of the literature on attachment security priming and 
developmental research that has used priming to examine how children’s mental 
representations guide their behavior. Next, I describe my method, followed by my 




Developmental Research Examining the Link between Attachment Security and 
Fear  
Two studies have experimentally manipulated the presence and availability of 
an attachment figure to examine the effects on psychosocial outcomes. Although none 
have examined the effects of an attachment figure’s presence and availability on fear 
in childhood, these studies suggest that increased attachment security causes 
improved psychosocial outcomes.  Sorce and Emde’s (1981) seminal experiment 
examined the effects of mothers’ availability and responsiveness on 15-month-olds’ 
exploration and affect, including fearfulness, anger, and sadness. Specifically, 15-
month-olds were introduced to a series of novel/unpredictable situations while their 
mothers remained in the room with them. Half of the mothers were present but 
unavailable and unresponsive (mothers were instructed to read the newspaper and 
remain unresponsive to their infants’ bids for attention), and the other half were 
present, available, and responsive (mothers did not read the newspaper, but instead 
were instructed to monitor their infants and respond empathically and appropriately). 
The infants whose mothers were unavailable and unresponsive exhibited more 
distress and were less exploratory compared to infants whose mothers were available 
and responsive.  
Although this study demonstrates that an attachment figure’s decreased 
availability and responsiveness increases negative affect and decreases exploration, 
these findings speak only indirectly to whether an attachment figure’s availability and 
responsiveness affect fearfulness. Specifically, fear was coded as one of several 




possible to interpret these findings as evidence that the presence of an available and 
responsive attachment figure decreases fearfulness because fear is confounded with 
other negative emotions.  
Another study found that physical contact with an attachment figure attenuates 
negative emotion and neural threat responses. Although this study was conducted 
with adults, given that attachment is a lifespan phenomenon, these findings are clearly 
relevant to the present study which seeks to determine whether increased attachment 
security reduces children’s fearfulness. Married women were subjected to the threat 
of a mild electric shock under three conditions: once while holding the hand of their 
husband, once while holding the hand of an unknown and anonymous male 
experimenter, and once while holding no hand at all (Coan, Schaefer, & Davidson, 
2006). Women’s reports of unpleasantness were lowest when they were holding their 
husbands’ hand compared to holding the stranger’s hand or no hand.  Similarly, 
functional brain imaging revealed less neural activation in areas of the brain 
associated with emotional and behavioral threat responses when women were holding 
their husbands’ hand compared to holding the stranger’s hand or no hand. In addition, 
this effect of decreased neural threat response in the spousal hand holding condition 
increased as marital quality increased (Coan, et al., 2006).  
In this same sample, Coan, Schafer, & Davidson (2005) also found that wives’ 
neural activity in response to threat during these three conditions (i.e., holding 
husband’s hand, holding stranger’s hand, no hand-holding), varied as a function of 
both wives’ and husbands’ self-reported attachment styles. During the husband hand 




to threat in areas of the brain associated with modulation of affect-related arousal, and 
wives’ security was linked to increased neural activity in these same areas of the brain 
linked to regulation of affect-related arousal when holding a stranger’s hand. 
Furthermore, during the husband hand holding condition, wives’ attachment-related 
avoidance (discomfort with closeness and intimacy) predicted increased neural 
activity in response to threat in areas of the brain associated with the regulation of 
negative affect, and increased activation of these same areas of the brain associated 
with the regulation of negative affect when holding a stranger’s hand. These findings 
suggest that more secure women are able to use their husbands as a source affect-
regulation during times of stress, and women who have greater levels of attachment 
avoidance are less able to use their husbands as a source of negative-affect regulation. 
In addition, Coan and colleagues (2005) also found that during the stranger 
hand holding condition, wives’ whose husbands reported higher levels of attachment 
anxiety (fear of abandonment) had greater neural activity in response to threat in 
areas of the brain associated with increased threat response and stress, suggesting that 
women whose husbands reported higher levels of fear of abandonment were less able 
to use the social support provided by a stranger to regulate their threat response and 
stress. Furthermore, husbands’ attachment avoidance influenced wives’ neural 
responses to threat. In the husband hand holding condition, women whose husbands 
had higher levels of attachment avoidance had increased neural activation in response 
to threat in areas of the brain associated with self-regulatory efforts, suggesting that 
women whose husbands were uncomfortable with intimacy and closeness relied more 




Similar to Source and Emde (1981), Coan and colleagues’ (Coan, et al., 2005, 
2006) findings support the idea that the presence and availability of an attachment 
figure decreases negative emotions. Nonetheless, Source and Emde’s and Coan and 
colleagues’ studies do not address the question of whether increased attachment 
security reduces fear reactivity. As such, a direct examination of the causal link 
between attachment security and fear has yet to be conducted.   
There is correlational evidence, however, to support the idea that attachment 
security is associated with less fearfulness. Several longitudinal studies have assessed 
attachment security during infancy in the Strange Situation and found that securely 
attached infants were less fearful or had lower levels of anxiety at later time points. 
For example, infants who were classified as securely attached at 14 months were less 
fearful at 33 months compared to insecurely attached infants (Kochanska, 2001). 
Infant attachment security assessed in the Strange Situation has also been linked to 
lower levels of separation anxiety at 6 years-of-age (Dallaire & Weinraub, 2005) and 
less school phobia at 11 years-of-age (Bar-Haim, Dan, Eshel, & Sagi-Schwartz, 2007) 
compared to insecurely attached infants. Infant attachment security has also been 
found to be a protective factor against the effects of negative life events on anxiety. 
Specifically, negative life events predicted greater levels of anxiety symptoms in first 
grade for children who were insecurely attached to mother at 15 months, whereas 
children who were securely attached were protected from the harmful effects of 
negative life events on anxiety symptoms (Dallaire & Weinraub, 2007). Another 
study found that higher levels of self-reported attachment anxiety and avoidance 




Waller, & Brennan, 2000) each predicted increases in anxiety symptoms over a 5 




 graders.  
A larger body of research has found links between concurrently assessed 
attachment security and fear or anxiety. Two studies have found a link between 
concurrently assessed attachment and fear. Stevenson-Hinde and Shouldice (1990) 
reported that 2.5-year-olds who were the most secure during the Strange Situation 
were also the least fearful of the stranger during the Strange Situation. Borelli, 
Crowley, et al. (2010) found a link between attachment security and startle response 
in children between 8- and 12-years-of-age. Specifically, children who were rated as 
having higher levels of narrative coherence during the Child Attachment Interview 
(Shmueli-Goetz, Target, Datta, & Fonagy, 2008) initially had a greater startle 
magnitude which decreased more rapidly during a threatening condition. These 
findings suggest that children who are able to discuss their attachment relationships 
more coherently respond initially to a threat with higher arousal but are able to down-
regulate more quickly.  
Other studies have found concurrent links between attachment security and 
anxiety. Shamir-Essakow et al., (2005) found that three- and four-year-olds classified 
as securely attached in a modified Strange Situation had fewer concordantly 
diagnosed anxiety disorders. Self-reported attachment using Kerns and colleagues’ 
attachment security scale (Kerns, Klepac, & Cole, 1996) has been linked to less 
anxiety symptoms (Duchesne et al., 2009) and less social anxiety symptoms 
(Brumariu & Kerns, 2008) in 6
th
 graders. Another study found that security assessed 




levels of general anxiety, social phobia, school phobia, and panic/somatic symptoms 
in 10- to 12-year-olds (Brumariu & Kerns, 2010). Several studies have found a link 
between concurrently assessed self-reports of adolescents’ attachment security and 
anxiety symptoms such that adolescents who report greater levels of security also 
report lower levels of anxiety symptoms (see Cunha et al., 2008; Muris, et al., 2000, 
2001; Muris & Meesters, 2001; Tremblay & Sullivan, 2010).  
The research reviewed above, taken together, indicates that attachment 
security predicts less fearfulness and less anxiety symptoms both concurrently and 
longitudinally in infants, preschoolers, children, and adolescents. Recent research 
suggests that this link between attachment security and fearfulness may vary as a 
function of biologically-based characteristics of the child. Specifically, Gilissen and 
colleagues have found that attachment security is linked to lower levels of 
electrodermal activity in 7-year-olds. In one study, securely attached 7-year-olds had 
lower levels of electrodermal activity (EDA) during a social evaluative threat task 
than insecurely attached children (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, 
& Linting, 2008).  In another study more secure 7-year-olds had lower EDA levels in 
response to fear-inducing video clips (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van 
IJzendoorn, & van der Veer, 2008).  
In addition to supporting the idea that attachment security is an important 
predictor of children’s physiological fear reactivity, these studies by Gilissen and 
colleagues also found evidence that, for biological reasons, some children are more 
susceptible to the effects of attachment security on their physiological fear reactivity. 




stress task was moderated by variation in the serotonin transporter allele in the 
promoter region of the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR). Specifically, securely 
attached children with two long alleles showed the lowest levels of EDA during the 
social stressor compared to children with other variants (Gilissen, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & Linting, 2008).  
In addition, the effect of attachment security on physiological fear reactivity 
increased as children’s temperamental fearfulness increased during the fear-inducing 
video clips. Results were consistent with the differential susceptibility hypothesis, 
which states that, “[S]ome children, for temperamental or genetic reasons, are 
actually more susceptible to both (a) the adverse effects of unsupportive parenting 
and (b) the beneficial effects of supportive rearing,” (Belsky, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, (2007, p. 300, italics in original text). Specifically, 
temperamentally more fearful children had the lowest levels of fear reactivity when 
their attachment to their primary caregiver was supportive (i.e., secure) and the 
highest levels of fear reactivity when their attachment to their primary caregiver was 
unsupportive (i.e., insecure).  
Taken together, this body of research reviewed above indicates that, consistent 
with theory, attachment security is associated with less fearfulness across 
development and that this link may vary as a function of biologically-based child 
characteristics. This research, however, is limited in two ways. First, no study has 
experimentally examined the causal link between attachment security and reduced 
fearfulness that is theorized to exist. Second, there are relatively few studies 




childhood. In what follows, I discuss research that uses priming methods to increase 
attachment security in experimental research and illustrate how applying attachment 
security priming methods to research with children would allow researchers to draw 
initial causal links between increased attachment security and less fear.   
Priming as a Way of Experimentally Increasing Attachment Security in Adults 
Priming is a technique that is used to activate a particular mental 
representation of interest by exposing participants to schema-relevant cues (Bargh, 
2003, 2006; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Hamilton, 2005). Just as it is possible to 
activate a mental representation of interest by exposing people to schema-relevant 
stimuli, it is also possible to activate mental representations of attachment security 
using stimuli that are related to attachment security. Activating mental representations 
of attachment security using priming methods offers the possibility of exploring how 
mental representations of attachment drive affect, cognitions, and behavior in 
attachment-relevant situations in experimental research (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 
2007b). Adult attachment researchers have recently extended the use of priming 
techniques to investigate whether increased security leads to improved adult 
psychosocial outcomes—an idea that is central to attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973).  
 This growing body of research has demonstrated that experimentally 
enhancing attachment security in adults by priming attachment security causes 
improvements in a wide-range of psychosocial outcomes including coping response 
to stressful situations (e.g., Cassidy, Shaver, Mikulincer, & Lavy, 2009; Pierce & 
Lydon, 1998), prosocial responses (e.g., Mikulincer, Gillath, Halevy, Avihou, 




Aloni, & Bor, 2003; Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, & Nitzberg, 2005), mood 
(Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, & Gillath, 2001), reactions toward outgroup 
members (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001), relationship expectations (Carnelley & Rowe, 
2007), and self-esteem (Gillath & Shaver, 2007; see Chapter 2 for a comprehensive 
review of the attachment security priming literature).  
Of particular importance to the present study is evidence that increased 
security serves as a buffer against increased negative affect in conditions of threat. 
Mikulincer et al. (2001) conducted a series of experiments to test whether activation 
of the secure base schema under stressful conditions acts as a buffer against distress 
and instill calmness and optimism in threatening situations. These studies looked at 
the effects of experimentally-induced activation of the secure base schema under 
stressful conditions by randomly assigning participants to either a threatening 
condition (i.e., subliminal exposure to the word failure or the word death [Study 5], 
failure feedback [Study 6], or asking participants to visualize being involuntarily 
separated from a loved one [Study 7]) or a non-threatening condition (subliminal 
exposure to the word hat [Study 5], no feedback [Study 6], or asking participants to 
visualize a TV talk show [Study 7]) before rating Chinese ideographs that were 
preceded by either a security-enhancing priming stimulus (e.g, a black and white 
Picasso sketch of a mother and her infant, an old couple sitting closely and 
comfortably) a positive affect prime (e.g., a picture of a treasure chest full of jewels), 
a neutral prime (a black polygon), or no prime.  
Results from these studies by Mikulincer and his colleagues (2001) indicated 




and positive affect enhancing picture primes were rated higher than those that were 
preceded with either a neutral prime or no prime. In the threatening conditions, 
however, ideographs that were preceded by an attachment security enhancing prime 
were liked more than ideographs that were preceded by a control prime stimulus (i.e., 
positive affect prime, neutral prime, no prime). In addition, ideographs that were 
preceded by control prime stimulus were no different from each other. Importantly, 
these studies indicate that in threatening situations when the need for felt security is 
thought to be more salient because the fear system is activated, security priming has a 
mood repair effect whereas positive affect priming does not.   
In general, adult attachment research that has used priming methods to 
experimentally enhance security is consistent with attachment theory’s predictions 
that secure mental representations lead to increased positive psychosocial outcomes, 
including fearful reactions (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; see also, Cassidy & Shaver, 
2008, and Grossmann, Grossmann, & Waters, 2005). These findings point to the 
possibility of extending our knowledge of the causal effects of attachment security on 
fear reactivity in childhood by randomly assigning children to receive attachment 
security enhancing primes prior to engaging in fear-inducing activities. The effects of 
attachment security priming on children have remained relatively unexplored despite 
clear evidence that priming is an effective method for tapping children’s existing 
mental representations, as I discuss in the next section. 
Priming as a Way of Examining How Children’s Mental Representations Drive 




There is a substantial amount of developmental research that has demonstrated 
the utility of priming as a method for investigating how children’s mental 
representations are causally related to neurological and cognitive responses to 
environmental events. Cognitive developmentalists have employed priming 
techniques to gain important insights into how children mentally represent numbers, 
language, and memories of specific events (see Chapter 2 for a discussion of 
cognitive developmental research that has used priming). A smaller yet still 
compelling body of developmental research has demonstrated the utility of priming 
for investigating how mental representations are causally related to responses in 
reaction to the social environment. Specifically, researchers have employed priming 
methods with children to gain a better understanding of how children’s mental 
representations drive their reactions toward out-group members, their eating behavior, 
their information processing of potentially-fear inducing stimuli, and their affiliative 
behavior.  
Two studies have used priming to examine how children’s mental 
representations influence their reactions toward outgroup members. One study found 
that priming competition with kindergarteners led to preferential allocation of play 
money to ingroup members (Spielman, 2000; Study 1). Another study found that 
priming first and fifth graders with positive stimuli or grandparent-related stimuli 
overrode children’s negative mental representations of the elderly by increasing 
positive evaluations of older individuals compared to negative, elderly, and neutral 




 Researchers have also extended priming methods to research with children to 
examine the effects of advertising as a “real world” prime on children’s eating 
behavior. By randomly assigning 7- to 11-year-olds to watch a cartoon that had either 
food advertisements or non-food advertisements while alone in a room with a bowl of 
goldfish crackers and a glass of water, researchers were able to establish a causal link 
between watching food advertisements and increased snack consumption (Harris, 
Bargh, & Brownell, 2009; Study 1). Specifically, children who watched commercials 
advertising food (i.e., waffle sticks and syrup, fruit roll-ups, potato chips, and a high 
sugar cereal) ate 45% more goldfish crackers than children who watched non-food 
product advertisements (e.g., toys). Moreover, the amount of goldfish crackers that 
children ate did not vary as a function of the child’s age, body mass index, sex, the 
length of time that had elapsed since having eaten, or the parent’s reports of the 
child’s appetite.  
 Researchers have also used priming to investigate the effects of mental 
representations of empowerment and helplessness on children’s memory for 
potentially fear-inducing stimuli. Specifically, children had better recall of a video of 
a child’s fearful visit to the doctor if they had earlier been primed with empowerment 
by watching a fairytale in which a child saved his or her parents from disaster 
compared to children who were earlier primed with helplessness by watching a video 
of a child’s mother rescuing the child from disaster (Cortez & Bugental, 1995).  
 Over and Carpenter’s (2009a, 2009b) recent studies provide particularly 
compelling evidence of the utility of priming as a way to examine children’s social 




2009a) tested the possibility that there is continuity in development between imitation 
in early childhood and infancy to mimicry in adulthood as a behavioral strategy to 
increase affiliation by examining how priming ostracism in 5- and 6-year olds 
influenced their subsequent imitation of an experimenter’s actions. Children primed 
with ostracism imitated more of the experimenter’s actions than children in the 
control condition. These findings indicate that children, like adults, modify their 
behavior in ways that increase affiliation after being exposed to social exclusion. Also 
impressive are Over and Carpenter’s (2009b) findings that priming 18 month olds 
with affiliation leads to increased helpfulness. Specifically, infants exposed to the 
affiliative prime (two dolls facing each other) were three times more likely to 
spontaneously help the experimenter during the first 10 seconds after the 
experimenter dropped a bundle of sticks compared to infants exposed to a neutral 
prime (two small stacks of blocks) and those exposed to the individuality primes (one 
doll alone, or two dolls back-to-back).  
In addition, one study has shown that repeated priming of children’s mental 
representations of a nurturing and accepting mother has the potential to improve 
children’s self-concept and boost academic performance (Bryant -Tuckett & 
Silverman, 1984). Specifically, a group of institutionalized, emotionally disturbed 
children and adolescents (mean age = 15.7, range = 10.8 to 19.3; enrolled in grades 5-
12) in a residential treatment school who were below age norms on measures of 
academic achievement and intellectual ability and had extensive histories of truancy 
were randomly assigned to receive four trials of either a prime that evokes images of 




or a neutral prime (subliminal exposure to “People are walking”) five times a week 
for six weeks. At the beginning of each of the 30 priming sessions, students were 
asked to imagine a tense situation related to school such as the anxiety before a test 
which served to pair the anxiety-provoking situation with the tension reduction that 
resulted from the security-enhancing prime. Post-treatment, students who were 
exposed to the security-enhancing prime had more positive self-concepts than 
students who were exposed to neutral primes. In addition, repeated subliminal 
exposure to “Mommy and I are one,” resulted in higher standardized reading and 
math scores, more frequent homework completion, more time spent working 
independently in the classroom, and less time spent watching television as recorded 
by their counselors.  
Research using Silverman’s “Mommy and I are one” (MIO) priming stimulus 
was designed to activate representations of a nurturing and accepting mother, which 
in turn, were thought to serve as a gratification for the need to merge with “the good 
mother of childhood” (Hardaway, 1990). Although the idea that a desire for oneness 
with mother is security-enhancing has fallen into disfavor, activating representations 
of a nurturing and accepting mother is consistent with the concept of priming 
representations of felt security. There is some evidence to support this idea. In 
particular, the more positive the emotional tone of memories of interaction with 
mother, the more positive is the response to exposure to MIO (see Sohlberg, 
Claesson, & Birgegard, 2003). Thus, to the extent that activating representations of 
maternal nurturance and acceptance activates representations of attachment security, 




subliminal security priming can be used to test causal links between attachment 
security and improved psychosocial outcomes.  
Given that the causal link thought to exist between increased attachment 
security and fearfulness has yet to be examined experimentally, security priming may 
prove to be a useful tool for conducting initial tests of this causal link in children 
based on the findings on priming with children. In addition, using attachment security 
priming methods in an experimental design (i.e., random assignment of children to be 
exposed to either security-enhancing stimuli or control stimuli) will also broaden our 
understanding of the social factors that influence children’s fear reactions more 
generally. In what follows, I discuss how mothers’ emotion socialization may also 
influence children’s fear reactions.   
Mothers’ Emotion Socialization and Child Emotional Development 
Mothers’ emotion socialization is guided, at least in part, by her beliefs about 
emotions (Eisenberg et al., 1998). In general, research indicates that mothers’ 
negative and unsupportive responses to children’s negative emotions are associated 
with poor socio-emotional outcomes for children (Eisenberg et al., 1998). For 
instance, researchers have found that mothers’ emotion socialization responses 
predicted young children’s emotion understanding and awareness of their own 
emotions. Specifically, mothers’ emotion socialization, comprised of mothers’ 
emotional expressivity, responses to her child’s emotions, and emotion talk with her 
child, assessed at child age 4.5 years predicted their children’s awareness of their own 
happiness and sadness a year later (Warren & Stifter, 2008). Analyses revealed that 




have children who had high awareness of their own happiness, whereas mothers who 
had non-supportive emotion socialization responses were more likely to have children 
who had low awareness of their own sadness. Similarly, Dunsmore and Karn (2004) 
found that children whose mothers believed in teaching emotion language had greater 
increases in emotion knowledge during the first semester of kindergarten. 
Research has also revealed that mothers’ emotion socialization is associated 
with emotion regulation and depression later in childhood. In particular, in a sample 
of 11- to 13-year old adolescents whose mothers responded in an invalidating or 
"dampening" manner toward their positive affect reported using maladaptive emotion 
regulation strategies more frequently and were rated by observers as displaying more 
emotionally dysregulated behaviors. In addition, girls whose mothers reported 
invalidating their positive affect reported more depressive symptoms (Yap, Nicholas, 
& Ladouceur, 2008).  
Of particular importance to the present study is research that has examined 
mothers’ emotion socialization and children’s anxiety disorders. Given that fear is the 
prevalent emotion in anxiety disorders, evidence that mothers of children with an 
anxiety disorder compared to mothers of non-clinical children differ on measures of 
mothers’ emotion socialization supports the idea that mothers’ emotion socialization 
influences children’s fearfulness. For example, in a sample of 8- to 12-year old 
children with and without an anxiety disorder, researchers found that mothers of 
children with anxiety disorders, compared to mothers of non-clinical children, spoke 
less frequently than their child, used fewer positive emotion words, and discouraged 




dyads talked about times that the child felt sad, worried, and angry (Suveg, Zeman, 
Flannery-Schroeder, & Cassano, 2005).  
Taken together, these findings, though suggestive of a link between mothers’ 
emotion socialization and children’s fearfulness, cannot speak directly to whether 
mothers’ reactions to their children’s emotions influence children’s fearfulness 
specifically. Given that fear seems to underlie not only anxiety disorders, but other 
mental disorders (e.g. avoidant personality disorder, dependent personality disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive personality disorder, and eating disorders), and other socio-
emotional risk-factors, such as behavioral inhibition, it is important for future 
research to examine how maternal emotion socialization and children’s fearfulness is 
associated with children’s fear reactions. In addition, given the growing body of 
research which suggests that the effects of the caregiving environment on children’s 
developmental outcomes may vary as a function of their temperament, with some 
children being more or less susceptible to caregiving influences, it is important to 
extend this body of research to include examinations of children’s temperament as a 
moderator of the link between maternal emotion socialization and children’s 
emotional outcomes. No study yet has examined how children’s temperament and 
maternal emotion socialization interact to predict children’s emotion development 
outcomes. 
 
The Present Study   
The present study is designed to add to the understanding of the role that 




childhood.  Specifically, I seek to extend attachment security priming methods to 
research with children between 6- and 7-years-of-age by employing a multi-method 
experimental approach to examine (a) whether experimentally induced attachment 
security causes less fearful reactions to fear-inducing tasks in children, and (b) 
whether maternal emotion socialization is associated with the fear reactivity of 
children randomly assigned to the neutral control group. Additionally, the present 
study also seeks to examine (a) whether the effects of experimentally-induced 
attachment security on children’s fear reactions vary as a function of children’s 
temperamental fearfulness, and (b) whether the link between maternal emotion 
socialization and children’s fear reactivity is moderated by children’s temperament 
fearfulness.   
I have chosen to address these questions using 6- and 7-year-old-children 
because if attachment security priming works in children as young as six, there are 
many interesting extensions and practical implications for future work that center 
around developmental outcomes that are of relevance for young children in particular. 
For example, 6- and 7-year-olds are in a transitional point where they are attending 
school all day and their social worlds change dramatically as a result (e.g., increased 
peer interactions, longer separation for family). Increasing attachment security in 
children of this age may not only reduce fear, but may also increase exploration and 
improve interactions with teachers and peers, thus supporting academic success. In 
addition, other outcomes that are of relevance for young children include sociability, 
internalizing and externalizing problems, social information processing. Each of these 




security priming may be able to move these links to the level of causality by 
examining these links for the first time using an experimental design.     
I examine children’s fear reactions by collecting their EDA and by asking 
children to rate their emotions on a visual analog scale. These two assessments will 
allow me to examine the effects of experimentally enhanced attachment security on 
both biological and psychological emotional reactions.   EDA is an indicator of 
sympathetic nervous system activity and stress. Increases in EDA is a result of 
sympathetic nervous system activity which increases sweat in the eccrine sweat 
glands (located in the palms of the hands and soles of the feet; Dawson, Schell, & 
Filion., 2003). Eccrine sweat glands respond to psychological stimulation rather than 
simply to temperature changes in the body (Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2003). Increases 
in EDA are the result of increased eccrine sweat gland activity which is the result of 
increased sympathetic nervous system activity. Thus, increases in EDA are indicators 
of increased arousal. 
Children’s fear-reactions were be elicited by presenting pictures taken from 
the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) 
using pictures that were rated by children as fear-inducing in studies conducted by the 
developers of the IAPS (Lang et al., 2008). To differentiate the effects of attachment 
security priming on children’s fear reactions specifically from those of sympathetic 
nervous system arousal in general, children will also be presented with pictures that 
are happy excitement inducing using IAPS pictures that were rated as excitement and 
happiness inducing. By comparing the effects of priming during the arousing and 




pictures, I can examine the effects of attachment security priming on fear specifically 
rather than on arousal in general. In addition, immediately following the fear- and 
happy excitement-inducing pictures, children will rate their fearfulness using a visual 
analog scale.  
I will examine the effects of attachment security on children’s fear reactions 
by comparing EDA and self-reported fear in each of three randomly assigned 
conditions: Security-enhancing condition, happiness enhancing control condition, 
neutral control condition. I have chosen to include a happy control condition to rule 
out the alternative explanation that attachment security priming is simply increasing 
happiness.  If the happiness-enhancing control condition does not decrease fear 
reactions, then I can conclude that the attachment-security enhancing condition was 
not simply the effects of increased feelings of happiness. In addition, by using 
pictures of adults with “true” Duchenne smiles, which indicate affiliation and 
cooperation (see Brown & Moore, 2002; Izard, 1971), as my happy control priming 
condition I can also distinguish the effects of attachment security priming from those 
that may have been due to priming affiliation. The experimental manipulation will 
take place during a game in which children are subliminally exposed to pictures 
according to the condition they were assigned. Picture primes for children randomly 
assigned to the attachment-security priming condition will be pictures that evoke 
mental representations of security (e.g., sketches of a mother having a caring 
interaction with her infant). Priming pictures for children randomly assigned to the 
happy control condition were pictures of adult humans smiling from the University of 




Charlton, May 2011). Priming pictures for children randomly assigned to the neutral 
control condition were pictures of a neutral valence (e.g., multi-colored polygons). 
 Hypotheses and Research Questions. I hypothesize that EDA and self-
reports of fear will be lower during the fear-inducing pictures than during the 
excitement-inducing pictures for children in the security-enhancing prime condition 
compared to children in the happy and neutral control conditions (Hypothesis 1). See 
Figure 1 for a depiction of my hypothesized results. With respect to the link between 
maternal emotion socialization and fear reactivity for children randomly assigned to 
the control group, I hypothesize that children’s EDA and reports of feeling scared 
during the fear-inducing pictures will decrease as their mothers’ endorsement of 
supportive responses to their negative affect increases, whereas children’s EDA and 
reports of feeling scared during the fear-inducing pictures will increase as their 
mothers’ endorsement of unsupportive responses to their negative affect increases 
(Hypothesis 2). See Figure 2 for a depiction of my hypothesized results.  
In addition, the effect of attachment security priming and maternal emotion 
socialization may not be uniform across children. These effects may be different for 
different children. As discussed earlier, theory and research suggest that 
environmental influences on children’s outcomes may vary for biological reasons (see 
Belsky et al., 2007; Belsky & Pluess, 2009). Of particular relevance to the present 
investigation is research that has found that the influence of attachment security on 
children’s EDA during fear-inducing video clips varied as a function of child 
temperamental fearfulness (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn , & van 




influence of attachment security priming and maternal emotion socialization on 
children’s fear reactivity varies as a function of child temperamental fearfulness.  
There are several ways that an interaction between attachment security 
priming and child temperament and an interaction between maternal emotion 
socialization and child temperament could manifest. For example, highly fearful 
children, compared to less fearful children, could have (a) the best outcomes under 
supportive conditions, (b) the worst outcomes under unsupportive conditions, or (c) 
both the best outcomes under supportive conditions and the worse outcomes under 
unsupportive conditions. Given the various ways that these interactions could present, 
I pose two research questions aimed at examining whether child temperamental 
fearfulness moderates the link between environmental influences (i.e., attachment 
security priming and maternal emotion socialization) in the present study, rather than 
two hypotheses.  
First, I will examine the interaction between temperamental fearfulness and 
experimental group on children’s EDA and reports of feeling scared to determine 
whether the effects of experimentally enhanced attachment security on children’s fear 
reactivity vary as a function of children’s temperamental fearfulness (Research 
Question 1). Second, using the control group only, I will examine the interaction 
between temperamental fearfulness and mothers’ responses to their children’s 
negative affect to determine whether the link between mothers’ responses to their 
children’s negative affect and their children’s EDA and reports of feeling scared in 




(Research Question 2).  See Table 1 for a list of study hypotheses and research 
questions. 
In testing these hypotheses and addressing these research questions, the 
present study contributes to the literature in several important ways. First, this study 
is the first to test whether experimentally induced attachment security reduces fear 
reactivity. Second, the present study adds to the relatively sparse body of research 
examining attachment and fear in early childhood. Third, the present study is the first 
to examine mothers’ emotion socialization as a predictor of children’s fear reactions. 
Fourth, this study adds to the small body of research that has examined whether the 
effects of experimentally-induced security on child outcomes vary as a function of 
child temperament. Fifth, this study adds to the small body of research that has 
examined whether the link between maternal emotion socialization and children’s 
emotional development varies as a function of child temperament. Sixth, this study 
will be the first to examine whether maternal emotion socialization and child 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
A core concept in social development is the idea that children’s experiences 
with their environment are organized into mental representations or schemas and that 
these mental representations guide children’s responses to social stimuli (Dweck & 
London, 2004). Social development research that explores how children process 
social information has largely relied on non-experimental designs as the field 
progresses from describing the associations among children’s experiences with the 
social environment, their social behavior, and their mental representations to 
explaining the cognitive mechanisms that mediate the link between exposure to social 
stimuli and children’s responses to this social information. The extensive body of 
observational and correlational research that has accumulated in this progression from 
description to explanation provides a wealth of descriptive information about the 
various factors associated with children’s processing of social information. What has 
remained relatively unexplored are the causal links between children’s mental 
representations and their processing and responses to social stimuli. In moving social 
development research forward, it is critical to build upon the solid empirical base of 
knowledge provided by this body of descriptive research and begin to address the 
cognitive causal mechanisms thought to underlie children’s processing and responses 
to social information.  
 Addressing this gap in our knowledge about how children’s cognitive 
representations influence how they process and respond to social stimuli requires 




addressing this gap is using priming methods to activate a particular mental 
representation of interest in an experimental design (i.e., randomly assign children to 
be exposed to schema-relevant stimuli or to a control group that is either not primed 
or exposed to neutral or unrelated stimuli).  Experimentally activating a mental 
representation of interest using priming techniques has the potential to expand our 
understanding of children’s social development to include explanations of the causal 
role that children’s cognitive representations play in their responses to social stimuli.   
 The goal of this paper is to demonstrate how priming offers the possibility for 
future research in social development to gain important insights into explaining the 
role of children’s mental representations of the social world in their responses to 
social cues. I begin by providing the theoretical conceptualization underlying 
priming. In this first section I also describe methods of priming. Second, I use 
attachment theory as a basis for demonstrating how the extension of priming 
techniques has allowed attachment researchers to draw initial causal links between 
representations of attachment security and improved psychosocial functioning. To 
this end, I present the theoretical underpinnings of attachment security priming 
followed by a comprehensive review of the research that has used the priming of 
mental representations of attachment security to disentangle the causal links between 
attachment security with improved psychosocial functioning. In my review of the 
attachment security priming literature, I discuss the importance of extending this 
research to assessments of observed behavioral outcomes and to research with 
children. Third, I review evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of priming 




describe how developmentalists who have used priming methods have uncovered 
important insights into how children mentally represent their world and use these 
representations to process and respond to environmental cues. Fourth, I discuss how 
priming can inform future research in social development using research examining 
attachment, social-information-processing, gender development, and mood and 
mental health as examples.  
Underlying Conceptualization of Priming  
 According to schema theory, psychological reactions to environmental events 
are driven by mental representations, or schemas, which are organized knowledge 
structures of past experiences (Bartlett, 1932; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rumelhart, 
1980). Thus, environmental events are filtered through mental representations, which, 
in turn, guide thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Taylor & Crocker, 1981). 
Environmental cues can activate relevant mental representations which then serve to 
guide attention, interpretation, encoding, storage, retrieval, and behavior. Priming is a 
method for tapping these mental representations that serve as the driving force behind 
how people respond to environmental cues. Specifically, priming activates a 
particular mental representation of interest by exposing participants to schema-
relevant cues (Bargh, 2003, 2006; Bargh & Chartrand, 2000; Hamilton, 2005). In 
what follows I describe techniques researchers have developed for exposing 
participants to priming stimuli. 
 Methods of Priming  
 Priming methods can be divided into two categories based on the level at 




present priming stimuli at or above the threshold of conscious awareness, whereas 
subliminal priming techniques present priming stimuli below the threshold of 
conscious awareness. I discuss each of these in turn. 
 Supraliminal priming. In methods that employ supraliminal priming, 
participants are consciously aware of the priming stimuli. Supraliminal priming can 
be accomplished by asking participants to focus on schema-relevant information by 
recollecting, imagining, reading, viewing, or writing about an event. For example, 
attachment researchers have primed attachment security by asking participants to 
write about a close relationship in which they felt secure to examine the effects of 
increased feelings of attachment security on lying (Gillath, Sesko, Shaver, & Chun, 
2010). 
Supraliminal priming can also be accomplished more inconspicuously by 
discreetly priming participants via subtle exposure to the priming stimuli (e.g., by 
placing schema relevant stimuli in the environment rather than asking participants to 
focus on the stimuli). One recent example of this method of surreptitious priming 
exposed participants to the priming stimuli by having the experimenter ask the 
participants to briefly hold her cup of hot or iced coffee while she recorded their 
name and the time of their participation during the elevator ride to the fourth floor 
(Williams & Bargh, 2008; Study 1). This subtle exposure to a hot or cold beverage 
was designed to prime mental representations of interpersonal warmth and coldness. 
Participants whose feelings of interpersonal warmth were primed by holding a cup of
 




primed by holding a cup of iced coffee, later judged a target person’s personality as 
warmer (e.g., generous, caring).  
 It is also common to consciously but surreptitiously prime participants by 
incorporating the priming stimuli into the experimental protocol as part of an 
ostensibly unrelated task. For example, in Williams and Bargh’s (2008) second 
experiment, feelings of interpersonal warmth and coldness were primed by asking 
participants to hold either a hot or cold therapeutic pad in order to evaluate its 
effectiveness. The true purpose of the experiment was to determine whether priming 
interpersonal warmth or coldness influenced participants’ generous or self-serving 
behavior. Participants whose feelings of interpersonal warmth were primed by 
evaluating a hot therapeutic pad behaved more generously (i.e., they were more likely
 
to choose as their reward for participating in the study a gift for friend rather than a 
gift for themselves). In comparison, those whose feelings of interpersonal coldness 
were primed by evaluating a cold therapeutic pad behaved in a more self-serving way 
(i.e., they were more likely to choose a gift for themselves as opposed to one for a 
friend).  
 Another commonly used technique for inconspicuously priming participants is 
the “scrambled sentence test” (Costin, 1969) in which participants are asked to 
construct a grammatically correct sentence from each word set they are given. During 
the sentence construction process, participants are exposed to words that are related to 
the concept that the experimenter intends to activate. One study that used this priming 
technique activated mental representations of the elderly by including words such as 




Study 2). By temporarily activating the availability of participants’ mental 
representations of the elderly, researchers were able to observe changes in behavior 
that were consistent with stereotypes of the elderly. Specifically, participants who 
were exposed to elderly stereotype-related primes walked down the hallway more 
slowly after leaving the experiment than those in the control condition.  
 Subliminal priming. Subliminal priming is typically done using the masked 
priming technique whereby the priming stimuli are presented very briefly (usually 
less than a tenth of a second) followed by the immediate presentation of a visual mask 
that is displayed for at least as long as, but preferably longer than, the preceding 
prime (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Despite the priming stimuli being presented too 
quickly for participants to be able to perceive them consciously, the masked priming 
paradigm has been found to influence a wide range of psychological outcomes. For 
example, repeated subliminal exposure to positively valenced words has been found 
to lead to increased positive mood, which, in turn, resulted in a more heuristic and 
less effortful information processing style, presumably because the positively 
valenced stimuli and corresponding positive mood signal that the environment is safe 
and friendly (Chartrand, van Baaren, & Bargh, 2006). On the other hand, in the same 
study, repeated subliminal exposure to negatively valenced words was found to result 
in an increased negative mood, which, in turn, led to a more analytic, cautious, and 
effortful information processing style, presumably because the negatively valenced 
stimuli and corresponding negative mood signal that the environment is problematic 




 Long-terms effects of subliminal priming have also been reported. For 
instance, long-term effects for exposure to subliminally presented words related to the 
concept of intelligence on academic performance have also been reported (Lowery, 
Eisenberger, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2007; Study 2). Students enrolled in an 
undergraduate level social psychology class participated in the study as part of a 
voluntary study session for an upcoming midterm exam for the course.  Students were 
subliminally exposed to words that were either related to intelligence (e.g., smart, 
brilliant, brainy, genius) or neutral words unrelated to intelligence (e.g., intact, smock, 
birch, garden). Students who were subliminally primed with intelligence-related 
words scored higher on both a practice exam taken immediately after the priming 
session and higher on the actual course exam taken up to four days later.   
 In addition, brain-imaging research has shown that subliminal priming 
influences both electrical brain activity and cerebral blood flow in predictable ways. 
Dehaene et al. (1998) were the first to provide evidence that subliminally presented 
stimuli can be semantically processed in the cerebral cortex using a combination of 
behavioral and brain-imaging techniques. Subjects were presented numbers between 
1 and 9 and asked to categorize the target numbers as being either greater than 5 or 
less than 5 by using one hand for greater than 5 and the other for less than 5. Before 
categorizing each number, subjects were subliminally exposed to a numerical prime 
between 1 and 9. Dehaene et al. found that primes that were congruent with the target 
number (i.e., both the prime and the target were greater than 5 or both the prime and 
the target were less than 5) increased the speed with which subjects were able to 




task also revealed a priming effect such that the peak amplitude of electrical brain 
activity from the onset of the priming mask occurred 24 milliseconds later for 
incongruent trials (i.e., the prime was greater than 5 and the target was less than 5 or 
vice versa) compared to congruent trials.  
 In addition, further analyses from this study revealed that the faster response 
time observed for congruent trials was due to the prime engaging a response in motor 
cortex in the same hemisphere that would respond to the target number, whereas for 
incongruent trials the prime activated a motor response in the hemisphere that was 
contralateral to the target. Both ERPs and functional magnetic resonance imaging 
(fMRI) demonstrated that subjects subconsciously applied the task instructions to the 
subliminally presented primes as indicated by activation of appropriate motor cortex 
areas. For primes that were greater than 5, the left motor cortex was activated 
indicating that the subject subconsciously applied the task instructions to the primes 
and prepared an appropriate right-handed motor response. Similarly, when primes 
were less than 5, the right motor cortex was activated indicating that subjects 
prepared a left-handed motor response. 
Attachment Security Priming  
 Recently, the effects of priming have been extended to adult attachment 
research, with the majority of this research investigating the effects of attachment 
security priming on outcomes such as response to stress-inducing situations, empathy, 
altruism, views of the self and others, exploration, concern for self and others, and 




underpinning of attachment security priming and then provide a comprehensive 
review of security priming research. 
 Theoretical Underpinnings of Attachment Security Priming  
In the same way that psychological reactions to environmental events are 
thought to be driven by mental representations, reactions to attachment-relevant 
events in particular and social events more broadly are thought to be driven by mental 
representations of attachment. Thus, according to attachment theory, and consistent 
with social-cognitive theory (Hamilton, 2005; Schneider, 1991), attachment-related 
cues and information are filtered through mental representations of attachment, 
which, in turn, guide thoughts, feelings, and behavior (Bowlby, 1969/1982, p. 81; see 
also Bretherton & Munholland, 2008). Just as schemas are thought to develop based 
on past experiences with the world, mental representations of attachment develop 
based on past experiences in attachment-relevant situations. Experiences with the 
availability and responsiveness of attachment figures are at the core of the mental 
representations of attachment that are subsequently brought to bear in novel 
attachment-relevant situations (Bowlby, 1973). Mental representations of attachment 
security develop from experiences of one’s attachment figures as sensitive and 
appropriately responsive to one’s bids for attention. Mental representations of 
attachment insecurity develop from experiences of attachment figures as rejecting, 
unavailable, ineffective, or frightening or frightened behaviors in response to bids for 
attention (Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; Main, Kaplan, 




 Just as it is possible to activate a mental representation of interest by exposing 
people to schema-relevant stimuli, it is also possible to activate mental 
representations of attachment security using stimuli that are related to attachment 
security. Activating mental representations of attachment security using priming 
methods offers the possibility of exploring how mental representations of attachment 
drive affect, cognitions, and behavior in social and attachment-relevant situations 
using experimental methods (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2007b). Adult attachment 
researchers have recently extended the use of priming techniques to investigate 
whether increased security leads to improved adult psychosocial outcomes— an idea 
that is central to attachment theory (Bowlby, 1973). 
 Review of Attachment Security Priming Research 
 With few exceptions, research has supported the idea that attachment security 
priming leads to more positive psychosocial outcomes. In this section, I provide a 
comprehensive review of research in which mental representations of attachment 
security were primed to disentangle whether attachment security is causally related to 
improved psychological, social, and emotional outcomes. For the most part, this 
literature has examined the effects of security priming using adults. Only one study 
has examined these effects in late adolescence.  
Response to Stress-Inducing Information. Pierce and Lydon (1998) 
examined the effects of secure and insecure mental representations on affect, support 
seeking, and coping responses to a hypothetical unplanned pregnancy. University 
women were subliminally exposed to sets of either security-enhancing words (i.e., 




related words (i.e., critical, rejecting, nagging, hurtful, and distant), or sets of random 
consonants (control group) before listening to a scenario in which they were asked to 
imagine that they had experienced an unplanned pregnancy. Compared to the control 
condition, those who received insecurity-related primes reported less positive affect, 
and those who received security-related primes reported that they would be more 
likely to seek emotional support and less likely to adopt self-denigration as a coping 
response. This study provides support for the idea that security increases willingness 
to seek emotional support and reduces the likelihood of adopting maladaptive coping 
responses in dealing with a difficult situation.  
More recently, Cassidy, Shaver, Mikulincer, and Lavy (2009) tested whether 
experimentally-enhancing one’s sense of security reduces insecure individuals’ 
reliance on defensive strategies to cope with painful emotions.  Specifically, Cassidy 
et al. examined whether subliminal attachment security priming reduced (a) anxious 
individuals’ tendency to heighten their feelings of distress in reaction to painful 
events and (b) avoidant individuals’ tendency to suppress and deny feelings of 
distress in reaction to painful events. Following an assessment of their dispositional 
attachment anxiety and avoidance using the Experiences in Close Relationships Scale 
(ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998), participants were asked to write about a time 
that a close relationship partner had hurt their feelings. Afterwards, participants were 
randomly assigned to receive either security-enhancing subliminal primes (the words 
love, secure, and affection) or neutral subliminal primes (the words lamp, staple, and 
building) before rating 20 pairs of furniture on their similarity. Immediately after the 




about the hurtful event that they had described earlier. As expected, security priming 
reduced anxious individuals’ tendency to report less constructive reactions, more 
intense feelings of rejection, more crying, and more negative emotions in response to 
the hurtful event. In addition, security priming also reduced avoidant individuals’ 
tendency to report less severe appraisals of the hurtful event, less intense feelings of 
rejection, less crying, and more defensive and hostile reactions. Thus, this study 
demonstrates that a greater sense of security reduces insecure individuals’ reliance on 
defensive strategies in response to painful experiences.  
 Exploration. Green and Campbell (2000) examined whether an increased 
sense of security causes increased interest in exploring the physical and social 
environment. Participants were told to become as familiar as possible with a set of 10 
sentences, three of which were filler items that were identical in each condition. 
Those in the security priming condition read sentences such as Jean comforted her 
child; those in the attachment anxiety priming condition read sentences such as Ellen 
is constantly worried that her boyfriend will leave her; and, those in the avoidance 
priming condition read sentences like John’s mom is cold and distant when he tries to 
hug her. After reading the priming sentences for 3 minutes, participants responded to 
a series of questions designed to assess their immediate reactions to unfamiliar stimuli 
and interest in participating in novel activities. Participants primed with attachment 
security expressed greater interest in intellectual exploration compared to those 
primed with attachment anxiety and those primed with avoidance. Those primed with 
security also expressed more interest in exploring their physical environment than 




avoidance. There were no priming effects for interest in exploring the social 
environment. These findings are problematic, however, due to the lack of a neutral 
prime or no prime control group. This lack of a control group precludes being able to 
determine whether security enhances interest in exploration or insecurity decreases 
interest in exploration.  
Risk-Taking. Taubman – Ben-Ari and Mikulincer (2007) examined the 
effects of security priming compared to positive affect priming, self-enhancement 
priming, and neutral priming on Israeli high school students’(aged 17-19 years; 
Median = 18) probability of engaging in reckless driving. Security was primed in one 
of three ways: asking students to write about either a poster depicting a young boy 
saying to his father, “Even if there is an ocean between us, I know you will be there 
for me,” (Study 1); watching a short video in which a young boy and his father 
recalled times that the father was available and sensitively responsive to his son’s 
needs (Study 2); or reading a story about a person who received sensitive and 
responsive help from his or her father and sister (Study 3). Following the priming 
procedure, students first reported the probability that they would drive recklessly in 
response to 10 hypothetical driving scenarios, then students completed the 
Experiences in Close Relationships scale (ECR; Brennan et al., 1998). Results 
indicated that security priming led to a lower probability of reckless driving compared 
to all other conditions when students reported low levels of attachment anxiety; 
however, security priming led to a greater probability of reckless driving compared to 




theoretical implications of these findings, however, are difficult to ascertain due to the 
design of this study.  
 First, given that attachment anxiety and avoidance were assessed after the 
experimental manipulation of security, it is possible that security priming decreased 
students’ reports of their attachment-related anxiety. Given Carnelley and Rowe 
(2007) and Gillath and Shaver’s (2007) findings (reviewed below) that repeated 
security priming reduces attachment anxiety, it is possible that, for some students, 
security priming led to decreased attachment anxiety, which, in turn, led to decreased 
endorsement of reckless driving. In addition, these findings are muddied by this 
study’s use of the father-child relationship to prime attachment security, which differs 
from most other attachment security priming research. Specifically, priming is 
typically done by asking participants to visualize a time that someone responded to 
sensitively their distress, to visualize a person who serves as a secure base, or by 
subliminally exposing subjects to security-related stimuli (e.g., the name of a person 
identified by the participant as making them feel secure, security-related words). By 
using the father-child relationship to prime security, researchers may not have tapped 
into participants’ secure-base schema. Rather, it is possible that the father-child 
relationship used to prime attachment security merely increased students’ 
accessibility to representations of their relationship with their father. This is 
problematic because this priming technique may have increased participants’ feelings 
of security depending on the quality of the relationship they had with their father.  
Concern for Self and Others. Mikulincer, Gillath, Sapir-Lavid, Yaakobi, 




security compared to positive affect and neutral priming conditions on concern for the 
welfare of close others and concern for the welfare of all humanity and nature. 
Security was primed by asking participants to recall and describe a situation in which 
close others assisted them with solving a problem they could not solve on their own 
(Studies 1 and 3) or by asking participants to rate a picture depicting a person in 
distress being comforted by an opposite-sex partner on the extent to which it aroused 
positive affect and feelings of security (Study 2). Following the priming procedure, 
participants rated the importance of benevolence (concern for the welfare of close 
others) and universalism (concern for the welfare of all humanity and nature) in 
guiding their lives (Studies 1 and 2), or they were asked to generate the 10 most 
important values that guided their lives (Study 3). Analyses indicated that security 
priming strengthened participants’ endorsement of both concern for close others and 
concern for all humanity and nature as important values that guided their lives. These 
findings suggest that increased security led to increased self-reported concern for 
others.  
 Similarly, Bartz and Lydon (2004) examined how attachment style affects 
concern for others and concern for self. Participants were primed by asking them to 
visualize a person with whom they have an important and meaningful relationship 
that fit the description they were given. In Study 1, participants were primed with a 
description of either a secure, avoidant, or ambivalent relationship (based on Hazan & 
Shaver’s [1987] secure, avoidant, and ambivalent attachment types). Results indicated 
that words related to concern for self were more easily accessible to those primed 




secure or avoidant attachment orientation, whereas words related to concern for 
others were more easily accessible to those primed with a secure attachment 
orientation compared to those primed with either an ambivalent or avoidant 
attachment orientation. In Study 2, participants were primed with a description of 
either a secure, fearful, dismissing, or preoccupied relationship (based on 
Bartholomew & Horowitz’s [1991] secure, fearful, dismissing, and preoccupied 
attachment types). Results indicated that participant reports of concern for self were 
higher for those primed with an insecure attachment orientation (i.e., preoccupied, 
dismissive, fearful) than those primed with a secure attachment orientation. The lack 
of a control group in both studies, however, clouds interpretations of these findings. 
For instance, without a control group to establish a baseline for concern for others and 
concern for self, it is unclear whether security decreases concern for self or whether 
insecurity increases concern for self. Likewise it is also impossible to determine 
whether security increases concern for others or whether insecurity decreases concern 
for others.   
Mikulincer, Gillath, Halevy, Avihou, Avidan, and Eshkoli (2001; Studies 1-4) 
examined whether experimentally-induced security reduces personal distress and 
enhances empathy in reaction to others’ needs. Attachment security was induced in 
one of three ways: asking participants to read a story in which a person in distress 
received sensitive and responsive help from family members (Study 1); inadvertently 
exposing participants to a picture of a person being comforted by someone of the 
opposite sex by attaching the picture to the inside cover of a folder that contained a 




4); or subliminally exposing participants to 60 trials of security-related words (e.g., 
love, support, hug, closeness; Study 3). Results indicated that attachment security 
priming decreased personal distress and increased empathy in reaction to reading a 
story about another person in need (Studies 1 -3) and decreased the amount of time 
required to recall an experience in which they witnessed another person’s plight and 
reacted with empathy (Study 4). These findings not only indicate that increased 
attachment security leads to increased empathy and decreased personal distress in 
reaction to someone in need of help, but Study 4 extends our knowledge of the effects 
of attachment security priming beyond participant self-reports to information 
processing speed.  
Relatedly, Mikulincer, Shaver, Gillath, and Nitzberg (2005) examined the 
effects of subliminal attachment security priming on willingness to help another in 
need. Participants were randomly assigned to receive subliminal exposure to the name 
of their security-providing primary attachment figure (security-priming condition), 
the name of someone close to them who was not an attachment figure (close-person-
priming condition) or an acquaintance (acquaintance-priming condition). Following 
the priming task, participants watched what they believed was the live performance of 
another participant. The participants saw an experimenter explain to the woman that 
she would perform a series of aversive tasks (look at three gory photographs, hold a 
large lab rat, hold her forearm in ice water for 30 seconds, pet a live tarantula, touch a 
preserved sheep’s eye, pet a snake, and insert her hand into a bag and allow 
cockroaches to crawl on her hand and arm) and that she was free to stop whenever 




became increasingly distressed as she proceeded through the tasks until she was told 
to pet a live tarantula. The woman was unable to continue and suggested to the 
experimenter that maybe the other participant could take her place.  Then, the 
television monitor went blank and the experimenter asked the participant to complete 
a questionnaire including items tapping his or her emotional reactions to the 
distressed woman and his or her willingness to help her by performing the remaining 
tasks. Participants who were in the security-priming condition reported more 
compassion, more willingness to help, and were more likely to agree to replace the 
distressed woman. These results suggest that increasing accessibility to attachment 
security-related representations increases compassion and willingness to help another 
in distress.  
 Reactions toward Outgroup Members. Mikulincer and Shaver (2001) 
conducted a series of studies aimed at testing the idea that attachment security 
decreases fearful reactions to the unfamiliar by examining the effects of attachment 
security priming on reactions towards outgroup members. Attachment security was 
induced one of three ways: subliminally presenting security-related words (e.g., love, 
support; Studies 1 and 4), asking participants to visualize a situation in which others 
are sensitive and responsive to their distress (Studies 2 and 5); or asking participants 
to visualize a person who serves as a secure base (Study 3). Findings indicated that 
attachment security priming, compared to positive affect and neutral priming, led to 
more positive evaluations of outgroup members (Studies 1-5), greater willingness to 
interact with outgroup members (Study 4), and attenuated appraisals of threats posed 




priming on evaluations of and willingness to interact with outgroup members 
persisted even when participants’ self-esteem (Study 4) or national identity (Study 5) 
were attacked.  
 Extending these findings, Mikulincer and Shaver (2007b) examined whether 
security priming reduced aggressive behavior toward out-group members. 
Undergraduates were recruited to participate in a study purported to be on taste 
preference. Aggressive behavior was assessed as the amount of hot sauce participants 
gave to a confederate who had indicated a clear dislike for spicy foods. Participants, 
who were Israeli Jewish undergraduates, met a same-sex student (a confederate of the 
experimenter) who indicated that he or she was either Jewish or Arab. Then, 
participants performed a 30-trial computerized word relation task. During each of the 
30 trials, participants were subliminally exposed to the name of either their own 
security-providing attachment figure, the name of a familiar person who did not serve 
as an attachment figure, or the name of a mere acquaintance. Following the priming 
procedure, participants were told that they would evaluate either a spicy or non-spicy 
food after which they completed a taste-preference inventory. Participants were then 
given the taste preference inventory of the other participant (the confederate) which 
indicated a clear dislike for spicy foods. Participants were asked to prepare a sample 
of hot sauce that the other participant would be asked to consume completely. To 
ensure that participants were aware of how painfully spicy the hot sauce was, they 
were asked to taste it. Results revealed that a larger amount of hot sauce was sent 
over to confederates who indicated that they were Arab students compared to those 




an out-group member was eliminated by security priming; that is, when participants’ 
sense of security was enhanced, they delivered equally low amounts of hot sauce to 
the Arab and Jewish confederates. These findings indicate that increased security may 
decrease aggressive behavior toward out-group members. 
Mood and Mental Health. Mikulincer, Hirschberger, Nachmias, and Gillath 
(2001) conducted a series of experiments to determine whether attachment security 
increases positive affect. It is important to note that this set of experiments, rather 
than relying on participant reports, assessed positive affect by examining whether the 
heightened positive affect that results from priming attachment security increases 
participants’ positive evaluations of neutral stimuli. Participants were presented with 
a series of neutrally valued Chinese ideographs and rated the extent to which they 
liked each one. In each trial, immediately before each ideograph was presented, 
participants were exposed to either a security-enhancing prime (e.g, a black and white 
Picasso sketch of a mother and her infant, an old couple sitting closely and 
comfortably) or one of several control primes (e.g., a picture of a treasure chest full of 
jewels, a black polygon). Studies 1 – 4 revealed that secure priming and positive 
affect priming increased positive affect which increased participants’ preferences for 
subsequently presented Chinese ideographs.  
  Studies 5-7 examined another core component of attachment theory: that 
activation of the secure base schema is particularly relevant under stressful conditions 
serving to protect against distress and instill calmness and optimism. These studies 
looked at the effects of experimentally-induced activation of the secure base schema 




condition (i.e., subliminal exposure to the word failure or the word death [Study 5], 
failure feedback [Study 6], or asking participants to visualize being involuntarily 
separated from a loved one [Study 7]) or a non-threatening control condition 
(subliminal exposure to the word hat [Study 5], no feedback [Study 6], or asking 
participants to visualize a TV talk show [Study 7]) before rating Chinese ideographs 
that were preceded by either a security-enhancing priming stimulus or one of three 
control primes. Results from these studies indicated that, similar to the previous 
studies, in the non-threatening control condition, ideographs that followed security-
enhancing and positive affect enhancing picture primes were rated higher than those 
following the neutral prime or no prime. In the threatening conditions ideographs that 
followed the security enhancing picture prime were liked more than those that 
followed the positive affect prime, the neutral prime, and no prime, whereas 
ideographs that followed these latter three picture primes were no different from each 
other. Taken together, these studies indicate that enhanced attachment security leads 
to greater positive affect under both neutral and stressful conditions. Importantly, 
these studies also differentiate the effects of security priming from priming a state of 
positivity more generally. That is, under stressful situations when the need for felt 
security is more salient, security priming has a mood repair effect whereas positive 
affect priming does not.   
 Experimentally enhanced security has also been shown to mitigate the effects 
of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms on responses to trauma. 
Mikulincer, Shaver, and Horesh (2006) selected two groups of participants based on 






 percentile, and the non-PTSD group scored in the bottom 25
th
 percentile. 
Response to trauma was assessed using a Stroop color naming task in which 
participants were asked to name the colors of 10 terror-related words, 10 negatively 
valenced words, and 10 neutral words. Longer latencies for naming the colors of the 
terror-related words indicated greater accessibility of trauma-related thoughts because 
the saliency of trauma-related thoughts interferes with color naming. Before each 
trial, participants were subliminally primed with an attachment security related word, 
a positively valenced word, or a neutral word. As has been the case in correlational 
research, the PTSD group demonstrated greater accessibility to trauma-related 
thoughts as indicated by their greater latencies to name the colors of terror-related 
words compared to the non-PTSD group. This link, however, was moderated by 
security priming such that this effect was significant only when participants were 
primed with the positive or neutral words. This study indicates that subliminal 
attachment security priming ameliorates the effects of PTSD symptoms on increased 
accessibility to trauma-related thoughts.  
 Attachment security priming has also been shown to mitigate 
psychopathological reactions of clinically diagnosed patients. Specifically, Admoni 
(2006) examined the effects of attachment security priming on heightened 
preoccupation with food and body shape and distorted body image in a sample of 
women hospitalized for eating disorders. Access to thoughts about food and body 
shape was assessed as the latency to name the colors of words related to food and 
body shape. Distorted body image was assessed by asking participants to adjust a 




accurate. Similar to correlational findings, women who were hospitalized for eating 
disorders had heightened accessibility to food and body shape related thoughts as 
indicated by their greater latencies to name the colors of food and body shape related 
words as well as more severe body image distortions compared to a group of age-
matched healthy women. When the group of women who were hospitalized for eating 
disorders was subliminally primed with the name of a security providing attachment 
figure, compared to when they were subliminally primed with the name of a person 
who did not serve as an attachment figure, the heightened accessibility to food and 
body shape related thoughts and distortions in their body image decreased, and the 
differences in performance between patients with eating disorders and the control 
group dramatically reduced. These findings indicate that attachment insecurity may 
be causally linked to eating disorders. Taken together with the findings of Mikulincer 
et al. (2006) reviewed above, these studies suggest that increased security reduces the 
dysfunctional cognitive responses characteristic of psychopathology. 
Long-Term Effects of Security Priming. Two studies have investigated the 
long-term effects of security priming. Carnelley and Rowe (2007) examined whether 
repeated supraliminal priming of attachment security had lasting effects on 
participants’ views of themselves, their relationships, and their self-reported 
attachment style. At baseline (Session 1) and follow-up (Session 5; 11 days after 
Session 1), participants reported their general expectations of relationships, self-views 
(i.e., self-liking and competence), attachment-related anxiety (e.g., fear of 
abandonment) and avoidance (e.g., discomfort with intimacy and dependency) on the 




secure. Participants who were randomly assigned to the secure priming condition 
were asked to write about a close significant other with whom they felt secure 
(Sessions 2 and 4) and an experience they had in which others were sensitive and 
responsive to their distress (Session 3), whereas those in the neutral prime were told 
to write about a coursework writing plan (Session 2), their route to the university 
(Session 3), and shopping for groceries (Session 4). Results indicated that repeated 
security priming led to more positive relationship expectations, more positive self 
views, and decreased attachment anxiety at follow-up.  
Gillath and Shaver (2007) examined whether repeated subliminal security 
priming had long-term effects on self-esteem, mood, compassion, and creativity. At 
baseline, participants completed self-reports of their self-esteem, positive affect, and 
compassion toward others, and they were asked to name as many creative uses for a 
common object as possible. Following baseline assessment, participants came to the 
laboratory every other weekday morning for three weeks to complete various 
cognitive tasks during which they were primed with subliminally presented words. 
Participants randomly assigned to the security priming condition were exposed to 40 
trials of subliminally presented security-related words (e.g., secure, embrace, love), 
whereas those assigned to the neutral priming condition were subliminally exposed to 
40 trials of neutral words (e.g., funnel, lamp). One week after the final priming 
session, participants completed the measures of self-esteem, mood, compassion, and 
creativity that they completed at baseline. Results indicated that security priming led 
to higher self-esteem, positive affect, and compassion toward others at follow-up 




these studies indicate that repeated security priming can lead to improvements in 
one’s views of self and relationships, mood, compassion, and attachment-related 
anxiety that last for days rather than minutes. 
Summary and Future Directions  
 In general, the studies reviewed here are consistent with attachment theory’s 
predictions that secure mental representations lead to increased positive psychosocial 
outcomes (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; see also, Cassidy & Shaver, 2008, and 
Grossmann, Grossmann, & Waters, 2005). These studies are the first to report 
evidence to support causal links between mental representations of security and more 
adaptive responses to stress-inducing information; enhanced views of self and close 
others; improved mood; increased concern, compassion, and empathy for others; and 
less aggressive behavior toward out-group members. Importantly, this body of 
research also provides evidence that experimentally-enhanced security using simple 
priming methods can lead to long term improvements in views of self and 
relationships, mood, and compassion, as well as decreases in attachment-related 
anxiety. Despite clear evidence that experimentally enhanced attachment security 
makes people respond as if they themselves were more secure, there are three 
important ways that this body of research has yet to be extended. 
 First, several theoretically-relevant outcome domains have yet to be explored 
including parenting quality, caregiving in romantic relationships, and interactions 
with close others. Relatedly, it remains unknown whether the effects of attachment 
security priming extend to observed behavioral outcomes. Given that the quality of 




Reis & Rusbult, 2004), it is important for future research to extend security priming 
techniques to the assessment of observed behavior, especially in the context of 
interactions with other. Moreover, the idea that internal working models of 
attachment causally drive affect, cognitions, and behaviors in attachment-relevant 
situations is a core construct to attachment theory (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973; 
Bretherton & Munholland, 2008; Main et al., 1985). As such, it is important to 
examine whether the effects of attachment security priming extend to observed 
behavior in attachment-relevant situations. 
 Second, future research should further examine how attachment security and 
mood interact to influence outcomes. Mikulincer and colleagues demonstrated the 
role that attachment security plays under conditions of threat, but the attachment 
system reaches more broadly than the fear system. Attachments are entrenched in 
emotional experiences. As Bowlby states, “Many of the most intense of emotions 
arise during the formation, the maintenance, the disruption, and the renewal of 
attachment relationships…Threat of loss arouses anxiety and actual loss gives rise to 
sorrow; whilst each of these situations is likely to arouse anger. The unchallenged 
maintenance of a bond is experienced as a source of security and the renewal of a 
bond as a source of joy,” (Bowlby, 1979). As such, extending investigations of the 
effects of security during emotionally charged situations beyond fear is important to 
understanding the role that attachment security plays in emotional experiences and 
how attachment security and emotions interact to predict other outcomes.  
 Third, the effects of attachment security priming on children have remained 




tapping children’s existing mental representations, as I demonstrate in the section that 
follows. Given the salience of the effects of attachment security on developmental 
outcomes in childhood (see Berlin, Cassidy, & Appleyard, 2008; Grossmann et al., 
2005; Thompson, 2008), it is important to determine whether the effects of 
attachment security priming extend to childhood. More importantly, there is a dearth 
of experimental research investigating whether attachment security in childhood is 
causally related to improved outcomes. In fact, there are only two studies that have 
examined whether infant attachment security is causally related to more positive 
psychosocial outcomes. van den Boom (1995) reported that infant attachment security 
at 12 months accounted for the effects of an intervention designed to increase 
caregiving quality and attachment security on increased positive interactions with an 
unfamiliar peer at 3.5 years. In contrast, Lyons-Ruth & Easterbrooks (2006) found no 
evidence that infant attachment security acted as a mediating mechanism of 
intervention effects on reduced behavior problems at five and seven years of age. 
Clearly more experimental research is needed. Given the evidence reviewed above 
that priming is an effective tool for attachment researchers to examine causal links 
between security and more positive outcomes in adults (see also Gillath, Selcuk, & 
Shaver, 2008, and Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b) and evidence that priming is 
effective with children, future research should look to security priming as a way to fill 
the void in our knowledge of how attachment representations in childhood drive 
children’s responses to attachment-relevant information. Below, I review empirical 
evidence that priming is a useful tool for examining how children’s mental 




Priming in Childhood 
 Priming has led to important insights into how children’s mental 
representations of the world influence their responses to environmental stimuli. In this 
section, I review studies that demonstrate that priming has proven to be a useful tool 
for developmentalists. I begin by describing research that has used priming to address 
questions related to cognitive development, followed by research that has used 
priming methods to address questions related to social development.  
 Cognitive Development 
 For the most part, research with children that has used priming techniques has 
come from cognitive development. Cognitive developmentalists have employed 
priming techniques to gain important insights into how children mentally represent 
numbers, language, and memories of specific events. Priming has also been used in 
conjunction with brain-imaging techniques to examine whether children mentally 
represent language in the same way that adults do. I consider each of these areas of 
research in turn.   
 Numerical representations. Investigations of how numbers are processed 
have provided evidence that Arabic numbers are represented on a mental number line 
with each number represented as a distribution around the number’s true location 
(e.g., Cordes, Gelman, Gallistel, & Whalen, 2001; Dehaene, Bossini, & Giraux, 
1993). According to the representational overlap hypothesis, these numerical 
representational distributions increasingly overlap as the distance between the 
numbers on the mental number line decreases such that the numbers that are closer to 




1970). Studies with adults have found a priming distance effect such that the 
processing of a particular number is faster when it is preceded by a number prime that 
is numerically closer to the target number than when it is preceded by a number prime 
that is numerically more distant (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Reynvoet & Brysbaert, 
1999). This effect is thought to occur because the prime activates the mental 
representation of the number that was primed and also the numbers that lie 
numerically close to the prime. This increased activation of surrounding numbers 
facilitates the processing of subsequent numbers that are numerically close to the 
prime. This priming distance effect has only just been extended to work with 
children. Reynvoet, Smedt, and Van den Bussche (2009) found that first, third, and 
fifth graders were able to determine with increased speed and accuracy whether a 
number was smaller or larger than 5 when they were supraliminally primed with a 
number that was numerically close to the target number. On a broader level, this 
study demonstrate the usefulness of priming as a method to investigate number 
processing in children and that children as young as 6 can be effectively primed with 
subliminally presented stimuli. 
Linguistic Representations. Priming has also proven to be a useful paradigm 
to investigate the development of linguistic representations in children. Several 
studies have assessed the effects of priming a particular syntactic structure on 
children’s descriptions of target stimuli to determine whether children possess and 
use mental representations of syntax structures (e.g., Hupp & Jungers, 2009; 
Huttenlocher, Vasilyeva, & Shimpi, 2004; Miller & Deevy, 2006; Savage, Lieven, 




van Beijsterveldt & van Hell, 2009). If children possess mental representations of 
particular syntactic structures then exposure to them should enhance their 
accessibility and increase the likelihood that children use the particular syntactic 
structures when processing subsequent stimuli. Consistent with this prediction, 
researchers have found that exposure to particular syntactic structures increases 
children’s subsequent use of these structures, some of which are rare in young 
children’s spontaneous speech. In addition, priming has proven to be useful for 
addressing the debate surrounding this literature as to whether children’s early 
syntactic knowledge is based on frequently used lexical items that develop into 
abstract mental representations of syntax that are dependent on lexical learning (see 
Tomasello, 2000, 2003 for a representative theoretical account of this position) or 
whether children, like adults, posses substantial early grammatical knowledge in the 
form of abstract mental representations of syntactic structure that are independent of 
lexical content (Savage, Lieven, Theakston, & Tomasello, 2006; Kemp, Lieven, & 
Tomasello, 2005). 
 Priming has also proven useful for investigating visual word recognition in 
developing readers. Castles and colleages’ research, in particular, has successfully 
utilized subliminal priming techniques to examine the development of visual word 
recognition (Castles, Davis, Cavalot, & Forster, 2007; Castles, Davis, & Forster, 
2003; Castles, Davis, & Letcher, 1999; see also Pratarelli, Perry, & Galloway, 1994). 
Their research has led to important insights about how children develop a means for 
differentiating a written word from all other words in their visual lexicon. For 




and adults with either a word that was identical to the target word (i.e., identity 
prime), a word that was one letter different from the target word (i.e., form prime), or 
a prime in which all the letters were different from the target word. Participants were 
asked to decide whether the target was a word or a non-word. Adults’ performance 
was not facilitated by form primes when the target word could form many other 
words by changing just one letter (e.g., the target word clap can become 10 other 
words by changing one letter [e.g., slap, flap, clip, clam], whereas the target word 
iron cannot be made into another word by changing just one letter). Children’s 
performance, however, was facilitated by form priming. These results suggest that in 
developing readers, word recognition is facilitated by form priming because their 
visual lexicon is more limited and a smaller set of candidate words are activated.  
 Another member of Castles’s lab (Cavalot, 1998, as cited in Castles et al., 
2003) subliminally exposed adults and third graders to transposition primes (e.g., 
priming the word sing with the word sign) to examine the effects of letter position in 
word retrieval.  Cavalot (1998) found that, compared to the all-letters-different 
control prime, word recognition was facilitated by transposition priming for third 
graders but not for adults. In fact, transposition priming was as effective at assisting 
word recognition as is typically seen in third graders when they are primed with the 
target word itself. These results suggest that the word recognition system in 
developing readers tolerates a larger degree of error in letter position when searching 
for a word in the visual lexicon that matches the target word.  
 Similarly, Syros (1998, as cited in Castles et al., 2003) primed adults and third 




target word and with distinctive word fragments that occurred in few or no words 
other than the target word or word fragments that occurred in many words other than 
the target word. The control prime was a word fragment that had no letters in 
common with the target word. Adults’ word recognition was facilitated only when the 
word fragment prime was at the beginning of the target word or the word fragment 
prime was specific to the target word. Third graders also showed word recognition 
facilitation when primed with word fragments that appeared in the target word, 
however, they were less sensitive to the position and distinctiveness of the word 
fragment prime. These results suggest that the mature word recognition system may 
be more tuned to respond to features of a word that provide unambiguous and more 
distinctive information that activates fewer target competitors. Taken together these 
studies support the view that when attempting to match a written word to its internal 
representation, the immature word recognition system considers similar looking 
words as candidates because the developing reader’s visual lexicon is limited and 
activates fewer candidate words, whereas the mature word recognition system is more 
fine tuned to distinctive orthographic features because the demand to discriminate is 
greater when the visual lexicon is larger.  
 Memory. Perceptual priming has also been useful for researchers 
investigating the development of infant memory. Whether infants can mentally 
represent an event has been a long-standing debate. Some researchers have argued 
that infants are not capable of mentally representing an event. For example, Piaget 
(1952) thought that infants are incapable of representation earlier than 18 months of 




able to rehearse the event by talking about it. Because tasks used to study the 
development of memory with older infants are often inappropriate for younger 
infants, methodological issues have stood in the way of experimentally investigating 
the parameters of infant memory, until recently. When researchers are sure that a 
particular event has been encountered but might not be remembered explicitly, 
researchers have employed perceptual priming in empirical work that examines the 
development of implicit memory (Lloyd & Newcombe, 2009). Rovee-Collier and her 
colleagues (see Rovee-Collier, 1999) have employed perceptual priming to sidestep 
the methodological issues that have impeded research on infant memory by training 
2- to 6-month-olds to move a mobile by kicking via a ribbon tied to their ankle and 
the mobile and 6- to 18-month-olds to move a toy train by pressing a lever.  
 These studies have yielded evidence that not only do infants form memories 
of the training event, but the length of time that infants retain their memories of the 
original training event increases linearly across the first year and a half of life, from 1 
to 2 days at two months to more than 13 weeks at 18 months (Hartshorn et al., 1998). 
More impressive, however, is that two of these studies (Hartshorn, 2003; Rovee-
Collier, Harshorn, & DiRubbo, 1999) have demonstrated that periodically priming 
infants with an isolated component of the original training event (e.g., the original 
cue, such as the mobile or the train) extends infants’ memory of the event for up to a 
year and a half after infants’ have forgotten the original task (Hartshorn, 2003; 
Rovee-Collier et al., 1999). Infants who were initially trained on the mobile task at 2 
months and were periodically primed by being exposed to the original mobile 




experiment had to be terminated because infants outgrew the mobile training task 
(Rovee-Collier et al., 1999). Similarly, infants who were initially trained on the toy 
train task at 6 months and were periodically primed with the original train maintained 
their memory of the training event until they were 2 years of age (Harshorn, 2003). 
This body of research suggests that priming infants with an isolated component of a 
previously encoded event increases infants’ accessibility to mental representations of 
this event, thus providing evidence that calls into question the long held notion that 
very young infants cannot form mental representations.    
 Brain-Imaging. As can be seen from the studies reviewed above, priming is a 
useful tool for investigating knowledge structures in both adults and children. 
Combining brain-imaging techniques with priming has proven useful in research with 
adults (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998). Recently, researchers have investigated infants, 
toddlers, and young children’s mental representations by combining neuroimaging 
and priming techniques. Negative ERP waves that peak 400 ms after stimulus onset 
(referred to as the N400) have been linked to the processing of semantic incongruity 
in adults (see Kutas & Federmeier, 2000, for a review). Larger amplitudes in this 
latency range are associated with slower reaction times indicating greater semantic 
incongruence (e.g., Anderson & Holcomb, 1995; Bentin, Maccarthy, & Wood, 1985; 
Holcomb, 1988; Holcomb & Neville, 1990; 1991; Rossel, Price, & Nobre, 2003).  
Recently, this N400 response has been found in children as young as 13 months of 
age (Friedrich & Friederici, 2004, 2005a, 2005b) In these studies, infants were 
presented with a picture followed by a spoken word that was either congruent or 




electroencephalographic (EEG) activity was recorded. These studies found that 
infants in their second year of life evidence the same N400 effect that has been found 
in adults. Similarly, von Koss Torkildsen, Syversen, Simonsen, Moen, & Lindgren 
(2007) found an N400-like effect for spoken pairs of semantically related and 
unrelated words in 24 month olds. Furthermore, the findings from a longitudinal 
investigation of the N400 effect in toddlers have implications for identifying children 
at risk for specific language impairment. Friedrich & Friederici (2006) demonstrated 
that the occurrence of an N400 effect at 19 months predicted adequate expressive 
language skills at 30 month of age. The lack of an N400 effect at 19 months, 
however, predicted poor expressive language skills at 30 months, which has been 
associated with an enhanced risk of the development of specific language impairment.  
Social Development 
 Although fewer in number than studies that have used priming to address 
questions related to cognitive development, several studies have demonstrated the 
usefulness of priming as a method for examining how children’s mental 
representations of the social world influence their reactions to the social environment.  
In particular, social developmentalists have used priming to gain important insights 
into how children’s mental representations drive their reactions toward out-group 
members, their eating behavior, information processing of potentially-fear inducing 
stimuli, affiliative behavior, and self-concept. I consider each of these areas of 
research in turn. 
Reactions toward Outgroup Members. Spielman (2000; Study 1) used 




preferential treatment to one’s ingroup members compared to outgroup members, has 
been widely replicated in adults in the minimal group paradigm, in which people are 
assigned to groups completely arbitrarily (e.g., coin toss). There is evidence to 
suggest that this ingroup bias effect may be due to priming mental representations of 
competition by assigning participants into one of two groups (e.g., Hartstone & 
Augoustinos, 1995).  The research available on ingroup bias in children suggests that 
children younger than 7 may not show ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm, 
perhaps, as Spielman suggests, because assignment to one of two groups does not 
prime competition in young children. Spielman examined the effects of priming 
competition on ingroup bias in the minimal group paradigm with kindergarteners to 
determine whether children younger than 7 have the capacity to demonstrate ingroup 
bias in the minimal group paradigm and whether ingroup bias is the result of 
competition. Competition was primed with a story about two children racing each 
other to the sandbox. As expected, children in the neutral and no-prime conditions did 
not preferentially allocate play money to ingroup members over outgroup members, 
however, children primed with competition did. These results suggest that children 
younger than 7 have the capacity, but not the tendency, to demonstrate in-group bias 
in the minimal group paradigm and that arbitrary assignment into one of two groups 
does not prime competition. In addition, this study also suggests that the ingroup bias 
effects found in adults in the minimal group paradigm may be the result of priming 
competition by assignment into one of two groups. 
Hoe and Davidson (2002) examined how priming influences children’s 




either the neutral priming condition or one of four experimental conditions (i.e., 
negative, positive, elderly, or grandparent priming) before evaluating ambiguous 
depictions of older individuals. The priming task was introduced as a memory game 
in which children were read a list of words that included a standard set of filler words 
and asked to recall the list of words. Next, children were asked to identify the words 
from the list words just read to them from several sentences that were read to them. 
Results indicated that positive and grandparent priming lead to more positive 
evaluations of older individuals compared to the negative, elderly, and neutral 
priming conditions. These findings are interesting because they demonstrate that by 
age 7, children have negative mental representations of older individuals that can be 
over-ridden when accessibility to mental representations of positive characteristics or 
grandparents are increased. 
 Eating Behavior. Harris, Bargh, and Brownell (2009; Study 1) recently 
examined the effects of advertising as a “real world” prime on children’s eating 
behavior. Children ranging from 7 to 11 years were randomly assigned to watch a 
cartoon that included 30 second advertisements for waffle sticks and syrup, fruit roll-
ups, potato chips, and a high sugar cereal or the same cartoon with four 30 second 
non-food advertisements. While children watched the cartoon alone, they were given 
a bowl of goldfish crackers and a glass of water. Children who saw commercials 
advertising food during the 14 minute cartoon ate 45% more goldfish crackers than 
children who saw non-food commercials. Moreover, the amount of goldfish crackers 
that children ate did not vary as a function of their age, body mass index, gender, the 




appetite. These results establish that television food advertising is causally related to 
increased snack consumption and may contribute to childhood obesity.  
 Information Processing of Potentially Fear-Inducing Stimuli. Priming has 
also been used to investigate children’s processing of social information as a function 
of the extent to which cues of fear, empowerment, and helplessness are present. 
Cortez and Bugental (1995) primed kindergarteners with a 6 minute video of a fairy 
tale in which the child either saved their parents from disaster (empowerment prime) 
or their mother saved the child (helplessness prime). Following the prime, children 
watched a 6 minute video of a child’s visit to the doctor’s office in which the child 
had either a fearful facial expression or a neutral one. As expected, after exposure to 
fearful cues, children who were primed with helplessness had poorer recall of the 
doctor visit sequence compared to children who were primed with empowerment. 
These results suggest that young children’s memory for fear-inducing events may be 
enhanced by activating mental representations of empowerment.   
Affiliative Behaviors. Over and Carpenter’s (2009a, 2009b) recent studies 
provide particularly compelling evidence of the utility of priming as a way to 
examine children’s social schemas as they influence reactions to social events. One 
study used priming as a way to examine whether children, like adults, employ 
behavioral strategies to increase affiliation and build rapport when exposed to cues of 
ostracism. Adults use mimicry as a means by which to affiliate after being socially 
excluded (e.g., Lakin, Jefferis, Cheng, & Chartrand, 2003). Children, on the other 
hand, generally do not unconsciously mimic an interaction partner’s mannerisms until 




suggested that children use imitation as a behavioral strategy to increase affiliation 
(Carpenter, 2006; Nielson, 2006). Over and Carpenter (2009a) tested the possibility 
that there is continuity in development between imitation in early childhood and 
infancy to mimicry in adulthood as a behavioral strategy to increase affiliation by 
examining how priming ostracism in 5- and 6-year- old children influenced their 
subsequent imitation of an experimenter’s actions. Children were primed with 
ostracism with two short videos of four shapes moving around a computer screen. 
The first video depicted 3 pentagons playing as a group and then moving away from a 
fourth pentagon that attempted to approach the group four times before withdrawing 
to the far side of the screen. The second video depicted two teardrop shaped objects 
playing ball to the exclusion of a third teardrop shaped object that attempted to join 
the game before withdrawing to the far side of the screen as in the first video. 
Following the priming, the experimenter demonstrated eight different ways of acting 
on a box with a light in it using three wooden tools before handing the box and the 
tools to the child. Children in the ostracism condition imitated more of the 
experimenter’s actions compared to children who watched the control videos. These 
findings indicate that children, like adults, modify their behavior in ways that increase 
affiliation after being exposed to social exclusion. These results are especially 
remarkable considering that this effect was observed using an abstract depiction of 
third party ostracism compared to research with adults in which the participants are 
socially excluded by conspecifics. 
More impressive are Over and Carpenter’s (2009b) findings that priming 18 




affiliation by showing them eight pictures of familiar household objects in the 
foreground and two small dolls facing each other in the background. Following 
priming, an experimenter entered the room with a bundle of sticks which she 
“accidentally” dropped on the floor. Infants exposed to the affiliative prime were 
three times more likely to spontaneously help the experimenter during the first 10 
seconds compared to infants exposed to neutral prime (two small stacks of blocks) 
and those exposed to the individuality primes (one doll alone, or two dolls back-to-
back).  
Self-Concept. Research using Silverman’s “Mommy and I are one” (MIO) 
priming stimulus was designed to activate representations of a nurturing and 
accepting mother, which in turn, were thought to serve as a gratification for the need 
to merge with “the good mother of childhood” (Hardaway, 1990). Although the idea 
that a desire for oneness with mother is security-enhancing has fallen into disfavor, 
activating representations of a nurturing and accepting mother is consistent with the 
concept of priming representations of felt security. There is some evidence to support 
this idea. In particular, the more positive the emotional tone of memories of 
interaction with mother, the more positive is the response to exposure to MIO (see 
Sohlberg, Claesson, & Birgegard, 2003).  
 Of particular interest to the present argument that priming may be a useful 
tool for examining how children’s mental representations of the social world drive 
their reactions to social cues is Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman’s (1984) use of the 
MIO subliminal priming paradigm to examine the effects of activating representations 




institutionalized, emotionally disturbed children and adolescents in a residential 
treatment school (N = 90; mean age = 15.7, range = 10.8 to 19.3; enrolled in grades 5-
12) who were below age norms on measures of academic achievement and 
intellectual ability and had extensive histories of truancy were randomly assigned to 
receive four trials of either a security-enhancing prime (subliminal exposure to 
“Mommy and I are one” which evokes images of a nurturing and accepting mother) 
or a neutral prime (subliminal exposure to “People are walking”) five times a week 
for six weeks. At the beginning of each of the 30 priming sessions, students were 
asked to imagine a tense situation related to school such as the anxiety before a test 
which served to pair the anxiety-provoking situation with the tension reduction that 
resulted from the security-enhancing prime. Post-treatment, compared to students 
who were exposed to neutral primes, students who were exposed to the security-
enhancing prime had more positive self-concepts. In addition, repeated subliminal 
exposure to MIO resulted in higher standardized reading and math scores, more 
frequent homework completion, more time spent working independently in the 
classroom, and less time spent watching television as recorded by their counselors.  
 This study is noteworthy because most priming studies, regardless of 
participant age, are conducted in one brief laboratory session. Moreover, the majority 
of priming studies conducted from a social cognition perspective rely on participant 
self-report. This study, however, not only looked at the long-term effects of repeated 
subliminal priming, Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman (1984) also conducted their 
priming sessions outside of the laboratory. In addition, Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman 




stimulus on an extensive range of outcomes including observed behavior. Thus, these 
findings not only suggest that repeated exposure to security-enhancing stimuli may 
improve children’s self concepts and academic performance in several domains, these 
findings show that subliminal security priming may influence actual observed 
behavior in a child clinical population.  
Summary 
  The literature reviewed above clearly demonstrates that priming is an 
effective means for exploring the contents and organization of children’s mental 
representations. Research that has employed priming techniques with children is 
concentrated mainly in cognitive science disciplines. This body of research has led to 
important insights into how children mentally represent numbers, language, and 
memories of specific events. This research has also yielded important information 
about the ages at which priming is effective with children. Rovee-Collier and 
colleagues’ research on infant memory has demonstrated that priming is effective 
with infants as young as two months of age. Moreover, Reynvoet et al. (2009) 
demonstrated that subliminal priming is effective with children as young as six years 
of age, and Castles and colleagues’ research (see Castles et al., 2003) on the 
development of word recognition has shown that subliminal priming is effective with 
children as young as seven years of age.  
A smaller body of research has used priming as a means for examining how 
children’s mental representations of the social world influence their reactions to 
social information. This body of research has led to important insights into how 




group members, information processing of mildly stressful information, affiliative 
behavior, and self-concept. This body of research has also yielded important 
information about the power of priming to influence children’s social behavior. Over 
and Carpenter’s (2009a, 2009b) research demonstrates that toddlers as young as 18 
months can be primed to be more helpful.  Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman’s (1984) 
findings demonstrate that repeated subliminal priming of children’s mental 
representations of a nurturing and accepting mother has the potential to improve 
children’s self-concept and boost academic performance. To the extent that activating 
representations of maternal nurturance and acceptance activates representations of 
attachment security, Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman’s findings point to the possibility 
that subliminal security priming can have long-term effects on children’s observed 
behavior. I now discuss this possibility, along with future research directions using 
priming as a method for examining how children’s reactions to the social 
environment are driven by their mental representations. 
Future Directions and Conclusions 
 I have described how priming techniques have allowed researchers to gain 
important insights into how mental representations of past experiences with the world 
drive how individuals process and respond to environmental cues by tapping into 
these existing mental representations. I have reviewed evidence of the usefulness of 
priming techniques to researchers investigating the causal links between attachment 
security and more positive psychosocial outcomes. I have also reviewed evidence that 
priming is an effective and useful tool for research in children. I conclude by 




how children’s mental representations of the social world drive their responses to 
social cues. In doing so, I use attachment, social information processing, gender 
development, and mood and mental health to exemplify some of the possible ways 
that priming promises to be an informative tool for social developmentalists. I discuss 
each of these in turn. 
 Attachment Research 
 As I mentioned earlier, researchers have adapted the widely used technique of 
priming to examine causal links between attachment security and theoretically 
relevant outcomes (see also Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b, and Gillath et al., 2008). In 
particular, this body of research has found that activating mental representations of 
security leads to more adaptive responses to stress-inducing information, increased 
concern for others, and improved mood and mental health-related outcomes. These 
findings, however, are limited to research with adults and older teenagers. There are 
two main reasons to believe that security priming will prove to be as fruitful for 
developmentalists who research attachment as it has been for adult attachment 
researchers, if not more so.   
First, attachment security, although a phenomenon that spans from the “cradle 
to the grave” (Bowlby, 1979, p. 126), is particularly important during early 
development, especially infancy through early childhood (Bowlby, 1973, Chapter 
22). As such, it is reasonable to suggest that the effects of activating mental 
representations of security on children’s responses to attachment relevant-information 




Second, there is little experimental research examining the causal effects of 
security in childhood. Correlational evidence and theory suggest that security may 
contribute to less fear in the face of novel objects, environments, and people; greater 
willingness to explore the physical and social environment (e.g., see Thompson, 
2008); more harmonious relationships with others (see Berlin et al., 2008); less 
reliance on hyperactivating and deactivating strategies of emotion regulation (see 
Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007a, 2008); and more positive views of the self (see 
Thompson, 2008). Security priming offers researchers the possibility of addressing 
the tantamount question of whether security enhances psychosocial functioning using 
an experimental design that targets representations of security directly, rather than 
targeting parental caregiving quality.  
The potential for using security priming as a method for targeting mental 
representations of attachment directly is underscored by research that suggests that 
security priming specifically targets representations of security rather than positive 
affect more generally. Evidence that security priming increases feelings security and 
decreases feelings of insecurity in both the short and long-term indicate that security 
priming activates secure mental representations (Carnelley & Rowe, 2007, 2010; 
Gillath, Hart, Noftle, Stockdale, 2009). In fact, these effects and the effects of 
security priming on increased positive affect in the face of threat, decreased 
defensiveness, and increased prosocial responses are not replicated when positive 
affect, self-esteem enhancing, or self-affirmation primes are used (Gillath et al., 2005; 
Mikulincer, Hirschberger, et al., 2001; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001; Mikulincer, 




not enhancing positive psychosocial outcomes simply by increasing positive affect 
more generally. Rather, these findings suggest that security priming enhances positive 
psychosocial outcomes by increasing mental representations of security. Thus, given 
this evidence that priming has proven to be an effective means for experimentally 
enhancing security (see also Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b, and Gillath et al., 2008) 
and that priming is effective with children, toddlers, and infants, security priming 
seems especially suited for exploring whether the link between representations of 
security and improved psychosocial functioning is causal. 
It is important to note that the effects of security priming may depend on past 
experiences of attachment security. For instance, it is possible that security priming 
may be more effective for children who have had more experiences of their 
caregivers as available and sensitively responsive when needed.  Thus, it is possible 
that security priming may be most effective for children who are chronically secure 
given their likely more frequent experiences of sensitive responsiveness from their 
caregivers. It is also possible that security priming may be relatively ineffective at 
enhancing positive psychosocial outcomes for children who are chronically secure 
compared to those who are chronically insecure because there is more room for 
improvement for those who are insecure. In addition, it is also possible that security 
priming is ineffective for those who have very few or no experiences of others as 
sensitively responsive because there is no secure base script to activate with priming.  
On the other hand, it may be the case that the effects of security priming do 
not depend on past experiences and hence also do not depend on dispositional 




that their bids for attention will elicit caregiving that effectively alleviates their 
distress. When their bids are rebuffed, infants experience rejection and increased 
feelings of anxiety at the prospect of losing proximity to their caregiver. The anxiety 
and the pain of rejection in the face of the infant’s repeated experiences of the infant’s 
signals of distress not resulting in eliciting effective caregiving are thought to lead to 
the infant organizing his attachment behaviors in a way that minimize the possibility 
of rejection and abandonment. If it is the case that infants come into the world with a 
very basic knowledge of a secure base script (e.g., “Alerting others that I am 
distressed will elicit their caregiving response which will alleviate my distress.”), 
security priming may tap into this basic secure base script and, thus, may not depend 
on dispositional security. 
The same logic can be applied to security priming in adults, however, the 
effects of security priming as a function of dispositional attachment security seem to 
be the exception rather than the rule. Though definitive conclusions are not possible 
without more rigorous and direct tests of the possibilities described above, the 
infrequency with which dispositional security and security priming interact in the 
adult literature seems to suggest that increases in dispositional security neither 
increase nor decrease the effectiveness of security priming as a general rule. This 
finding, however, may not extend to childhood. For example, it is possible that, 
compared to children, adults have had more experiences of their needs for comfort 
being met by a sensitively responsive other because they have more opportunities for 
intimacy outside of their relationships with their parents. As such, it may be rather 




and security being met by another, and it may be relatively more common for 
children to have very few or no experiences of their needs for comfort and security 
being met by another. Thus, dispositional security may interact with security priming 
in childhood and this possibility should be kept in mind as attachment researchers 
design studies that extend security priming to childhood.  
Social-Information Processing Research 
 Dodge and his colleagues (Dodge & Crick, 1990; Crick & Dodge, 1994) 
proposed that children’s behavioral responses to problematic social events are 
mediated by a series of cognitive processes whereby children (1) encode the event, 
(2) interpret the event, (3) formulate a goal or select a desired outcome, (4) generate 
strategies to achieve the desired outcome, (5) evaluate the likelihood that the 
strategies generated will achieve the desired outcome, and finally, (6) behaviorally 
enact the selected strategy. Children’s mental representations or schemas of the social 
environment are thought to serve as the cognitive mechanism through which children 
proceed from one step to the next. Specifically, children draw on their mental 
representations of past social experiences to guide their attention when encoding the 
event, their interpretation of the event, the goal they formulate, the strategies they 
generate, and their evaluation of these strategies.  
 A large body of research has emerged in support of this model of social 
information processing (see Dodge & Pettit, 2003, for a review). Only two studies, 
however, have tested this model experimentally. Rabiner and Coie (1989) examined 
the effects of rejected children’s expectations of being liked and accepted on their 




these unfamiliar peers form of them. Rejected children in the experimental group who 
were led to expect a positive interpersonal experience were preferred by their 
unfamiliar peers over rejected children in control group and behaved more 
competently (girls only; Study 2). Slaby and Guerra (1988) examined the effects of 
social information processing on aggressive behavior in adolescents incarcerated for 
violent offenses. Adolescents in the experimental group who participated in a 12-
week intervention aimed at increasing their ability to attend to nonhostile social cues, 
generate a variety of responses, and evaluate the potential responses in terms of their 
effectiveness in achieving a legal and nonviolent outcome were rated by staff as 
having less aggressive behaviors.  Rabiner and Coie’s study, although able to causally 
link expectations of positive interactions with improved outcomes in the peer group, 
does not, as theory suggests, answer questions as to whether and how mental 
representations drive social information processing. This evidence, although 
suggestive of mental representations as the cognitive mechanism driving children’s 
social information processing, is far from conclusive and further experimental 
research is needed. 
 Priming offers researchers another methodological tool for determining 
whether the link between children’s mental representations direct how they attend to, 
encode, and interpret social events, and how they draw upon their social schemas to 
formulate a goal and to generate and evaluate strategies for achieving their goal. For 
example, future research could examine the effects of increased accessibility to 
mental representations of aggression and benevolence on children’s social 




if children draw upon their mental representations to process social information, 
increased accessibility to benevolent mental representations should lead to greater 
encoding of schema-consistent information (e.g., greater recall of friendly behavior 
on the part of others), interpreting others’ behaviors as more benevolent, formulating 
more prosocial goals, and generating more prosocial strategies. In addition, bringing 
to mind times that children behaved in a benevolent manner should influence their 
evaluations of the strategies they generate. For instance, children should have greater 
confidence in their ability to enact more prosocial responses. 
 From a social information processing perspective, chronic aggression is the 
result of hypervigilance to hostile social cues, attributing hostile intentions to others’ 
behavior, formulating a hostile goal, accessing fewer competent responses and more 
incompetent responses, and more positive evaluations of aggressive responses  It is 
thought that this aggressive social information processing is driven by chronically 
activated mental representations of the social environment as hostile, self-defensive 
goals, and aggressive responses based on their experiences interacting with the social 
environment (Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge & Crick, 1990). To date, no study has 
examined whether aggression is the result of increased accessibility to mental 
representations of aggression and hostility. Increasing accessibility to mental 
representations that inhibit aggressive and hostile schemas by priming prosocial 
mental representations would provide an initial examination of this unexplored area 
of research. Findings that chronically aggressive children, after being primed with 
prosocial-related stimuli, are less attentive to hostile social cues, are less ready to 




access more competent and fewer incompetent responses, evaluate aggressive 
responses more negatively, and behave more competently would provide initial 
evidence that children’s aggressive behavior is the result of increased accessibility to 
aggressive and hostile mental representations.   
 In addition, priming may generate important insights into whether emotions, 
gender schemas, and mental representations of attachment play an integrative role in 
children’s social information processing. For example, Crick and Dodge (1994) posit 
that anger might lead to the formation of a retaliatory goal, or anxiety might lead to 
the desire to remove oneself from the situation. Affective priming would afford 
researchers the ability to address these questions experimentally. Recently, Ostrov 
and Godleski (2010) have built upon social information processing theory by pointing 
to gender schemas as particularly important mental representations that influence 
children’s encoding, interpretation, goal formulation, and generation and evaluation 
of strategies to achieve their goals. Increasing accessibility to mental representations 
of gender using priming could address whether and how children’s gender schemas 
influence social information processing. Furthermore, research and theory suggest 
that social information processing mediates the link between mental representations 
of attachment and social and emotional outcomes (see Dykas & Cassidy, in press, for 
a review). Priming offers the possibility of examining whether social information 
processing serves as the causal mechanism for the influence of attachment on 
psychosocial outcomes using an experimental design. If mental representations of 
attachment drive social information processing which, in turn, drives psychosocial 




lead to improved social information processing, which, in turn, should lead to 
improved social and emotional outcomes. 
Gender-Related research 
 According to gender schema theory (see Martin & Ruble, 2004; Martin, 
Ruble, & Szkrybalo, 2002), children’s mental representations of gender-related 
concepts about themselves and others (i.e., their gender schemas) influence their 
information processing and behavior. In particular, gender schema theory posits that 
the emergence of gender identity (i.e., realizing that they are either a girl or a boy), 
leads to increased motivation to selectively attend to and recall information about 
their own gender group and to behave in gender consistent ways (Martin et al., 2002). 
Experimental evidence has emerged indicating that, consistent with theory, children’s 
gender schemas do indeed influence children’s information processing and behavior 
(see Martin & Dinella, 2001, for a review). This research has employed the use of 
gender-labeling of novel non-gender-typed toys or activities to examine the direct 
link between gender stereotypes and children’s responses. In these studies, the novel 
gender-neutral toys were labeled most often by experimenters telling the children that 
most girls or most boys like a particular toy or do well at a particular task. This vein 
of research has demonstrated that children pay more attention to, have better memory 
for, have better performance with, and have greater expectations of success with toys 
and activities that were labeled by experiments as appropriate for their sex. These 





 One methodological limitation is the demand characteristics inherent in 
overtly labeling toys or activities as “for girls” or “for boys” (Martin et al., 2002). 
Some studies have attempted to fix this methodological limitation by labeling an 
activity in a more covert manner (e.g., Davies, 1986, 1989; Hargreaves, Bates, & 
Foot, 1985). For instance, Hargreaves et al. (1985) told children that the motor 
steadiness task they were about to complete was either a test to see how good they 
were at mechanics or operating machinery or a test to see how good they would be at 
sewing and knitting. Results were consistent with expectations that when the task was 
labeled as sex-appropriate, children made fewer errors.  
 Priming offers researchers the opportunity to determine how children’s mental 
representations of gender influence their information processing and behavior in a 
manner that is much more covert than those currently described in the literature. For 
instance, placing children in a waiting room with either dolls or trucks or having 
children watch a cartoon depicting gender stereotyped behavior or characters prior to 
entering the lab would activate children’s gender schemas is a more subtle manner 
than methods previously used to determine the degree to which demand 
characteristics may account for previous findings.  When examining the effects of 
gender schemas on older children’s behavior, subliminal priming, which has shown to 
be effective with children as young as six (Reynvoet et al., 2009), would more 
definitively rule out interpretations that findings from studies employing overt 
manipulations were not due to demand characteristics or other active strategies on the 
part of the participants (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). For example, researchers could 




objects and assess how children’s knowledge of gender stereotypes colors their 
interpretation of gender-neutral stimuli. In particular, researchers could examine how 
subliminally exposing children to gender cues influences how they categorize and 
further process and respond to novel non-gendered objects, people, and events.  
 Furthermore, priming children’s mental representations of gender would 
address Martin et al.’s (2002) suggestion that the links between children’s gender 
schemas and behavior may be more apparent when stereotypes are salient. Priming 
would allow researchers to make children’s gender schemas salient and assess 
whether this activation leads to more gender consistent behavior. As such, it stands to 
reason that future research using priming to examine how representations of gender 
drive children’s information processing and behavior may prove particularly useful in 
ruling out alternative interpretations and addressing unanswered questions.  
Mood and Mental Health Research 
 Beck’s (1967) cognitive theory of depression suggests that depression is the 
result of heightened accessibility to negative self-schema, and much empirical 
support exists for this proposition (Clark, Beck, & Alford, 1999; Lakdawalla, Hankin, 
& Mermelstein, 2007). In particular, research with children has revealed a robust 
inverse relationship between their self-reports of self-esteem and depression (Garber 
& Hilsman, 1992). What is lacking, however, is experimental research examining 
whether increases in negative self-schema are causally related to the development of 
depression. It stands to reason that increased accessibility to positive self-schema 
would serve to reduce depression. As such, research that increases accessibility to 




to determine whether self-schemas are causally related to depression.  Findings that 
depressive symptomatology decreases for children exposed to positive self-schematic 
cues would provide initial evidence that children’s views of themselves directly 
influence their level of depressive symptoms.  
 In addition, an internal locus of control—perceptions of oneself as able to 
control one’s own life events through positive attributes or effort—is thought of as a 
protective factor against depression and anxiety. At the other end of the locus of 
control continuum is an external locus of control—perceptions that one’s life is 
controlled by outside forces like powerful others, chance, or luck—which has been 
associated with increased vulnerability toward depression and anxiety in children and 
adolescents (Chorpita & Barlow, 1998; Ostrander& Herman, 2006). To date, no study 
has examined whether external locus of control is causally related to either depression 
or anxiety in children. Future research that increases perceptions of oneself as in 
control of one’s own life events by activating mental representations of empowerment 
using priming techniques would provide the opportunity to examine whether locus of 
control is causally related to the development of depression and anxiety.  
Conclusions  
 I have presented evidence that priming offers social developmentalists the 
opportunity to gain important insights into how children’s mental representations of 
the social world drive their responses to social cues. I described the theoretical 
conceptualization underlying priming and priming techniques. I used attachment 
theory as a case to demonstrate how the extension of priming techniques has allowed 




attachment security and more adaptive responses to stress-inducing information, 
enhanced views of self and others, improved mood, increased concern and empathy, 
and less aggressive behavior toward out-group members. In my review of the 
attachment security priming literature, I discussed the importance of extending this 
research to assessments of observed behavioral outcomes and to research with 
children. Next, I reviewed evidence demonstrating the effectiveness of priming 
techniques as a way of accessing children’s mental representations. This review 
described the ways in which developmentalists have used priming methods to 
uncover important insights into how children mentally represent their world and use 
these representations to process and respond to environmental cues. In concluding, I 
have used attachment, social-information-processing, gender development, and mood 
and mental health research as examples of ways that priming can inform future social 
development research. Given the important insights that have already been gained by 
applying priming techniques to psychological research, it is reasonable to believe that 
social developmentalists will also gain important insights into how children mentally 
represent their social world and use these representations to guide their responses to 




Chapter 3: Method 
Participants 
Ninety mothers and their 6- to 7-year-old children (46.7% girls) were 
recruited to participate in a study about mothers’ and children’s reactions to social 
and emotional events. An a priori power analysis assuming a small effect size with 
Power (1-β) set at 0.80 indicated that a sample size of 90 is sufficient to detect a 
significant interaction between child temperament and priming condition. Dyads were 
recruited from the Washington, D.C. greater metropolitan area using flyers and emails 
(see Appendix A for the recruitment flyer). Mothers’ reports of their children’s race 
and ethnicity were as follows (mothers could choose as many of the following races 
and ethnicities that applied): 50% were Black/African American, 49.3% were White, 
17.1% were Hispanic or Latino, 3.9% were Native American, 2.6% were Asian, 1.3% 
were Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander, and 1.1% were Middle Eastern. 
Mother’s mean age was 38.39 years (SD = 5.458, Range: 25 - 47). Children’s mean 
age was 6.95 years (SD = 0.61; Range: 6.00 – 7.93). Most mothers were married 
(65.8%). The median household income was between $79,000 and $99,000 per year. 
Most mothers were native English speakers (89.5%), and most children were also 
native English speakers (98.7%). The only exclusionary criterion was that mothers 
and children were fluent in English and were able to complete the protocol in English.  
Procedure 
 The present study is a 3 (Prime: Secure Prime vs. Happy Control Prime vs. 
Neutral Control Prime) × 2 (Valence: Fear-Inducing Pictures vs. Excitement-Inducing 




First) repeated measures experimental design that is part of a larger study on 
children’s socio-emotional development (see Table 2). The priming condition (Secure 
Prime vs. Happy Prime vs. Neutral Prime) was randomly assigned prior to the start of 
the lab. Both the experimenters and participants were blind to the priming condition 
assigned to each child. The order of the presentation of the pictures was 
counterbalanced across participants so that 45 children saw the fear-inducing pictures 
first and 45 children saw the excitement-inducing pictures first. Experimenters were 
advanced undergraduate research assistants and graduate students. Priming was 
administered during a computer game (see Experimental Manipulation: Secure Prime 
vs. Happy Control Prime vs. Neutral Control Prime). Below, I describe how children 
were randomly assigned to a priming condition and order condition and how the 
priming condition to which children were assigned remained concealed from both the 
participants and the experimenters. Then, I describe how I experimentally 
manipulated attachment security followed by the order of the tasks that mothers and 
children completed during the visit to the laboratory. 
 Randomization and Priming Condition Concealment. Thirty participant 
identification numbers were assigned randomly without replacement to each of the 
three conditions (30 participant identification numbers × 3 conditions = 90 
participants). Using Research Randomizer (Urbaniak & Plous, 2011), an online 
computer program that creates customized sets of randomly generated numbers that 
researchers can use for random assignment to experimental conditions, I specified one 
set of unique random numbers between 1 and 90 be generated. The first 30 participant 




second set of 30 participant identification numbers in this list were assigned to the 
Happy Control Prime Condition; the third set of participant identification numbers 
were assigned to the Neutral Control Condition. The results of this randomization are 
presented in Appendix B. 
 I entered the results of this randomization into a text file that listed each 
participant identification number and the condition to which it had been assigned. 
This text file was then saved as the autostart file for the MediaLab (Jarvis, 2010a) 
experiment that I developed for the purposes of presenting the study protocol and 
recording particpants’ responses. MediaLab then used this autostart file to assign the 
participant identifications number and the condition automatically prior to each 
session. This process keeps the participant’s condition concealed from both the 
experimenters and the participant.  
 Experimental Manipulation: Secure Prime vs. Happy Control Prime vs. 
Neutral Control Prime. The experimental manipulation occurred during a computer 
game in which children determined whether each picture in a series of 20 randomly 
presented pictures was an animal (e.g., cow, deer) or a plant (e.g., dandelion, ivy; see 
Appendix C for these cover pictures that children judged). The computer game was 
completed prior to viewing each of the three fear-inducing picture presentations and 
each of the three excitement-inducing picture presentations, for a total of six times 
throughout the lab. Prior to viewing each cover picture, children were exposed to a 
picture prime.  
 The picture prime was presented subliminally for 15 milliseconds, which is 




backward masked by an image of multi-colored television static. This mask was 
presented for 500 milliseconds immediately before the picture prime and for 500 
milliseconds immediately after the picture prime. Cover pictures were then presented 
until children told the experimenter whether the picture was an animal or a plant. All 
children were able to follow this protocol. See Figure 3 for a visual depiction of the 
order and duration that stimuli are presented. Children were instructed by an 
experimenter on how to play the computer game during a training session. During the 
training session, children saw only the mask and the cover picture. No priming 
pictures were presented during the training period. Children were told that the mask 
was “the computer picking the picture to show on the screen.”  
  Picture primes for children randomly assigned to the attachment-security 
priming condition were pictures that evoke mental representations of security (e.g., 
sketches of a mother having a caring interaction with her infant; See Appendix D for 
the security priming stimuli). Priming pictures for children randomly assigned to the 
happy control condition were pictures of adult humans smiling from the University of 
Bolton Affect Recognition Tri-Stimulus Approach (Lawrence, Abdel-Nabi, & 
Charlton, May 2011; See Appendix E for a list of the pictures used and example 
pictures for the happy priming condition). Priming pictures for children randomly 
assigned to the neutral control condition were pictures of a neutral valence (e.g., 
multi-colored polygons; See Appendix F for the neutral priming stimuli).  
  Order of Tasks. Here, I describe the order of the tasks that mothers and 
children completed during their visit to the laboratory, however, not all of these tasks 




tasks that are part of the present study. In Table 2, I provide a visual representation of 
the procedure that shows the order of each task, when the mother and child are 
together and when they are separated, and the length of each task. The tasks that are 
bold are tasks that are part of the present study. After informed consent was obtained 
(see Appendix G for a copy of the IRB approval letter and Appendix H for a copy of 
the IRB approved informed consent form), an experimenter attached three sets of 
psychophysiological monitors to both mother and child (EDA, electrocardiogram, and 
respiratory effort). Placement of the sensors took approximately 3-minutes. Next, 
mothers and their children completed several tasks in separate, adjacent rooms. 
During this first separation, children completed an assessment of their language 
ability, which is not part of the present study. This language ability assessment, which 
lasts approximately 10-minutes, involves the child telling a story using a picture book 
that has no words (Justice, Bowles, Pence, & Gosse, 2010). Second, children 
completed an assessment of their secure-base script knowledge, a measure that is not 
part of the present study. This 10-minute assessment of children’s secure-base script 
knowledge involved children finishing a set of story stems and a set of dolls. Children 
were told the beginning of the story and told to tell the rest of the story. Third, 
children were asked to sit quietly with their eyes closed and try to clear their mind of 
all thoughts for 2-minutes. The purpose of this brief rest period was to establish the 
child’s baseline EDA, ECG, and respiratory effort. These baseline measures were not 
used in the present study. After the rest period, children completed an emotions 
labeling task during which children will labeled the expressions of six photographs of 




purposes. First, this task ensured that each child could identify accurately the 
emotions depicted in the photographs that were used to assess children’s emotions 
throughout the lab session. Second, this task served as a baseline assessment of 
children’s self-reported emotions. Following the emotions labeling task, children 
were reunited with their mother for 3- to 5-minutes to take a short break. After this 
brief reunion, children were separated from their mother for a second time. 
 During this second separation, children played the computer game and saw 
several sets of pictures. First, children saw a set of 20 neutral pictures to assess their 
baseline EDA. For the Fear-Inducing Pictures First group, children saw three sets of 
20 fear-inducing pictures were presented followed by a set of 20 neutral pictures to 
bring children back to baseline after which they saw three sets of 20 excitement-
inducing pictures. For the Excitement-Inducing Pictures First group, children saw 
three sets of 20 excitement-inducing pictures followed by a set of 20 neutral pictures 
to bring children back to baseline after which they saw three sets of 20 fear-inducing 
pictures. Following each fear-inducing and each excitement-inducing picture set, 
children rated how the pictures made them feel using a visual analog scale. Children 
completed the computer game prior to the start of each fear- and excitement-inducing 
picture set. The child experimenter script is provided in Appendix I. 
 While the children were completing their tasks, mothers were in an adjacent 
room completing several tasks (see Table 2 for summary and order). During the first 
separation, mothers answered demographic questions about herself and her child (5-
minutes). Then mothers were asked to sit upright, close their eyes, and try to clear 




rest period is to establish a baseline for the psychophysiological assessments that will 
be collected throughout the laboratory session. The mothers’ psychophysiological 
responses are not part of the present study. Following the brief rest period, mothers 
reported on their child’s temperamental fearfulness using three subscales 
(Discomfort, Fear, and Shyness) of the Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; 
Rothbart, Ahadi, Hershey & Fisher, 2001). These subscales of the CBQ took 
approximately 20-minutes to complete. Then, mothers completed two adult 
attachment assessments, each of which takes approximately 10-minutes to complete. 
First, mothers completed the Adult Secure Base Script assessment (Waters and 
Waters, 2006). Second, mothers completed the Experiences in Close Relationships 
inventory (ECR; Brennan, Clark, & Shaver, 1998). Then, mothers were reunited with 
their child for 3- to 5-minutes to take a short break after which mothers were 
separated from their child for a second time. 
 During the second separation, mothers completed several tasks designed to 
assess their caregiving information processing. First, mothers’ reactions to infant 
distress were assessed by having mothers watch video clips of infants crying and 
having them answer questions related to these videos (Leerkes, 2010; Leerkes & 
Siepak, 2006). Second, mothers’ completed the Coping with Children’s Negative 
Emotions questionnaire (CCNES; Fabes, Eisenberg, & Bernzweig, 1990). Lastly, 
mothers’ ability to tolerate infant crying was assessed using the CryBaby a 
computerized game adapted from the Behavioral Indicator of Resiliency to Distress 




tasks that mothers and children completed that are part of the present study in detail 
below.  
Measures and Materials 
 Demographics. Mothers were asked to report on the age and sex of all 
members of their household and each person’s relationship to themselves and their 
child, their annual household income, whether they and their children are native 
English speakers, their marital status, their child’s race and ethnicity, and the month 
and year of their child’s birth. Additional demographic information was collected that 
were not intended to be part of the present study (see Appendix J for complete 
demographics questionnaire).  
 Picture Presentations. Children’s fear, happy excitement, and baseline 
emotional reactions were elicited by presenting pictures selected from the IAPS 
(Lang et al., 2008). The IAPS is a large set of emotionally-evocative color 
photographs that has been widely used in psychophysiological research (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001; Bradley, Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001) 
and has been used successfully in research with children (McManis, Bradley, Berg, 
Cuthbert, & Lang, 2001). This set of pictures has undergone a rigorous affective 
norming and rating process in order to establish it as a standardized set of materials 
for researchers to use in the study of emotion. From the IAPS I selected three sets of 
pictures to show children: a set of fear-inducing pictures, a set of excitement-inducing 
pictures, and a set of neutral pictures. I describe each set of pictures below.  
 Fear-Inducing Pictures. I selected pictures from the animal attack category 




category because it had been rated by adults as making them feel afraid or anxious 
(Bradley, Codispoti, Sabinelli, & Lang, 2001) and this category had been rated as 
having high unpleasant valence and high arousal by children between 10-12 years-of-
age (Lang et al., 2008). Children were shown three sets of 20 fear-inducing pictures 
(i.e., 60 different pictures). Each picture was presented for 3-seconds. See Appendix 
K for a list of the IAPS pictures that I used for fear-inducing stimuli.  
 Happy/Excitement-Inducing Pictures. I selected pictures from the adventure, 
sports, and food categories to use as excitement-inducing stimuli. I selected these 
categories because they had been rated by adults as making them feel excited and 
happy (Bradley, Codispoti, Sabinelli, & Lang, 2001) and they had been rated as 
having high pleasant valence and high arousal by children between 10-12 years (Lang 
et al., 2008). Children were shown three sets of 20 fear-inducing pictures. Each 
picture was presented for 3-seconds. See Appendix L for a list of the IAPS pictures 
that I used for happy excitement-inducing stimuli.  
 Neutral Pictures. I selected pictures from the household objects category and 
other pictures rated by children between 10 and 12 years of age as having low levels 
of arousal and mid-range on the scales for pleasantness-unpleasantness and 
dominance. These pictures were used to assess children’s baseline reactivity and to 
bring children back to baseline between the fear- and excitement-inducing picture 
sets. Children were shown one set of 20 pictures to assess their baseline reactions 
after the break, and they were shown a second set of 20 pictures between the fear-




was shown for 3-seconds. See Appendix M for a list of the IAPS pictures that I used 
as neutral stimuli.  
 Children’s fear reactivity. Children’s fear reactivity was assessed in two 
ways. Children’s physiological fear responses were assessed by measuring the child’s 
EDA. In addition, children reported the intensity of their fear. I describe each of these 
measures in turn.  
 Children’s EDA. An experimenter applied an odor-free, hypo-allergenic 
silver chloride gel to the silver chloride electrodes. An experimenter attached these 
two electrodes to the palmar surfaces of the index and middle finger on the second 
phalanges of children’s non-dominant hand using double-sided adhesive discs and 
elasticized Velcro bands (one electrode on the index finger and the other on the 
middle finger) to assess children’s EDA. To prevent the electrodes from moving, 
experimenters also taped the electrodes to participants’ fingers.  
 EDA was assessed continuously using a Biopac MP 150 system and 
AcqKnowledge v4.1. The system was calibrated to zero before the start of each 
session. EDA was sampled at a rate of 1000 samples per second at a gain of 5 µΩ/V 
and 10 Hz. Phasic skin conductance was calculated using a smoothing baseline 
removal. The baseline used to calculate the phasic skin conductance was taken from 
the 2-minute rest period during which children sat still and quiet. Using the phasic 
skin conductance, skin conductance responses (SCRs) were calculated using a 
threshold of 0.02 µS. SCRs under 10% of the maximum were rejected. SCRs were 
used as an indicator of children’s sympathetic nervous system responses to the picture 




result of environmental stimuli. Prior to examining the data, I chose to operationalize 
children’s physiological fear reactions as children’s skin conductance responses for a 
conceptual/methodological reason. Specifically, I chose to use SCRs as a marker of 
physiological fear responses because they are derived from the phasic EDA, which 
takes into account children’s baseline EDA. (Additions are in bold typeface).
 After children’s SCRs were calculated, the number of SCRs in each of the 8 
picture presentations (3 fear-inducing picture sets, 3 excitement-inducing picture sets, 
2 neutral picture sets) were counted. After the number of SCRs during each picture 
presentation was calculated, videos of the children during the picture presentations 
were viewed to identify times that the child’s hand with the EDA electrodes moved 
and segments during which extra-experimental factors occurred (e.g., construction 
noise). If the child’s hand moved during a picture presentation or an extra-
experimental factor occurred, the EDA activity during that segment was dropped 
from the dataset. Of the 720 possible SCRs data points (90 participants × 8 pictures 
presentations = 720 possible data points), children’s hands moved and/or an extra-
experimental factor occurred during 54 segments resulting in 54 EDA segments that 
were deleted from the dataset.  
 Children’s Self-Reported Emotions (Durbin, 2010). To circumvent problems 
that may be present due to the verbal abilities of young children, I used Durbin’s 
(2010) protocol that allowed children to indicate their emotional state using a visual 
analog scale and a set of six pictures of children displaying facial expressions of 




expressions of emotions (Widen & Russell, 2003), I conducted a training session that 
ensured that they were able to identify each emotion accurately.  
 During the training session, children viewed six photographs of a child who is 
approximately 10-years old and the same sex as the child. Five of these photographs 
were of a child displaying a facial expression of a discrete emotion (i.e., happiness, 
sadness, anger, fear, and surprise). The sixth photograph was of a child with a neutral 
expression. The experimenter showed children each picture and asked them to label 
the expression. If children correctly labeled the photograph, the experimenter 
acknowledged that they were correct and continued to the next photograph. Forty-one 
(45.6%) of the children were able to identify all five discrete emotions on the first 
attempt. Of the 49 children who incorrectly labeled at least one emotion on the first 
attempt, 35 incorrectly labeled only one emotion (happiness = 0, sadness = 1, anger = 
4, fear = 25, and surprise = 5). Only 6 children incorrectly labeled more than one 
emotion. 
  If children incorrectly labeled the photograph, the experimenter did three 
things. First, the experimenter provided the child with the correct label. Second, 
features of the facial expression that define the correct emotion were pointed out to 
the child (e.g., “See how her eyes and mouth are open wide? She is feeling 
surprised.”). Third, the experimenter provided the child with a brief scenario 
describing a situation that would elicit the emotion (e.g., “Maybe she is happy 
because she got a present she really likes.”) Then, children were asked to label the 





 After children were shown the emotional expression pictures, they were then 
shown a drawing of five thermometers: one 5% full, one 25% full, one half full, one 
75% full, and one completely full). The experimenter labeled each thermometer 
(“almost none or very, very little,.” ; “a little bit,”  “ medium,” “ a lot,” and “very, 
very much or a whole, whole lot,”).  Children were asked to repeat the labels. The 
experimenter explained that the thermometers were going to be used to talk about 
how much of each feeling the child was feeling. See Appendix N for the pictures of 
the facial expressions and the thermometers. Then, the experimenter showed the child 
a “How I Feel” worksheet that had each of the six pictures on it with a set of 
thermometers under each picture presented in a random order. Children were ask to 
think about how they felt and to circle or point to the thermometer that matched how 
happy, sad, surprised, scared, angry, and okay they felt. Children completed the How 
I Feel worksheet following the baseline neutral picture presentation and following 
each fear- and excitement-inducing picture presentation. Intensity was scored as 
follows: not selected = 0, “almost none or very, very little,” = 1; “a little bit,” = 2; “ 
medium,” = 3; “ a lot,” = 4; and “very, very much or a whole, whole lot,” = 5.  The 
full script for the emotions labeling task is included in the child experimenter script 
(Appendix I). 
 Photographs were provided by Linda Camras and Emily Durbin. These 
photographs have been used in previous studies of children’s facial expression 
identification (Camras, Ribordy, Hill, Martino, Sachs, Spaccarelli, & Stefani, 1990). 
The photographs displaying the five emotions were judged to represent prototypical 




Friesen’s (1978) facial action coding system (FACS). Durbin (2010) developed and 
validated this method of measuring children’s self-reported emotions with a sample 
of children between 3- and 6-years-old. Durbin reported that children’s reports of 
their emotions during a series of tasks from the Laboratory Temperament Assessment 
Battery (Lab–TAB; Goldsmith, Reilly, Lemery, Longley, & Prescott, 1995) were 
consistent with the emotions that the tasks were designed to elicit and were correlated 
with observers’ ratings of children’s affect across the laboratory tasks.   
 Child Temperamental Fearfulness (CBQ; Rothbart, et al., 2001). The 
CBQ is a caregiver report measure designed to assess 15 aspects of temperament in 
children between 3 and 7-years-of-age. Mothers completed three subscales of the 
CBQ, which is a parent-report measure of temperament for children between 3- and 
7-years-of-age. Parents respond on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 “extremely untrue 
of your child” to 7 “extremely true of your child.” The Discomfort (12 items), 
Fearfulness (12 items), and Shyness (13 items) subscales will be used (37 items total). 
The Discomfort subscale assesses the amount of negative affect children have in 
response to light, movement, sound, and texture. The Fearful subscale assesses the 
amount of negative affect (e.g., unease, worry, nervousness) children have in 
anticipation of pain, distress, and potentially threatening situations. The Shyness 
subscale assesses children’s slow or inhibited approach in novel or uncertain 
situations (see Appendix O). 
 Internal consistency for ratings of 6- to 7-year-old children for the items in 
each of the three subscales included in the present study range from .67 to .92. 




and 7-years with correlations ranging from .50 to .79 for the Fear, Discomfort, and 
Shyness subscales. In addition, children’s scores on these subscales are consistent 
across different raters as indicated by the moderate correlations between 
mothers’scores and fathers’ scores. (Rothbart et al., 2001). 
 Following Gillissen et al. (2007), children’s standardized scores on the Fear, 
Discomfort, and Shyness subscales were averaged to create an overall temperamental 
fearfulness score. Previous research has found these subscales to load highly onto the 
same factor (Rothbart et al., 2001; Gillissen et al., 2007). This temperamental 
fearfulness composite has also demonstrated to have adequate internal consistency 
(Gillissen et al., 2007). Internal consistency in the present study was high (α = .90). 
The reliability for the Discomfort subscale was high (α = .79). Reliability for the Fear 
subscale was high (α = .73). Reliability for the Shyness subscale was also high (α = 
.93). Following Gillissen et al. (2007), children’s standardized scores on the Fear, 
Discomfort, and Shyness subscales were averaged to create an overall temperamental 
fearfulness score. Previous research has found these subscales to load highly onto the 
same factor (Rothbart et al., 2001; Gillissen et al., 2007). This temperamental 
fearfulness composite has also demonstrated adequate internal consistency (Gillissen 
et al., 2007). Internal consistency in the present study was high (α = .90). In addition, 
the Discomfort subscale was correlated with the Fear (r = .66, p < .01 ) and Shyness 
(r = .26, p = .014) subscales, and the Fear and Shyness subscales were correlated (r = 
.29, p = .005). The overall reliability for all 37 items used in the composite 




 Mothers’ Responses to Child’s Negative Emotions (CCNES; Fabes et al., 
1990). Mothers’ responses to their children’s negative emotions will be assessed 
using the CCNES which was designed to assess how parents typically respond to 
their young children’s (preschool or early elementary school) negative emotions. This 
self-report measure presents parents with 12 hypothetical scenarios in which their 
child is upset or angry (e.g., “If my child is panicky and can't go to sleep after 
watching a scary TV show, I would:”). Six possible ways of responding to the child’s 
negative emotions are provided for each scenario [e.g., (a) “encourage my child to 
talk about what scared him/her,” (b) “get upset with him/her for being silly,” (c) “tell 
my child that he/she is over-reacting ,” (d) “help my child think of something to do so 
that he/she can get to sleep (e.g., take a toy to bed, leave the lights on),” (e) “tell 
him/her to go to bed or he/she won't be allowed to watch any more TV,” (f) “do 
something fun with my child to help him/her forget about what scared him/her”]. 
Parents are asked to rate the likelihood that they would respond to the scenario in 
each of the six possible ways provided on a 7 point scale ranging from 1 “very 
unlikely” to 7 “very likely” (Fabes et al., 1990; see Appendix P for the instructions 
and items).  
 Each of the six responses corresponds to one of the six subscales that are 
derived reflecting the degree to which parents respond to their children’s distress by 
becoming distressed themselves (Distress Reactions), verbal or physical punishment 
(Punitive Reactions), validation or acceptance of their child’s negative emotional 
displays (Expressive Encouragement), providing the child with strategies to help the 




that caused the child’s distress (Problem-Focused Reactions), and discounting the 
seriousness of the situation or devaluing the child’s problem or distressful reaction 
(Minimization Reactions; Fabes et al., 1990).  
 The results of a study aimed at investigating the psychometric properties of 
the CCNES indicate that it is both a reliable and valid instrument. Specifically, the six 
subscales derived from the CCNES have demonstrated acceptable internal 
consistency with alpha coefficients ranging from .69 to .85. Test-retest reliability 
across four months is also high with correlations between scores at both time points 
ranging from .62 to .83 for each of the six subscales (Fabes et al., 1990). Internal 
consistency for the present study was good (α = .80).   
 Correlations between the six CCNES subscales and other self-report parenting 
indexes generally support this measure’s construct validity. Specifically, correlations 
between parents who reported higher levels of empathic concern and perspective 
taking indicated that they would be more likely to respond to their children’s negative 
emotions with supportive reactions (i.e., Emotion-Focused and Problem-Focused 
Reactions) and would be less likely to respond to the children’s negative emotions 
with harsh and non-supportive reactions (i.e., Minimizing and Punitive Reactions). In 
addition, parents who reported feeling more anger when children are annoying or 
misbehave reported a greater likelihood of responding to their child’s negative 
emotions with Punitive, Minimizing, and Distress Reactions.  Furthermore, parent 
who reported using more harsh parenting practices also reported more harsh and non-





 Factor analysis of the six subscales revealed that Minimizing Reactions and 
Punitive Reactions loaded together reflecting a harsh negative and non-supportive 
response style, and Emotion-Focused Reactions and Problem-Focused Reactions 
loaded together reflecting a supportive response style that is focused on helping the 
child cope with his or her distress and the cause of it. As such, these six subscales 
were combined in a way to reflect this two factor structure (See Table 3 for the 
correlations matrix for this measure). That is, Minimizing and Punitive Reactions 
scores were combined to create a Non-Supportive/Harsh Reactions score and 
Emotion-Focused and Problem-Focused Reactions were combined to create a 
Supportive Reactions score. In order to examine whether high maternal supportive 
responses and low maternal harsh responses to child distress were linked to children’s 
fear reactions, I combined the Supportive and Harsh subscales into one Maternal 
Emotion Socialization score by subtracting mothers’ Harsh scores from their 




Chapter 4: Results 
Data Management and Preliminary Analyses 
Data were examined prior to analyses to assure that the condition that each 
child was assigned to was delivered properly. Videos of each session were reviewed 
to verify the order in which the participants received the anxiety-inducing and 
excitement-inducing pictures. DirectRT (Jarvis, 2010b) recorded both the priming 
stimuli that were presented and the length of time that each priming stimulus was 
presented. These data logs were examined for each participant to verify both (a) the 
priming condition of each participant and (b) that the priming stimuli were presented 
below the threshold of conscious awareness. All participants were shown the correct 
stimuli and all priming stimuli were presented below the threshold of conscious of 
awareness (mean presentation time 24.53 ms, SD = .11 ms). In addition, data were 
examined to ensure that each response logged in the data file was a possible response. 
Specifically, the range of each variable was examined to determine that each response 
fell within the possible range of the scores. SCRs do not have a pre-specified 
maximum possible score that would indicate whether a response is an impossible 
score. As such, videos during the picture presentations were examined to ensure that 
the response was not an artifact of excessive movement or some other disturbance 
(e.g., loud, sudden noises that are not part of the protocol but are outside of the 
control of the experimenter can cause changes in SCRs). SCRs responses that were 
determined to be the cause extra-experimental factors were discarded. Six SCRs were 
removed due to loud construction noise and 48 SCRs were removed due to children’s 




to two children who were unable to complete the study. Thus, of the 720 possible 
SCRs (90 participants × 8 picture presentations = 720) 65 (9.03%) were missing, 
resulting 655 SCRs available for data analyses. Of these 655 SCRs, the mean was 
4.56 (SD = 10.10; Range: 0 – 79). Descriptive statistics of children’s SCRs during 
each picture presentation are presented in Table 4. Because of the extensive data 
cleaning, extreme scores, defined as scores that were more than 2.5 standard 
deviations away from the mean (also referred to as outliers), were maintained in the 
dataset. In this dataset, there were 19 SCRs identified as extreme scores ranging from 
2.67 to 6.06 standard deviations from the mean.  
 After examining my data for impossible values, but prior to conducting my 
primary analyses, I examined my data for missing values. None of the CBQ mean 
scores were missing. Only one mother did not complete the CCNES. Her scores were 
not imputed because her child was in the happy prime condition and her scores were 
not needed for analyses. Of the 720 possible How I Feel worksheets (90 participants 
× 8 How I Feel worksheets), 11 were missing because two children were unable to 
complete the procedure and one child was missing all 8 worksheets because he did 
not cooperate with the experimenter throughout and scribbled on top of his responses, 
thus making his data indecipherable. Thus, 19 (2.64%) of the children’s self-reported 
emotions were missing. As stated above, 65 (9.03%) SCRs were missing.  Data were 
missing completely at random as indicated by a Little’s MCAR test (χ
2
 (5669) = 
210.69, p = 1.000). The missing SCRs and children’s self-reported emotions were 
imputed using the Multiple Imputation module in SPSS. I imputed missing values to 




complete datasets were used to conduct my primary analyses (next section). Each 
analysis was run with each dataset, then the parameter estimates, estimated marginal 
means, and their standard errors obtained from these analyses were pooled. Inferential 
tests of my hypotheses and research questions were conducted using these pooled 
statistics allowing me to do so with improved power and unbiased parameter 
estimates compared to other methods for handling missing data, including listwise 
deletion and single imputation (Graham, 2009). Given that Generalized Estimating 
Equations (GEE), which is the statistical analysis technique that I used to test my 
primary hypotheses, does not assume either normality or linearity, the last step prior 
to conducting my primary analyses was to determine how children’s SCRs were 
distributed. Given that SCRs are frequency count data, and based on the shape of the 
distribution, I determined that the data best fit a negative binomial or Pascal 
distribution. The negative binomial distribution was specified in my GEE analyses for 
SCRs.  
There were no sex differences in children’s SCRs (F(1,89) = 1.43, p = .236). 
There were differences in children’s self-reported fear (F(1,89) = 10.26, p = .002) such 
that girls  (M = 1.69, SD = 1.39) reported being more scared than boys (M = .88, SD = 
.97). As such, an additional set of analyses for children’s self-reported fear, was 
performed that included the effect of sex, in addition to the variables already 
specified. For the analysis with all three conditions that tested the effects of priming 
on children’s self-reported fear, none of the main effects was statistically significant 
[Condition:  χ
2
 (2) = 4.04, p = 0.133; Order: χ
2
 (1) = .73, p = 0.394; Valence: χ
2
 (1) = 
.70, p = 0.401; Sex: χ
2
 (1) = 2.00, p = 0.157; Temperament:  χ
2




There were also no significant two-way interactions [Condition × Order: χ
2
 (2) = .21, 
p = 0.901; Condition × Valence: χ
2
 (2) = 3.629, p = 0.163; Condition × Sex: χ
2
 (2) = 
3.37, p = 0.185; Condition × Temperament: χ
2
 (2) = 3.72, p = 0.156; Order × 
Valence: χ
2
 (1) = .67, p = 0.412; Order × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .48, p = 0.487; Order 
× Sex: χ
2
 (1) = 1.58, p = 0.208; Valence × Sex: χ
2
 (1) = .01, p = 0.929; Valence × 
Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .23, p = 0.635; Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .000, p = 0.998]. 
There were no significant three-way interactions [Condition × Order × Valence: χ
2
 (2) 
= .05, p = .974; Condition × Order × Sex: χ
2
 (2) = 2.77, p = .251; Condition × 
Valence × Temperament: χ
2
 (2) = 3.138, p = .208; Condition × Sex × Temperament: 
χ
2
 (2) = 2.27, p = .323; Order × Valence × Sex: χ
2
 (2) = 2.77, p = .251; Order × 
Valence × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = 1.98, p = .160; Order × Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) 
= .56, p = .453; Valence × Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .06, p = .812]. There were no 
significant four-way interactions [Condition × Order × Valence × Sex: χ
2
 (2) = .19, p 
= .909; Condition × Order × Valence × Temperament: χ
2
 (2) = .24, p = .889; 
Condition × Order × Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (2) = 2.89, p = .236; Condition × 
Valence × Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (2) = 1.80, p = .406; Order × Valence × Sex × 
Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .18, p = .669]. The five way interaction between Condition, 
Order, Valence, Sex, and Temperament was also not significant (χ
2
 (2) = .33, p = 
0.848). 
Similarly, for the analysis using only the neutral control condition to 
determine the effects of maternal emotion socialization, none of the effects were 
statistically significant. There were no significant main effects present [Order χ
2
 (1) = 
.152, p = .697; Valence: χ
2
 (1) = .637, p = .425; Sex: χ
2






 (1) = .010, p = .920]. There were also no significant two-way 
interactions [Sex × Valence: χ
2
 (1) = .125, p = .723; Sex × Maternal Emotion 
Socialization: χ
2
 (1) = .223, p = .637; Sex × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .031, p = .860; 
Valence × Maternal Emotion Socialization: χ
2
 (1) = .622, p = .430; Valence × 
Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = 1.238, p = .266; Maternal Emotion Socialization × 
Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .554, p = .457]. These were also no significant three-way 
interactions [Sex × Valence × Maternal Emotion Socialization: χ
2
 (1) = .348, p = 
.555; Sex × Valence × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .762, p = .383; Sex × Maternal Emotion 
Socialization × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .278, p = .598; Valence × Maternal Emotion 
Socialization × Temperament: χ
2
 (1) = .238, p = .626]. Lastly, the four-way 
interaction between Sex, Valence, Maternal Emotion Socialization, and Temperament 
was not significant [χ
2
 (1) = .432, p = .511].  
 In order to determine whether SCRs among the security, happy, and neutral 
priming groups differed as a function of the order in which children watched the fear-
inducing and excitement-inducing pictures, I conducted a full-factorial generalized 
estimating equations (GEE) analysis. The main effects of Condition (Secure Prime vs. 
Happy Prime vs. Neutral Prime), Valence (Fear-Inducing Pictures vs. 
Happy/Excitement-Inducing Pictures), and Order (Fear-Inducing Pictures First vs. 
Happy/Excitement-Inducing Pictures First) were entered as between subjects factors, 
as were all possible two-way interactions (i.e., Condition × Valence, Condition × 
Order, Valence × Order), and the three-way interaction between Condition, Valence, 
and Order. This analysis was conducted separately for each of the following outcome 




Primary Analyses  
The present study was designed to address two hypotheses and to address two 
research questions. In order to test my two hypotheses and address my two research 
questions, I conducted three sets of analyses (see Table 1 for my Hypotheses and 
Research Questions). 
Order Effects. First, in order to determine whether changes in SCRs between 
the security, happy, and neutral priming groups differed as a function of the order in 
which children watched the fear-inducing and excitement-inducing pictures, I 
conducted a full-factorial generalized estimating equations (GEE) analysis for 
children’s SCRs. The main effects of Condition (Secure Prime vs. Happy Prime vs. 
Neutral Prime), Valence (Fear-Inducing Pictures vs. Happy/Excitement-Inducing 
Pictures), and Order (Fear-Inducing Pictures First vs. Happy/Excitement-Inducing 
Pictures First) were entered as between subjects factors, as were all possible two-way 
interactions (i.e., Condition × Valence, Condition × Order, Valence × Order), and the 
three-way interaction between Condition, Valence, and Order.  The main effect of 
Order was not significant (χ
2
 (1) = 2.70, p = .100). The Condition × Order interaction 
was not significant (χ
2
 (2) = .29, p = .865), but the the Valence × Order interaction 
was significant (χ
2
 (1) = 6.32, p = .012). Post-hoc probing indicated that during the 
Fear-Inducing pictures, SCRs were higher when the Happy/Excitement-Inducing 
pictures (Mean = 6.97, SE = 1.254) were presented first compared to when the Fear-
Inducing pictures (Mean = 2.44, SE = .635) were presented first (Mean difference = -
5.12, SE = 1.546, p = .001).  Similarly, during the Happy/Excitement-Inducing 




6.07, SE = 1.150) were presented first compared to when the Fear-Inducing pictures 
(Mean = 2.13, SE = .565) were presented first (Mean difference = -4.22, SE = 1.39, p 
= .002).  There was not a difference in SCRs between the Fear-Inducing pictures and 
the Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures when the Fear-Inducing pictures were 
presented first (Mean difference = .37, SE = .223, p = .096). When the 
Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures were presented first, SCRs were higher during 
the Fear-Inducing pictures compared to during the Happy/Excitement-Inducing 
pictures (Mean difference = 1.27, SE = .482, p = .008). The Condition × Valence × 
Order (χ
2
 (1) = 1.51, p = .469).  
Analyses of whether of there were any effects of Order for children’s self-
reports of fear indicated that the main effect of Order was not significant (χ
2
 (1) = 
1.53, p = .261). The Order × Valence interaction was also not significant (χ
2
 (1) = 
333, p = .564). Because the main effect of order was significant in the analyses with 
SCRs, this variable will be included in GEE analyses involving the effect of 
Condition. Order will not be included in analyses that are conducted with only the 
Neutral Control condition due to inadequate power to test a model that included this 
additional effect.  
Hypothesis 1 and Research Question 1. To test hypothesis 1 and address 
research question 1, I conducted a full-factorial GEE analysis as follows. Order, 
Condition and Valence were entered as between subjects factors and Temperament 
was entered as a covariate to examine the main effects. In addition, all possible two-
way interactions (i.e., Condition × Valence, Condition × Temperament, Valence × 




way interaction s (i. e., Condition × Valence × Order, Condition × Temperament × 
Order, Valence × Temperament × Order, Condition × Valence × Temperament), and 
the four-way interaction between Order, Condition, Valence, and Temperament were 
examined. This analysis was conducted twice: once with SCRs as the outcome 
variable, and again with children’s self-reported fear as the outcome variable. See 
Tables 5 and 6 for the tests of the omnibus model effects for SCRs and children self-
reported fear, respectively.  
Hypothesis 1: Children who are exposed to security-enhancing primes will 
have lower EDA and will report feeling less scared or anxious during the anxiety-
provoking tasks compared to children in the control condition.  Pairwise 
comparisons of the pooled Estimated Marginal (EM) means obtained from GEE 
analysis described above were used to test Hypothesis 1 by examining differences in 
SCRs and self-reported feelings of fear between children in the Secure priming, 
Happy priming, and Neutral Control priming conditions. The omnibus effect of the 
interaction between Condition and Valence was significant for analyses of SCRs (χ
2
 
(2) = 7.634, p = .022). Post-hoc testing indicated that SCRs for children during the 
Fear-Inducing pictures were lowest for children in the Secure priming condition 
compared to children in both the Happy priming (mean difference = -2.82, p = .036, 
one-tailed) and Neutral priming (Mean difference = -3.93, p = .012, one-tailed) 
conditions. In addition, SCRs for the Happy priming condition and Neutral priming 
condition did not significantly differ (Mean difference = -1.11, p = .700, one-tailed) 




Post-hoc tests of SCRs for children during the Happy/Excitement-Inducing 
pictures indicated that SCRs were not significantly different for children in the Secure 
priming condition compared to children in the Happy priming (Mean difference = 
2.04, p = .092, one-tailed) and Neutral priming Conditions (Mean difference = 1.25, p 
= .232, one-tailed). SCRs were not significantly different during the 
Happy/Excitement pictures for children in the happy priming condition and children 
in the neutral priming condition (Mean difference = -0.79, p = .729). See Table 5 for 
the tests of the omnibus effects.  See Figure 2 for a depiction of the pairwise 
comparisons of the pooled EM means.  
For analyses of children’s self-reported fear, neither the Condition × Valence 
(χ
2
 (2) = 1.124, p = .570) nor the Condition × Valence × Order (χ
2
 (2) = .416, p = 
.812) interactions were significant. See Table 6 for the tests of the omnibus effects.   
Additional comparisons. To further probe the interaction between Condition 
and Valence for SCRs, I examined within group differences. Because there were no a 
priori hypotheses regarding within group tests, I use two-tailed tests of significance. 
Within group comparisons of SCRs indicated that children in the secure priming 
group had lower SCRs during the Fear-Inducing pictures compared to the 
Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures (Mean difference = -2.55, p = .004, two-tailed). 
The opposite emerged when probing within group differences for the Happy and 
Neutral Priming conditions in which SCRs were higher during the Fear-Inducing 
pictures compared to the Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures (Mean difference for 
Happy Priming group = 2.31, p = .014, two-tailed; Mean difference for the Neutral 




pairwise comparisons for the Condition × Valence interaction that emerged for 
children’s SCRs. Furthermore, there was a marginal main effect for composite child 
temperamental fearfulness that indicated that children who were rated by their 
mothers as less temperamentally fearful had more SCRs than children who were rated 
by their mothers as less temperamentally fearful (χ
2
 (1) = 3.143, p = .076). 
Research Question 1: Does child temperamental fearfulness moderate the 
effect of attachment-security priming on children’s EDA and self-reported fear 
during the anxiety-provoking tasks?. I addressed Research Question 1 according to 
the specifications of the differential susceptibility hypothesis (see Belsky et al., 2007, 
and Belsky & Pluess, 2009) by probing the highest order interaction including the 
effects of Condition, Valence, and Temperament (i.e., Condition ×  Valence × 
Temperament or Condition × Order × Temperament × Valence). For analyses of 
children’s SCRs, neither the Condition × Valence × Temperament (χ
2
 (2) = . 521, p = 
.771) nor the Condition × Order × Temperament × Valence (χ
2
 (2) = . 690, p = .708) 
interactions were significant. See Table 5 for the tests of the omnibus effects.   
For analyses of children’s self-reported fear, neither the Condition × Valence 
× Temperament (χ
2
 (2) = .954, p = .621) nor the Condition × Order × Temperament × 
Valence (χ
2
 (2) = .689, p = .709) interactions were significant. See Table 6 for tests of 
the omnibus effects. 
Hypothesis 2 and Research Question 2. Tests of Hypothesis 2 and Research 
Question 2 were conducted using a full-factorial GEE analysis with the Neutral 
control group only. Valence was entered as a between subjects factor and Maternal 




main effects. In addition, all possible two-way interactions (i.e., Maternal Emotion 
Socialization × Valence, Maternal Emotion Socialization × Temperament, Valence × 
Temperament), and the three-way interaction between Maternal Emotion 
Socialization, Valence, and Temperament. See Tables 5 and 6 for the tests of the 
omnibus model effects for analyses with SCRs and children’s self-reported fear, 
respectively. 
Hypothesis 2: In the control group only, children’s EDA and reports feeling 
scared or anxious during the anxiety-provoking tasks will decrease as their 
mothers’ endorsement of supportive responses to their negative affect increases , 
whereas children’s EDA and reports feeling scared or anxious during the anxiety-
provoking tasks will increase as their mothers’ endorsement of unsupportive 
responses to their negative affect increases. None of the interactions of interest was 
statistically significant. For children’s SCRs, neither the Maternal Emotion 
Socialization × Valence interaction for the analysis with SCRs was significant (χ
2
 (1) 
= .780, p = .377; see Table 7) nor was the Maternal Emotion Socialization × Valence 
interaction for children’s self-reports of fear significant  (χ
2
 (1) = .147, p = .702; see 
Table 8).  
Research Question 2: In the control group only, does child temperamental 
fearfulness moderates the link between mothers’ responses to her child’s negative 
affect and her child’s EDA and self-reported fear? None of the interactions of 
interest were statistically significant. For children’s SCRs, neither the Maternal 
Emotion Socialization × Valence × Temperament (χ
2
 (1) = 1.24, p = .265; see Table 




× Valence × Temperament interaction for children’s self-reports of fear significant (χ
2
 




Chapter 5:  Discussion 
The present study was designed to determine whether experimentally enhanced 
attachment security causes decreased fear reactivity in children and to examine how 
mothers’ emotion socialization relates to children’s fear reactions. I also sought to 
examine how children’s temperament may serve as a moderator of these links. Based 
on attachment theory and previous research, I proposed that attachment security 
priming would decrease fear reactions compared to children in the control conditions. 
Based on emotion socialization theory and research, I hypothesized that increased 
maternal supportive reactions and decreased maternal unsupportive/harsh reactions to 
their children’s distress would be linked to lower fear reactivity in children. Based on 
the differential susceptibility hypothesis, I examined whether children with more 
fearful temperaments were more influenced by the effects of priming and the effects 
of maternal emotion socialization.  
 I assessed children’s fear reactions using both skin conductance responses and 
children’s self-reports. Only analyses of children’s SCRs data supported my 
hypothesis that experimentally-enhanced attachment security reduces fear responses. 
Specifically, as expected, I found that the effects of attachment security priming 
caused lower SCRs during the Fear-Inducing pictures compared to both the happy 
control priming and neutral control priming conditions. Also as expected, there were 
no differences among the attachment security priming, happy control priming, and 
neutral control priming conditions during the Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures. I 




condition. I discuss these findings further in the context of attachment and 
developmental research. I conclude by suggesting areas of future investigation.  
Attachment Security and Fearfulness 
 A central tenet of attachment theory is that the feeling of security and safety 
that is derived from the presence of an available and responsive attachment figure 
reduces fearfulness in children (Bowlby, 1969/1982, 1973). As such, I hypothesized 
that attachment security priming, which momentarily activates mental representations 
of security, would reduce children’s fear responses. As I expected, I found that 
children who were exposed to attachment security enhancing primes had lower 
physiological fear responses than children who were exposed to happiness enhancing 
primes and children exposed to primes of a neutral valence. Previous studies with 
infants have examined how increased accessibility to mother increases exploration 
(Carr, Dabbs, & Carr, 1975), and decreases negative emotions (Sorce & Emde, 1981). 
These findings, however, provide the first experimental evidence to support the idea 
that increased attachment security reduces fearfulness. Moreover, because this study 
included a happiness enhancing control condition, I can say that these findings are not 
due simply to increased positive affect. Also as expected, I found no differences 
among the attachment security priming, happy priming, and neutral priming 
conditions during observation of the Happy/Exciting pictures. These findings support 
the idea that attachment security decreases fearfulness specifically, as opposed to 
arousal in general.  
 Interestingly, unexpected within group differences emerged. Specifically, I 




more SCRs during observation of the Fear-Inducing pictures compared to the 
Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures. In contrast, within the security priming group, 
children had fewer SCRs during observation of the Fear-Inducing pictures compared 
to the Happy/Excitement-Inducing pictures.  
 In contrast to the findings discussed above, results for data analyses of 
children’s self-reported fear reactions were not statistically significant. Specifically, 
there were no differences in children’s self-reported fear among the attachment 
security priming, happy priming, and neutral control priming conditions. There are 
several reasons that may explain why attachment security priming influenced 
children’s physiological fear responses but did not influence children’s self-reported 
fear. First, children were asked to indicate how scared the pictures made them feel 
after the presentation of the pictures, whereas children’s SCRs were assessed 
continuously throughout the picture presentations. It is possible that by the time the 
picture presentations were over, the effects of priming had waned. Future research 
that examines how children’s skin conductance responses at the start of the picture 
presentations and at the end of the picture presentations map onto their self-reported 
fearfulness will be able to address the possibility that the effects of priming had 
waned by the time children reported on their feelings.   
Second, because the effects of attachment security priming were subconscious 
(i.e., priming was subliminal), it is possible that attachment security priming reduced 
the non-conscious measure of SCRs whereas priming did not influence the conscious 
subjective ratings of fear. It is possible that attachment security priming effects may 




participants are consciously aware. For example, children could be primed by looking 
at a picture book with the priming stimuli. This picture book priming technique has 
been successful in Over & Carpenter’s (2009a, 2009b) work which found that this 
priming technique changes children’s overt and conscious behavior. Research by 
Cassidy et al., (2009) suggests that it is possible to use a subliminal prime to change 
participant self-reports, however, this study is more of an exception rather than a 
rule,. For the most part, attachment security priming studies that have changed 
participant self-reports or conscious behavior have by and large used explicit priming 
(Mikulincer et al., 2005; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007b; Taubman – Ben-Ari & 
Mikulincer, 2007]).  
 Demand characteristics may have been another reason that children’s self-
reports of fear were not lower in the attachment security priming condition compared 
to the happy and neutral priming conditions. For example, because children were 
tested on their knowledge of the various emotions that were assessed after each 
picture presentation at the beginning of the experiment, they may have over-reported 
their fear because they wanted to get the answer “right”. If children over-reported 
their fear, this may have created a ceiling effect. This explanation seems plausible 
given that a substantial proportion of children reported to have the highest level of 
fear in response to the pictures.  
Another possibility is that characteristics of the child may have biased their 
self-reported fear. For example, it is possible that children’s constitutional attachment 
quality may be linked to their self-reported fear. Previous research and attachment 




Dismissing attachment style are thought to be more likely to minimize their negative 
emotional responses, whereas people who have an Ambivalent or Preoccupied 
attachment style are thought to be more likely to maximize their negative emotional 
responses (Cassidy, 1994; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2008). As such, it is possible that 
children who had an Avoidant attachment minimized their expressions of fear, 
whereas children who had an Ambivalent attachment maximized their expressions of 
fear. Future research that assesses children’s constitutional attachment quality using a 
separation-reunion procedure will be able to address this possibility.  
It is important to note that the effects of security priming may depend on past 
experiences of attachment security. For instance, it is possible that security priming 
may be more effective for children who have had more experiences of their 
caregivers as available and sensitively responsive when needed.  Thus, it is possible 
that security priming may be most effective for children who are chronically secure 
given their likely more frequent experiences of sensitive responsiveness from their 
caregivers. It is also possible that security priming may be relatively ineffective at 
enhancing positive psychosocial outcomes for children who are chronically secure 
compared to those who are chronically insecure because there is more room for 
improvement for those who are insecure. In addition, it is also possible that security 
priming is ineffective for those who have very few or no experiences of others as 
sensitively responsive because there is no secure base script to activate with priming.  
On the other hand, it may be the case that the effects of security priming do 
not depend on past experiences and hence also do not depend on dispositional 




attachment figure under threateneing situations is a primary biologically based 
behavioral strategy with which infants are born. If this is the case, then it could be 
argued that infants come into the world with a very basic knowledge of a secure base 
script (e.g., “Alerting others that I am distressed will elicit their caregiving 
response.”). Thus security priming may tap into this basic secure base script and may 
not depend on dispositional security. 
The same logic can be applied to security priming in adults, however, the 
effects of security priming as a function of dispositional attachment security seem to 
be the exception rather than the rule. Though definitive conclusions are not possible 
without more rigorous and direct tests of the possibilities described above, the 
infrequency with which dispositional security and security priming interact in the 
adult literature seems to suggest that increases in dispositional security neither 
increase nor decrease the effectiveness of security priming as a general rule. This 
finding, however, may not extend to childhood. For example, it is possible that, 
compared to children, adults have had more experiences of their needs for comfort 
being met by a sensitively responsive other because they have more opportunities for 
intimacy outside of their relationships with their parents. As such, it may be rather 
uncommon to reach adulthood without having experienced one’s needs for comfort 
and security being met by another, and it may be relatively more common for 
children to have very few or no experiences of their needs for comfort and security 
being met by another. Thus, dispositional security may interact with security priming 
in childhood and this possibility should be kept in mind as attachment researchers 




 Within the attachment security priming literature, the present study meshes 
with previous related research conducted with adults. Mikulincer and others (2005) 
found that attachment security priming, compared to close person priming and 
acquaintance priming, increased participants’ compassion, willingness to help, and 
likelihood of agreeing to replace a distressed woman who participants thought was 
going to have to pet a live tarantula. Similar to Mikulincer and colleagues (2001), the 
present study’s findings also indicate that attachment security priming is specific to 
threatening situations. Mikulincer et al. (2001; Studies 5-7) found that attachment 
security primes and positive affect enhancing primes increased participants’ positive 
affect compared to neutral primes under non-threatening condition. Under threatening 
conditions, however, attachment security primes increased participants’ positive 
affect more than both the positive affect enhancing and neutral primes). In the present 
study, during observation of the Fear-Inducing pictures, children’s SCRs were fewer 
in the attachment security priming condition compared to the happy priming and 
neutral control priming conditions, but there were no differences between priming 
condition groups during observation of the Happy/Excitement enhancing condition. 
These findings, like those of Mikulincer et al. indicate that attachment security 
priming reduces physiological arousal during times of threat.  
 Not only does the present study mesh with previous attachment security 
priming findings, it also extends this literature. Specifically, I included a social 
affiliative positive affect condition because the adult security priming literature has 
not excluded the possibility that exposure to a social positive affect prime may 




literature found that the effects of attachment security priming are not simply the 
result of positive affect, but the primes that have been used are not necessarily social 
in nature. For example, Mikulincer and colleagues (2001) used a picture of an 
overflowing treasure chest or a picture of a smiley face drawing. These positive affect 
primes do not rule out the possibility that a social positively valenced picture may 
reduce fearfulness. The present study has been able to rule out this possibility. In 
addition, because the present study used happy control primes of people with “true” 
Duchenne smiles, which signal affiliation and cooperation (see Brown & Moore, 
2002; Izard, 1971), the present study is also able to rule out the possibility that 
attachment security priming is simply priming affiliation. Moreover, the argument 
could be made, especially in work with children, that the attachment priming pictures 
reduced fear simply because there was an available, affiliative, and cooperative adult. 
Given that the present study used pictures of smiling adults for the social happiness 
primes, this possibility has also been ruled out.   
On a broader developmental level, these findings are only the second to 
demonstrate that a subliminal social prime influences children’s outcomes. The only 
other study, conducted by Bryant-Tuckett and Silverman (1984), found that fifth 
through twelfth graders subliminally exposed five times a week for six weeks to the 
phrase, “Mommy and I are one” had more positive self-reported self-concepts, higher 
standardized reading and math scores, more frequent homework completion, more 
time spent working independently in the classroom, and less time spent watching 
television as recorded by their counselors, compared to children who were 




six weeks. The present study is the first to find that a subliminal social prime changes 
children’s physiological responses. Given the important theoretical and practical 
implications of the findings of the present study, it seems possible to make many 
other important gains in our understanding of children’s social development by 
incorporating priming techniques in future research. I discuss some areas of future 
research below in Future Directions.  
Maternal Emotion Socialization and Children’s Fear Reactions 
 I hypothesized that mothers who reported high supportive and low 
unsupportive/harsh reactions to their child’s distress would have children who had 
lower fear reactions. Both the SCRs and children’s self reports were not supportive of 
this hypothesis. There are several possibilities for this lack of an association between 
maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions. One reason that the 
predicted link may have failed to emerge is that the maternal emotion socialization is 
not the appropriate measure to predict children’s fearfulness. It is possible that 
aspects of parenting that were not assessed in the present study are related to 
differences in children’s fear reactions.  
For example, it is possible that maternal attachment representations are an 
important factor for predicting children’s fear responses. Given that parental 
attachment representations are linked to children’s representations (see De Wolff & 
van IJzendoorn, 1997), and children’s attachment representations are linked to 
children’s outcomes (see Weinfield, Sroufe, Egeland, & Carlson, 2008), future 
research may do well to examine whether maternal attachment is linked to children’s 




attachment representations, research that assesses maternal attachment representations 
using more than one attachment measure (for example, secure base script knowledge, 
self-report attachment, Adult Attachment Interview) may prove fruitful.  
Relatedly, it remains possible that a behavioral measure of maternal responses 
to children’s distress may show the hypothesized link to children’s fear reactions. For 
example, observations of mothers’ behavior in the home or during a structured lab 
task may demonstrate the hypothesized link between maternal responses to children’s 
distress and children’s fear reactions.  
 It is also possible that children’s fear reactions may be predicted by mothers’ 
physiological reactions to children’s distress. For example, studies that examine 
mothers’ skin conductance, heart rate, or respiration during stressful caregiving-
related situations may be linked to children’s fear reactions. This possibility is 
underscored by research that found a link between mothers’ physiological reactions to 
infant crying during pregnancy to their infant’s attachment security in toddlerhood 
(Leerkes, Parade, & Gudmundson, 2011).  
Despite the links between maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear 
reactions (assessed as SCRs and self-reported fear) not emerging, it is possible that 
another indicator of children’s fear may emerge in future research. For example, 
future work that examines other measures of physiology, like heart rate, respiration, 
blood pressure, or skin temperature, may find support for the idea that mothers’ 
reactions to child distress predicts children’s fear reactions. Relatedly, research that 
includes more than one assessment of physiology would be able to speak to whether 




inducing stimuli, as opposed to reactivity, which is what the present study assessed. 
The present study examined children’s physiological fear reactivity (changes in 
physiology that are the result of a specific event) as opposed to physiological 
regulation, which is changes in physiology that are meant to maintain homeostasis. 
Given that research on maternal emotion socialization has found links between 
invalidating or "dampening" maternal responses toward their adolescents’ positive 
affect and adolescents’ dysregulated behavioral emotion regulations strategies (Yap et 
al., 2008), it seems plausible that maternal emotion socialization may influence 
children’s physiological regulation.  
Another possibility that remains to be tested is whether a behavioral marker of 
children’s fearfulness would be predicted by maternal emotion socialization. For 
example, one study has found links between parental emotion socialization and 
children’s emotional expression have used behavioral observations of children’s 
emotional expressions (e.g., Kochanska, Aksan, & Joy, 2007). As such, it might be 
the case that children’s facial expressions of behaviors during their observation of the 
picture presentations are linked to maternal emotion socialization. Future research 
that codes children’s emotional expressions and behaviors during tasks designed to 
elicit children’s emotions may prove fruitful to future research. 
It is also important to note that the measure of maternal emotion socialization 
that was used in the present study (i.e., CCNES; Fabes et al., 2002) has only four 
hypothetical scenarios that relate to children’s fear, anxiety, or nervousness; the other 
eight scenarios are about other emotions including anger, sadness, pain, 




responses to child distress and child fearfulness did not emerge because mother’s 
responses to child fear would be a better predictor of children’s fear responses. Future 
research could develop a questionnaire that asks mothers about her responses to her 
child’s fear and examine whether maternal responses to child fear links to children’s 
fear responses.  
Lastly, it is also possible that maternal responses to children’s distress are 
more important in predicting children’s expressions of emotions other than fear. For 
example, it is possible that maternal reactions to child distress are linked to children’s 
happiness, anger, or sadness. In fact, research has found links between emotion 
socialization and children’s happiness and sadness (Warren & Stifter, 2008; Yap et 
al., 2008). Future studies that are designed to elicit these emotions would address this 
possibility.  
The present study was designed, at least in part, to determine for the first time 
whether maternal emotion socialization predicts children’s fear. The rationale behind 
examining for the first time whether maternal emotion socialization is linked to 
children’s fear was based on research indicating that maternal emotion socialization is 
linked to children’s anxiety disorders (Suveg et al., 2005). However, given that no 
study has shown a link between maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear, 
and the present study failed to find the link, perhaps there is a file drawer problem 
that exists in that this issue has been examined, but has failed to emerge as 
significant. If a file drawer problem exists, a meta-analysis that asks researchers to 
report null findings would be able to determine if this is the case.  




 Based on the differential-susceptibility hypothesis, I sought to determine 
whether children who were rated by their mothers as having a more fearful 
temperament would be more influenced by the effects of priming and by the effects of 
maternal emotion socialization on their fear reactions than children whose mothers 
rated them as less fearful. The results indicated that temperamental fearfulness did not 
moderate the links between priming and children’s fear reactions or the links between 
maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions.  
The present study used the Shyness, Fear, and Discomfort subscales of the 
CBQ (Rothbart, et al., 2001) to assess temperamental fearfulness based on previous 
research that used these subscales (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, 
& Linting, 2008; Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & van der Veer, 
2008; Gilissen, et al., 2007). Using the Shyness, Fear, and Discomfort subscales of 
the CBQ, Gilissen and colleagues (Gilissen, et al., 2007; Gilissen, Bakermans-
Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & van der Veer, 2008) found that the link between 
attachment security and lower levels of EDA in children was moderated by child 
temperamental fearfulness such that attachment security was more strongly linked to 
lower EDA for children rated by their mothers as more temperamentally fearful. In 
addition, other studies have found that temperamental fearfulness moderates the link 
between the environment and child outcomes (Leve, Kim, & Pears, 2005; Kochanska 
et al, 2007; Volling & Feagans, 1995). Thus, given the parallels between the design of 
Gilissen and colleagues’ work (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, & 
van der Veer, 2008) and the present study, other previous research that has used 




takes an hour to complete), I chose to assess temperamental fearfulness in the way 
that Gilissen and colleagues did.  
Nonetheless, I did not find that temperamental fearfulness moderates the links 
between priming and children’s fear reactions or the links between maternal emotion 
socialization and children’s fear reactions. Despite several indicators that the 
assessment of temperament that I chose may prove useful, there are several 
possibilities for this failure to find that temperamental fearfulness serves as a 
moderator of the link between priming and children’s fear reactions and maternal 
emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions. First, the differential-
susceptibility hypothesis states that children should vary in their susceptibility to 
environmental influences. It does not predict, however, that more temperamentally 
fearful children will be the children who are more susceptible (Belsky & Pluess, 
2009). Many researchers, including myself, have chosen to examine elements of a 
negatively emotional temperament which could be such elements as temperamental 
fearfulness, difficulty, or irritability because Belsky (2005) and colleagues (Belsky, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007; Belsky & Pluess, 2009) made an 
empirical observation that children with more negatively emotional temperaments are 
often most susceptible to environmental influences (see Belsky & Pluess, 2009 for a 
review). Temperamental fearfulness is only one aspect of a negatively emotional 
temperament. Thus, other elements of negatively emotional temperament may 
moderate the links between priming and children’s fear reactions and the links 
between maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions. As such, it is 




the links between either priming and children’s fear reactions or the links between 
maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions because another aspect of 
temperament that was not assessed in the present study may serve as the moderator of 
these links.  
In particular, temperamental difficulty may be an important temperamental 
element to consider in future research given that several studies that have assessed 
temperamental difficulty have found evidence of differential susceptibility. van Aken, 
Junger, Verhoeven, van Aken, and Dekovic (2007) found that the link between 
maternal sensitivity and externalizing problems was stronger for toddler boys with 
difficult temperaments compared to toddler boys who did not have difficult 
temperaments. Bradley and Corwyn (2008) found that the link between parenting 
quality and teacher-reported problems was moderated by the child’s difficult 
temperament such that this link was stronger for children with difficult temperaments 
compared to children with less difficult and easy temperaments. Given these findings 
and others (see Dopkins Stright, Cranley Gallagher, & Kelley, 2008; Pluess & Belsky 
2009, 2010), future research that assesses temperamental difficulty may find that it 
moderates the links between priming and children’s fear reactions and the links 
between maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear reactions may be useful.  
Another alternative is to use observational measures of child temperament. 
Maternal reports of child temperament can be biased by maternal perceptions of her 
child (Gartstein & Marmion, 2008; Leerkes & Crockenberg, 2003). As such, a 
standardized observational assessment that removes the biases introduced by maternal 




research has found that neonatal infant irritability assessed with the Neonatal 
Behavioral Assessment Scale twice in the first 30 days post-partum moderated the 
effect of a parenting intervention between 6-9 months on infant attachment security at 
12 months (Cassidy, Woodhouse, Sherman, Stupica, & Lejuez, 2011). 
The age at which Cassidy et al. (2011) assessed temperament  points to 
another alternative for finding differential susceptibility for the links between priming 
and children’s fear reactions and the links between maternal emotion socialization 
and children’s fear reactions. It is also possible that the hypothesized moderating 
effect of temperament would be present in a study that assesses temperament at an 
earlier age or an assessment that is less influenced by environmental factors. Given 
that temperament is known to be a product of both biology and the environment 
(Rothbart & Derryberry, 1981, 2002; Bridgett, et al., 2009)., and the differential-
susceptibility hypothesis in based on the idea that some children may be more or less 
susceptible to environmental influences due to evolutionary reasons, it seems that, a 
more biologically-based measurement of temperament may show evidence of the 
proposed interaction between temperament and priming or temperament and maternal 
emotion socialization. For example, a future study that assesses temperament in early 
infancy may find differential susceptibility.  
It is also possible that temperamental fearfulness may moderate the link 
between environmental influences and children’s social fear or social anxiety. Studies 
that are designed to elicit social anxiety, perhaps by using the Trier Social Stress Test 
(Kirschbaum, Pirke, & Hellhammer, 1993) may show that temperamental fearfulness 




Given that temperamental fearfulness includes shyness as an element, it seems 
reasonable to think that temperamental fearfulness may moderate the link between 
maternal emotion socialization and children’s fear during social situations.   
Lastly, it is also possible that the reason I did not find differential 
susceptibility when Gilissen et al. (Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, 
& van der Veer, 2008) did is that children who are highly negatively emotional are 
not differentially susceptible to the influence of attachment security priming on their 
fear responses. Gilissen et al. assessed constitutional attachment security at 4 and 7 
years of age which developed over the course of years from repeated daily 
interactions with the primary caregiver. They found that higher constitutional 
attachment security predicts lower EDA in response to fear-inducing stimuli and that 
this link was strongest for children who were highly temperamentally fearful. It is 
possible that temperamentally more fearful children in Gilissen et al.’s study were the 
least fearful when they had a secure attachment and the most fearful when they had 
an insecure attachment because more temperamentally fearful children were afraid 
more frequently and as a result, approached their parent for comfort more frequently. 
The feeling of fear would have then been paired with their parent’s response to their 
fear frequently making the pathway stronger for temperamentally fearful children. If 
this were true, then the present study, which experimentally manipulated security 
only briefly in the lab using priming, may not have found differential susceptibility 
because the more frequent pairing between fear and the parent’s response that might  
have happened for temperamentally fearful children in Gilissen et al.’s study would  




It is also important to note that the interaction being tested was between child 
temperamental fearfulness and the effects of priming. I tested this interaction because 
Gilissen, Bakermans-Kranenburg, van IJzendoorn, and van der Veer (2008) found 
that the child’s constitutional security interacted with child temperamental 
fearfulness. Priming attachment security is different than constitutional attachment 
security because constitutional security develops over the course of years of 
interactions between the child and caregiver. Attachment security priming, as it was 
executed in the present study, only temporarily increased accessibility to mental 
representations of attachment security. As such, the present study was not a 
replication of Gilissen et al. (2008) and it remains possible that had the present study 
assessed constitutional attachment security, an interaction with child temperamental 
fearfulness  and differential-susceptibility would have emerged. 
Future Directions 
 The present study found that subliminal attachment security primes result in 
lower physiological fear reactions in children compared to children in a happiness 
priming and neutral priming condition. These findings are important to both 
attachment research and social development research in general. Below I discuss 
several directions for future research based on the finding that attachment security 
priming decreases fear.  
Implications for Attachment Research 
Until the present study, the large body of attachment security priming research 
findings has been limited to research with adults and older teenagers. The present 




determining whether increased attachment security is causally linked to child 
development outcomes. We now have experimental evidence that increased 
attachment security decreases fear, as attachment theory, correlational research, and 
Sorce and Emde’s (1981) seminal study have suggested. I chose to start with fear as 
an outcome because of its centrality to attachment theory, but future research should 
extend attachment security priming work to include research that investigates other 
important outcomes of increased attachment security.   
Some important areas to begin future inquiry include the link between 
attachment security and exploration. Attachment security it thought to provide the 
child with a secure base to explore the world by decreasing fear. The present study 
has demonstrated that attachment security priming decreases physiological fear 
responses. The next logical step is to move our understanding of the role that 
attachment security plays in children’s development forward by exploring whether 
attachment security causes decreased exploration. Specifically, future research should 
determine whether decreases in fearfulness that were the result of experimentally-
enhanced attachment security lead to increases in exploration. 
Examining whether attachment security priming increases exploration could 
advance the field of attachment not only by determining whether increased security 
causes increased exploration but also by extending our knowledge of how attachment 
security priming changes observed behavior. To date, only one study has assessed the 
effects of attachment security priming on observed behavior. Mikulincer and Shaver 
(2007b) found that people in the attachment security priming group put equally low 




behavior has been studied in the context of attachment security priming. In addition, 
this finding extends only to adults. Other types of behaviors have yet to be examined 
to determine if attachment security priming influences them in theoretically 
predictable ways. There are several types of observed behavior that are central to 
attachment theory including interaction quality, exploratory behavior, and caregiving 
behavior that future research should examine to determine if attachment security 
priming changes these behaviors.   
There is experimental evidence that simple priming techniques have the power 
to change a wide range of observed behavior. For example, priming the concept of 
“old age” makes adults walk slower (Bargh, et al., 1996; Study 2), and priming the 
concept of affiliation makes toddlers more likely to assist a stranger (Over & 
Carpenter, 2009b). Given these compelling examples of priming changing actual 
behavior (also see Chapter 2, herein), and the data from the present study which 
indicate that subliminal attachment security priming reduces children’s physiological 
fear responses, it seems logical to think that attachment security priming may change 
observed of children’s fear expressions. In addition, attachment security priming may 
also increase the quality of interactions with other and caregiving quality. If 
attachment security priming does turn out to change parenting quality and observed 
behavior in interactions with others, there are many important clinical implications 
(one of which I discuss immediately below). As such, an important next step for 
attachment security priming research is to extend our understanding of how 




 Given that the present study has demonstrated attachment security priming to 
be a useful tool for reducing children’s physiological fear reactions, extending 
attachment security priming methods to research on anxiety symptomatology and 
anxiety-related disorders is a logical future research direction for attachment security 
priming that has important clinical applications. It is possible that attachment security 
priming may reduce anxiety symptomatology or that repeated attachment security 
priming may reduce anxious behavior.  
Additionally, using attachment security priming as a first step in determining 
whether attachment security improves psychosocial outcomes may have important 
clinical implications. Specifically, very little research has examined whether 
attachment security is causally-linked to improved psychosocial functioning. The 
paucity of this research is likely due to the costly nature of traditional randomized 
control trials in which researchers attempt to increase attachment security through 
expensive and time-consuming therapeutic or parenting interventions. Initial research 
that uses attachment security priming to momentarily increase attachment security in 
the lab to observe changes in psychosocial functioning may prove to be useful in 
establishing initial causal links between attachment security and the outcome of 
interest prior to embarking upon costly traditional randomized control trials. 
Furthermore, attachment security priming may prove useful in grant writing to 
establish a causal link between attachment security and the outcome of interest using 
experimental evidence.   




 The present study meshes with previous research in social development that 
has used priming as a way of examining how children’s mental representations of the 
social world drive children’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. For example, studies 
have shown that priming children with food increases food consumption (Harris et al., 
2009; Study 1), priming children with affiliation increases helping behavior (Over & 
Carpenter, 2009b), and priming children with ostracism increases imitation (Over & 
Carpenter, 2009a). The present study adds to this small body of literature which 
demonstrates the utility of priming as a technique for determining how child 
development outcomes are influenced by their mental representations. As such, it is 
important that researchers consider priming as a technique to incorporate in future 
studies to add to our understanding of how children’s social schemas drive affect, 
cognitions, and behavior.  
For example, social-information processing research may benefit greatly from 
the application of priming techniques in future research. Dodge and his colleagues 
(Crick & Dodge, 1994; Dodge & Crick, 1990) proposed that children’s behavioral 
responses to problematic social events are mediated by a series of cognitive processes 
whereby children (1) encode the event, (2) interpret the event, (3) formulate a goal or 
select a desired outcome, (4) generate strategies to achieve the desired outcome, (5) 
evaluate the likelihood that the strategies generated will achieve the desired outcome, 
and finally, (6) behaviorally enact the selected strategy. Children’s mental 
representations or schemas of the social environment are thought to serve as the 
cognitive mechanism through which children proceed from one step to the next. 




to guide their attention when encoding the event, their interpretation of the event, the 
goal they formulate, the strategies they generate, and their evaluation of these 
strategies. A large body of research has emerged in support of this model of social 
information processing (see Dodge & Pettit, 2003, for a review). Only two studies, 
however, have tested this model experimentally (Rabiner & Coie, 1989; Slaby & 
Guerra, 1988).  
 Priming offers researchers an alternative to lengthy and costly intervention 
studies for determining whether the link between children’s mental representations 
direct how they attend to, encode, and interpret social events, and how they draw 
upon their social schemas to formulate a goal and to generate and evaluate strategies 
for achieving their goal. For example, future research could examine the effects of 
increased accessibility to mental representations of aggression and benevolence on 
children’s social information processing by priming these concepts.  
 Lastly, the present study chose to use 6 and 7 year old children because this 
age range was the youngest in which subliminal primes had been used. Cognitive 
developmentalists have used subliminal priming of numbers in first graders 
(Reynvoet et al., 2009). As such, I chose to use 6 and 7 year olds for the present study 
as a starting point for future research. Given that subliminal attachment security 
priming works in children as young as 6, it seems logical to believe that subliminal 
attachment security priming works in older children as it did in Bryant-Tuckett and 
Silverman’s (1984) study with children enrolled in grades 5-12. What remains 




than 6. Future research that examines the effects of priming in progressively younger 
children will be able to address this question.  
Conclusions 
 The present study found that increased mental representations of attachment 
security decreased children’s physiological fear reactions. In doing so, this study is 
the first to provide experimental evidence that supports one of the most central tenets 
of attachment theory: that increased attachment security reduces fear. Future research 
should employ attachment security priming as a technique to examine the ways that 
increased attachment security influences child development outcomes in experimental 
studies. More broadly, this study suggests that priming techniques are a useful 
methodological tool for social development research aimed at determining how 







Hypotheses and Research Questions for the Present Study  
Hypothesis 1: Children who are exposed to security-enhancing primes will have 
lower EDA and will report feeling less scared or anxious during the fear-inducing 
pictures for children in the security-enhancing prime condition compared to children 
in the happy and neutral control conditions. 
 
Research Question 1: Does child temperamental fearfulness moderate the effect of 
attachment-security priming on children’s EDA and self-reported fear during the 
anxiety-provoking tasks? 
 
Hypothesis 2: In the control group only, children’s EDA and reports feeling scared or 
anxious during the fear-inducing pictures will decrease as their mothers’ endorsement 
of supportive responses to their negative affect increases, whereas children’s EDA 
and reports feeling scared or anxious during the fear-inducing pictures will increase 
as their mothers’ endorsement of unsupportive responses to their negative affect 
increases. 
 
Research Question 2:  In the control group only, does child temperamental 
fearfulness moderates the link between mothers’ responses to her child’s negative 








 Order of Laboratory Tasks 
MOTHER & CHILD 
Informed Consent (5 min) 
GSR, ECG, and RSP electrodes on MOTHER (3 min) 




CBQ (10 min) 






Emotion Labeling Task (10 min) 
 
MOTHER & CHILD (5 min) 
MOTHER 
 







Fear Picture Set 1(1 min)* 
(3 min) 
(2 min) 
Fear Picture Set 2(1 min)* 
 (3 min) 
(2 min) 




Exciting Picture Set 1(1 min)* 
(3 min) 
(2 min) 
Exciting Picture Set 2(1 min)* 
el (3 min) 
(2 min) 
Exciting Picture Set 3(1 min)* 
(3 min) 
MOTHER & CHILD 
GSR, ECG, and RSP electrodes off (5 min) 
Note. Tasks in bold typeface are tasks that are included as part of the present study. 
Tasks presented in separate boxes indicate that mother and child are separated in 








Correlation Matrix of the CCNES Subscales 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.  6.  7. 8. 
1. DR          
2. EE  0.07        
3. EFR  0.34†        
4. MR  0.21 -0.28 0.09      
5. PFR  0.25 0.56* 0.63* -0.29     
6. PR 0.13 -0.23 -0.20 0.69* -0.22    
7. Supportive 0.26 0.79* 0.81* -0.21 0.89* -0.26   
8. Harsh 0.59* -0.20 0.10 0.85* -0.12 0.81* -0.09  
9. CCNES -0.25 0.65* 0.45* -0.74* 0.66* -0.74* 0.71* -0.77* 
 
Note. DR = Distress Reactions; EE = Expressive Encouragement; EFR = Emotion 
Focused Reactions; MR = Minimization Reactions; PFR = Problem Focused 
Reactions; PR = Punitive Reactions; Supportive = Mean of EE, EFR, and PFR; Harsh 






Descriptive Statistics for Children’s SCRs 
 
Mean SD Range 
Neutral 1 4.14 9.57 0 - 52 
Fear 1 4.53 10.27 0 - 56 
Fear 2 5.40 10.83 0 - 71 
Fear 3 6.35 11.12 0 - 57 
Neutral 2 2.65 6.26 0 - 27 
Happy/Excite 1 3.27 7.88 0 - 37 
Happy/Excite 2 4.77 11.25 0 - 79 











 df p-value 
Condition 3.751 2 .153 
Order 2.701 1 .100 
Valence 1.747 1 .186 
CBQ 3.143 1 .076 
Condition × Order .291 2 .865 
Condition × Valence 7.634 2 .022 
Condition × CBQ 4.491 2 .106 
Order × Valence 6.316 1 .012 
Order × CBQ .561 1 .454 
Valence × CBQ .414 1 .520 
Condition × Order × Valence 1.514 2 .469 
Condition × Order × CBQ 1.011 2 .603 
Condition × Valence × CBQ .521 2 .771 
Order × Valence × CBQ 5.687 1 .017 
Condition × Order × Valence × CBQ .690 2 .708 
 
Note. Omnibus model effects are from analyses using only the original (not imputed) 
dataset because omnibus model effects are not able to calculated using the pooled 
imputed datasets. Wald chi-square statistics were tested using Type III sum of squares 





Table 6  
 




 df p-value 
Condition 3.514 2 .173 
Order 1.532 1 .216 
Valence .199 1 .656 
CBQ .355 1 .551 
Condition×Order .085 2 .959 
Condition×Valence 1.124 2 .570 
Condition×CBQ 2.711 2 .258 
Order×Valence .904 1 .342 
Order×CBQ 1.352 1 .245 
Valence×CBQ 1.110 1 .292 
Condition×Order×Valence .416 2 .812 
Condition×Order×CBQ .328 2 .849 
Condition×Valence×CBQ .954 2 .621 
Order× Valence×CBQ 4.946 1 .026 
Condition×Order×Valence×CBQ .689 2 .709 
 
Note. Omnibus model effects are from analyses using only the original (not imputed) 
dataset because omnibus model effects are not able to calculated using the pooled 
imputed datasets. Wald chi-square statistics were tested using Type III sum of squares 





Table 7  
Omnibus Model Effects from GEE Analysis Using Neutral Control Group Only to 
Predict Children’s SCRs 
Variable Wald χ
2
 df p-value 
Valence 2.345 1 .126 
CBQ .386 1 .535 
CCNES 1.035 1 .309 
Valence × CBQ 2.036 1 .154 
Valence × CCNES .780 1 .377 
CBQ × CCNES .981 1 .322 
Valence × CBQ × CCNES 1.244 1 .265 
 
Note. This analysis was conducted using only data from the Neutral Control Group. 
Omnibus model effects are from analyses using only the original (not imputed) 
dataset because omnibus model effects are not able to calculated using the pooled 
imputed datasets. Wald chi-square statistics were tested using Type III sum of squares 





Table 8  
 
Omnibus Model Effects from GEE Analysis Using Neutral Control Group Only to 
Predict Children’s Self-Reported Fear 
Variable Wald χ
2
 df p-value 
Valence .256 1 .613 
CBQ .160 1 .689 
CCNES .171 1 .679 
Valence × CBQ .149 1 .700 
Valence × CCNES .147 1 .702 
CBQ × CCNES .132 1 .716 
Valence × CBQ × CCNES .023 1 .880 
 
Note. This analysis was conducted using only data from the Neutral Control Group. 
Omnibus model effects are from analyses using only the original (not imputed) 
dataset because omnibus model effects are not able to calculated using the pooled 
imputed datasets. Wald chi-square statistics were tested using Type III sum of squares 
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Figure 4. Children’s skin conductance responses as a function of their priming 
condition and the picture valence. Within each picture valence, bars with different 
subscripts differ significantly from each other. Within each condition, bars with 






Figure 5. Children’s self-reported fear as a function of their priming condition and the 

















Figure 8. Children’s self-reported fear as a function of temperamental fearfulness, 











Figure 10. Children’s SCRs as a function of maternal responses to negative affect and 











Figure 12. Children’s self-reported fear as a function of maternal responses to child’s 














Appendix B.  
Table of Participant Identification Numbers Randomly Assigned to Each Condition 
(N = 90)  
 Security Condition 
(n = 30) 
Happy Control 
Condition 
(n = 30) 
Neutral Control 
Condition 
(n = 30) 
3 2 1 
6 4 5 
11 8 7 
14 10 9 
17 13 12 
20 16 15 
22 19 18 
24 23 21 
28 25 26 
31 29 27 
35 30 32 
36 34 33 
41 37 38 
43 39 40 
45 44 42 
48 46 47 
52 49 50 
54 53 51 
58 55 56 
59 57 60 
61 62 63 
65 64 67 
68 66 71 
69 70 74 
73 72 75 
76 77 79 
80 78 82 
81 83 84 
85 88 86 






Appendix C.  




































Appendix D.  

















List of Happy Photographic BARTA Pictures Used for Happy Control Priming 
Condition and Pictures Examples 
Mandy, Jaz ,Diana ,Sammy, Howler, Norm, Buddy, Milo, Bert, Lady, Paul, Amy, 






































Appendix I.  
Child Experimenter Script 
1
st
 task: Story table 
FROG, WHERE ARE YOU? 
Look what I have here. [Show child the book “Frog, Where Are You?”] Come sit 
here so I can show you. [Motion for child to sit at the story telling table in the chair 
that faces the camera.]  
It’s a picture book. It’s called, “Frog, where are you?” Let’s look at the pictures 
together.  
Look at the cover of this book. [Wait 5-10 seconds for the child to look at the 
cover.]  
I have an idea. Let’s look at all the pictures together and then you tell me a story 
about the pictures.  
Okay, this first time, we’re just going to look at all the pictures. [Open the book to 
the first picture. Hold the book open so that your hands do not cover the pictures.] 
Look at this picture. [Draw the child’s attention to the picture by circling the page 
with your finger. Allow about 5–10 s for the child to look at each page before turning 
to the next page.  
If it seems that the child is off task or not looking at both pages of the book, you may 
prompt the child by saying: “Look at this page” or “Now look at this one.” Do not 
comment about the pictures in any way. If the child offers comments or asks 
questions, gently remind him/her that you are just looking at the pictures now, and 
he/she can tell the story the next time you look at the book. 
[When you reach the end of the book, close the book and hand it to the child.] Now I 
want you to tell me a story using the pictures in this book. Make up a story for 
me that tells me about the pictures in this book. Try to make the story as long as 
you can. Use the pictures in this book to tell me a story.  
If the child is hesitant to tell a story, or tells you “I don’t know how to read,” you may 
prompt the child by saying: “This book doesn’t have any words in it, so you can tell 
any story you want about the pictures. Tell me a story about the pictures” 
During the story production, you may provide prompts such as: “Tell me about this 
page or “What about this page?” 
As the child produces a story, you may also repeat exactly what the child says about a 
picture. This provides an acknowledgement to the child that you are listening, and 
also will help future coders to understand an utterance that may be unintelligible on 
video/audio. Do not change what the child says in your repetition, even if there are 
errors. For example, if the child says “Frog goed in the water,” you repeat “Frog goed 
in the water.” Do not correct the utterance (e.g., Do NOT say, “Frog went in the 
water.”).  
[At the end of the book, say] Is there anything else you want to add to your story? 
2
nd





Okay, good job. Now, you get to sit in the orange circle chair. [Wait for the child 
to sit in the resting chair.] 
All settled? For this next part I need you to sit in the orange circle chair with 
your eyes closed as still and as quiet as you can for two whole minutes. While 
your eyes are closed and you are resting quietly, I will be watching this timer 
[show child the timer] to know when two minutes have passed. For the two 
minutes that I am watching the timer, close your eyes and think about your 
breathing and how your body sinks into the circle chair. This timer beeps to let 
you know the time starts and stops.  
Let’s set it for exactly two minutes. Press the 2, now press the zero, and the zero 
one more time. Good! When I press this start button to start the time, you will 
hear a beep just like the beeps it made when you pressed the numbers to set it.  
When you hear the beep I need you to close your eyes and rest. When you hear 
the second beep, the two minutes is over and you can open your eyes and move 
again.  
What are you going to do when you hear the first beep? Right! You are going to 
stay very, very still and quiet and close your eyes and think about your 
breathing and your body sinking into the chair. 
What am I going to be doing while you have your eyes closed? Right! I’m going 
to be watching the timer. 
What happens when you hear the second beep? Right! You open your eyes. Are 
you ready?” [Wait for the child’s response.]  
 
Okay, when you hear the beep close your eyes and just rest here quietly until the 
time is up. [Sit down and watch the child and the clock.]  
If the child opens his or her eyes, is squirmy or wiggly, or talks, gently remind 
him/her to keep his/her eyes shut and to sit quietly.  
[After the timer beeps] Okay. Good job. You can open your eyes. It’s been two 
minutes. [Wait for child to open his/her eyes.]  
Let’s stand up and stretch for a moment.  
[Stand up and stretch a little. While the child is still standing, say] 
3
rd
 task: Story table 
STORY TELLING WITH DOLLS  
Our next activity is going to be at the story telling table again. [Sit down at the 
table.] Come sit here at the table so I can show you what I have. [Motion for the 
child to sit at the story telling table in the chair that faces the camera. Wait for the 
child to sit. Get the set of dolls that match the child’s sex.] 
I have some dolls that I’d like us to play with together. [Set up “Janie/Bobby Goes 
to School,” which is the practice story.]  
Let’s play a story telling game – I’m going to tell just the very beginning of the 
story, and your job is to finish the whole big story.  
What am I going to do? Right! I’m just going to start the story. 
And, what’s your job? Right! Your job is to tell me the whole big story.  
Let’s start. I’m going to start this story. [Starting with the Janie/Bobby doll, say] 




This is Janie [Bobby]. Let’s imagine that she [He] has just grabbed her [his] 
backpack and her [his] lunchbox and has said goodbye to her [his] mom and 
dad. Now she [He] is waiting for her school bus.  
[Bring on school bus.] The school bus is here!  
 
[In an inviting tone of voice, say] That was just the very beginning of the story. 
Now you tell me the rest of the story. [Let the child hold the doll(s).]  
If the child does not tell a story, ask the child “Can you tell me a story about what 
happens next?” If the child still does not tell a story, tell a story yourself to 
demonstrate to the child what to do. 
If the child does not address the issue in his or her story, ask the child about it (e.g., 
the hurt knee, creepy noise, etc. For example, ask the child, “What about the hurt 
knee?” 
If the child uses ambiguous language (e.g., child says, “His knee was bandaged,” or 
says, “She said hello.”), ask the child, “Who put the Band-Aid on?” or “Who said 
hello?” 
If the child gives only one response, elicit more elaboration by asking, “Anything 
else?”, “What else?”, or “Then what?” unless the child indicated by speech or action 
that the story was finished (For example, the child says, “The end.”). 
To verify what the child says and get the child to elaborate, you can repeat what the 
child says in question form. For example, “The teacher wrote on the chalkboard? 
And, then what?” 
If the child seems to have finished, or becomes repetitive, say: “All done?” or “Let’s 
try another,” or “Let’s put this book away and get the next book.” 
[After the child has finished telling the story, say] Okay, let’s put this scene away 
and set up a new one. 
[Put away the old props and get out, “Janie/Bobby Hurts Her [His] Knee” props.] 
This story is called, “Janie/Bobby Hurts Her [His] Knee.” 
[Set up the yard scene.] Which one of these do you think is Janie/Bobby? Right! 
This is Janie/Bobby. She [he] is in the backyard with her/his mom and dad. This 
is Janie/Bobby’s dad. Janie/Bobby’s dad is raking leaves. This is Janie/Bobby’s 
mom. Janie/Bobby’s mom is watering the flowers. Janie/Bobby is running to the 
swing set. She [he] is going to swing on her swing set.  
Uh oh! Janie/Bobby tripped over a rock while she [he] was running. She [he] fell 
and hurt her [his] knee! “Ouch!” 
That was just the very beginning of the story. Now you tell me the rest of the 
story. [Let the child hold the doll(s).] 
[After the child has finished telling the story, say] Okay, let’s get out a new scene. 
[Put away the props, and get out “Janie/Bobby Hears a Scary Noise” props.] 
 This story is called, “Janie/Bobby Hears a Scary Noise.”  
[Set up the bedroom props.] This is Janie/Bobby. This is Janie/Bobby’s bedroom. 
It is nighttime. Imagine it’s dark outside and the moon is out. What is 
Janie/Bobby doing? Right! Janie/Bobby is asleep in her [his] bed. 
[Sit the doll upright. Gasp a little before you say,] Janie/Bobby woke up because 




That was just the very beginning of the story. Now you tell me the rest of the 
story.  
[After the child has finished telling the story, say] Okay, let’s put this away and I’ll 
get out a different scene. 
[Put away the old props and get out, “Janie/Bobby’s Painting Gets Wet” props.] 
This story is called, “Janie/Bobby’s Painting Gets Wet.” 
[Set up the kitchen scene.] This is Janie/Bobby. She [He] is in the kitchen at the 
table. These are Janie/Bobby’s parents. Janie/Bobby’s mom and dad are 
washing the dishes. Janie/Bobby just finished painting this picture that’s here on 
the table. She [He] is really proud of her [his] picture. Of all of the pictures that 
Janie/Bobby has painted, this picture is her [his] favorite.  
Oh no! As Janie/Bobby was getting up from the table, the glass of water 
suddenly spilled all over her [his] painting! “Oh no!”  
That was just the very beginning of the story. You tell me what happens now.  
[After the child has finished telling the story, say] Okay, let’s put this away and get 
out something new. 
[Put away the old props and get out, “Janie/Bobby Gets Lost” props.] 
This story is called, “Janie/Bobby Gets Lost.” 
[Set up the store scene.] This is Janie/Bobby. This is Janie/Bobby’s mom. 
Janie/Bobby is at the store with her/his mom. They say hello to the lady who 
runs the store, who Janie/Bobby knows because she’s their neighbor. 
Janie/Bobby is walking behind her mom and looking at all of the different things 
on the shelves.  
“Oh no!” says Janie/Bobby. Janie/Bobby is all by her/himself! Janie/Bobby 
doesn’t see her/his mom anywhere!  
Now you tell me the rest of the story.  
[Now use the counter prop, to provide a more specific scenario.] 
Let’s tell the story with more details about what happens when “Janie finds her 
mom.” 
[Reintroduce elderly female neighbor to the scene.] The store manager is helping 
Janie/Bobby find her [his] mom. They walk to the front of the store so they can 
call for Janie/Bobby’s mom on the loudspeakers. When Janie/Bobby and the 
manager get to the front of the store, they see a woman standing by the counter. 
When the woman turns around, Jane/Bobby sees that it is her/his mother! 
Now you tell me the rest of the story.  What do Janie/Bobby and her/his mom 
say to each other? 
Okay, good job. We’re all done with the dolls. Let’s stand up and stretch a little 







 task: Computer table 
EMOTIONS LABELING TASK 
[Prior to child’s arrival, select sex of child on computer.] 
Our next activity is at the computer table. You sit here and I’ll sit here. [Motion 
for the child to sit in the chair that faces the monitor]. We’re going to play the faces 
game.  
For the faces game, I’m going to show you some pictures of a little girl [boy] who 
is a little bit older than you. In each picture the girl [boy] has a different feeling. 
After I show you each picture, your job is to tell me how the girl [boy] in the 
picture is feeling. When I press the button, the first picture will come up. Do you 
remember what you are going to do when you see the first picture? Right! You 
are going to say how the girl/boy is feeling.  
[Click start] Look, here’s the first picture. How does the girl [boy] in this picture 
feel?  
[If the child labels the picture correctly the first time, say,] “That’s right. Let’s look 
at the next picture.” [Press 1. Correct responses are below (accept derivations of 
these words).] 
Fear  Happy  Sad  Angry  Surprised 
fear  happy  sad  angry  surprise 
afraid  glad    mad 
anxious joy 
scared  pleased 
nervous   
frightened 
 
If the child doesn’t label the picture correctly:  
1. Provide the child with the correct label. For example, for the fear picture the child 
says happy, say,] “Not quite [You are close, but]. This boy is feeling scared.” 
2. Point out the facial features that define that emotion. For example, for the fear 
picture say, “See how his teeth are clenched and his lips are turned down?” 
3. Provide the child with a scenario that would elicit that emotion. For example, for 
the fear picture, say, “Maybe he is scared because he saw something scary that 
frightened him.” 
4. Ask the child to label the expression again. For example, “How does this boy in the 
picture feel?” 
Examples for each picture of what to say to children when children respond 
incorrectly are below.  
Fear: “Not quite. This boy is feeling scared. See how his teeth are clenched and his 
lips are turned down? (alt., See how his eyebrows are pushed together and his teeth 
are clenched?) Maybe he is scared because he saw something scary that frightened 
him. (alt., Maybe he is scared because he heard a loud, scary noise.).”  
Sad: “Close, but this girl is sad. See how she is frowning? Maybe she sad because she 
lost her favorite toy (alt., Maybe she is sad because it’s raining and she can’t go 




Happy: “Very close, but this boy is happy. See how she is smiling? Maybe she is 
happy because she won a prize. (alt., Maybe she is happy because she got a present 
she really likes.).” 
Anger: “Not quite. This girl is angry. See how her teeth are showing and her mouth is 
open? Maybe she is angry because something didn’t go her way (alt., Maybe she is 
mad because someone is teasing her.).”  
Surprise: “Not quite. This boy is surprised. See how his eyes and mouth are open 
wide? Maybe he is feeling surprised because something happened suddenly (alt., 
Maybe he is feeling surprised because something unexpected happened.” 
[If the child correctly labels the emotion the second time, say,] That’s right! [Press 
2] 
If the child doesn’t label the picture correctly the second time, repeat the process 
above.] 
[If the child labels the picture correctly the third time, say,] That’s right! [Press 3] 
If the child doesn’t label the picture correctly the third time, move on to the next 
picture by saying,] Let’s look at a different picture. [Press 0] 
[The neutral picture will be displayed last. When the neutral picture comes up, say,] 
In this picture, the girl [boy] is neutral. She [He] doesn’t really have any of the 
feelings that we just talked about. She [He] is okay. She [He] doesn’t have any 
good or bad feelings. [Press enter on the keyboard when you are done explaining the 
neutral picture.] 
[Next, a picture with six thermometers will come up. Label each thermometer for the 
child, pointing to the relevant thermometer as you explain,] This thermometer is 
empty. It means none. The thermometer has only a tiny bit; it means almost 
none or very, very little; this thermometer means a little bit; this one in the 
middle means medium; this one means a lot, and this one that is almost all the 
way to the top is the most full; it means very, very much or a whole, whole lot. 
[Ask the child to repeat the labels by pointing to the thermometers starting on the far 
left,] What does this one mean? [If the child gets one wrong, give the child the 
correct label and move to the next one, but go back to ones the child missed and ask 
the child to label them again before proceeding. To proceed, press enter on the 
keyboard.]  
Now let’s look at each face again and talk about it using the thermometers. 
[Press enter] 
[After the first face/thermometers combination picture appears] Do you remember 
what this girl [boy] is feeling? Right! [Point to empty thermometer.] This 
thermometer means not [emotion; that is, happy, scared, surprised, sad, angry].  
[Point to next thermometer.] This thermometer has only a tiny amount, so it 
means a very, very little bit [emotion]. This thermometer is a little more full so it 
means a little bit [emotion]. This one means medium [emotion]. Do you know 
what this thermometer means? Right! It means very [emotion]. And, what does 
this thermometer mean? Right! It means very, very [emotion] or [emotion] a 
whole, whole lot. [Continue through the pictures. Have the child try to generate 
answer him/herself first.]  
Okay, we’re done looking at pictures on the computer for right now. We’ll use 




HOW I FEEL 
What we’re going to do next is called “How I Feel”. Here I have the same 
pictures that we were just looking at on the computer. This time, I want you to 
look at each picture and pick out the one(s) that show how you feel right now. 
There aren’t any right or wrong answers. We just want to know how you are 
feeling right now. [Put away the images that the child doesn’t select. Get out the 
thermometer card and the first emotion image that the child selected.] 
Now, can you point to the thermometer that matches how much you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.] right now? 
 
[If child seems unclear, prompt with:] Do you feel a little bit happy/scared/etc, or a 
lot happy/scared/etc? [Pointing to the appropriate thermometer. If they have selected 
more than one emotion, repeat process with the subsequent emotions. Record 
responses on response sheet.] 
[After the child is done, say,] Okay, all done? Good. We’re all done at the 
computer table for now. We’ll go back to it in a little bit. Now I thought we 
would take a break and read in the resting chair. [Direct the child to sit in the 
resting chair so that s/he is facing mom when she enters the room. After the child is 








 Task: Computer Table 
PICTURES AND COMPUTER GAME 
Okay, it’s time to put the book away now; will you put it back for me? [If the 
child helps, thank him or her.] 
For our next activity, we’re going to be at the computer table. Have a seat here, 
where you were before the break. I have some pictures I want to show you and a 
computer game that I want you to play.  
NEUTRAL PICTURE SET (baseline) 
First, I’m going to show you some pictures. Then, you are going to play a 
computer game. [Press enter. Neutral picture set 1 will play.]  
HOW I FEEL (baseline) 
[Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
COMPUTER GAME TRAINING AND PRACTICE 
[After pictures are done playing and an X appears on the screen, say] Now it’s time 
to teach you how to play the computer game. The computer is going to pick 




screen because I want you to look at the pictures on the computer screen and tell 
me if the thing in the picture is an animal or a plant as soon as the picture shows 
up on the screen. 
If the picture is an animal, say Animal! If it’s a plant, say Plant! So, as soon as 
you can after each picture you are going to say either Animal! or Plant! 
What will you do after you see a picture? Right! You are going to say either 
Animal! Or Plant!  
If you saw a picture of a cow, what would you say? ...Right! You would say 
Animal! As fast as you could because cows are animals.  
If you saw a picture of a tomato plant, what would you say? ...Right! You would 
say Plant! As fast as you could because a tomato plant is a plant. 
Let’s do some for practice before you play the game.  
Okay, look at the X on the screen and remember to watch the screen closely and 
say either Animal! or Plant! as quickly as you can. [Press enter].  
[If the child gets it correct, say] That’s right! [If the child gets it wrong explain the 
correct answer. There are 10 practice pictures. Press the enter key to proceed to the 
next practice picture. It is very important to make sure that the child is watching the 
screen very closely for each trial before proceeding to the study trials.]  
Okay, good job. Now you are ready to play the computer game. This game is a 
fast game. It only lasts for two minutes, so it’s very important that you watch the 
screen very closely the whole time. The goal is to say the right answer as fast as 
you can, so we shouldn’t talk during the game other than when you say either 
Animal! Or Plant!  
COMPUTER GAME 1 
Okay, remember, watch the screen very closely and say either Animal! or say 
Plant! as soon as you can. Look at the X on the screen, ready, set, go! [Press 
enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 1.]  
PICTURE SET 1 
[As soon as the instruction screen appears, say,] Now, you are going to look at 
some pictures. [Press Enter. Randomized picture set will play.] 
[Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
COMPUTER GAME 2 
[After the randomized pictures are done playing, an X will appear on the screen. 
Prepare the child to play plant/animal game again.] Okay, now you are going to 




Do you remember how to play? [Wait for child’s response.] Right! You watch the 
screen very closely and you say ‘Animal’ if the picture is an animal or you say 
‘Plant’ if the picture is a plant.   
Okay, remember to watch the screen very closely. Ready, set, go! [Press enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 2.]  
PICTURE SET 2 
Okay, now I have some more pictures for you to look at on the computer. [Press 
Enter. Randomized picture set 2 will play.] 
HOW I FEEL 
[Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
COMPUTER GAME 3 
[After the randomized pictures are done playing, an X will appear on the screen. 
Prepare the child to play plant/animal game again.] Okay, now you are going to 
play another round of the computer game.  
Do you remember how to play? [Wait for child’s response.] Right! You watch the 
screen very closely and you say ‘Animal’ if the picture is an animal or you say 
‘Plant’ if the picture is a plant.   
Okay, remember to watch the screen very closely. Ready, set, go! [Press enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 3.]  
PICTURE SET 3 
Okay, now I have some more pictures for you to look at on the computer. [Press 
Enter. Randomized picture set 3 will play.] 
HOW I FEEL 
 [Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
NEUTRAL PICTURE SET 2 
Okay, now I have more pictures to show you. [Press Enter. Neutral picture set 2 
will play.] 




[After the randomized pictures are done playing, an X will appear on the screen. 
Prepare the child to play plant/animal game again.] Okay, now you are going to 
play another round of the computer game.  
Do you remember how to play? [Wait for child’s response.] Right! You watch the 
screen very closely and you say ‘Animal’ if the picture is an animal or you say 
‘Plant’ if the picture is a plant.   
Okay, remember to watch the screen very closely. Ready, set, go! [Press enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 3.]  
PICTURE SET 4 
Okay, now I have some more pictures for you to look at on the computer. [Press 
Enter. Randomized picture set 3 will play.] 
HOW I FEEL 
 [Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
COMPUTER GAME 5 
[After the randomized pictures are done playing, an X will appear on the screen. 
Prepare the child to play plant/animal game again.] Okay, now you are going to 
play another round of the computer game.  
Do you remember how to play? [Wait for child’s response.] Right! You watch the 
screen very closely and you say ‘Animal’ if the picture is an animal or you say 
‘Plant’ if the picture is a plant.   
Okay, remember to watch the screen very closely. Ready, set, go! [Press enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 3.]  
PICTURE SET 5 
Okay, now I have some more pictures for you to look at on the computer. [Press 
Enter. Randomized picture set 3 will play.] 
HOW I FEEL 
 [Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 




[After the randomized pictures are done playing, an X will appear on the screen. 
Prepare the child to play plant/animal game again.] Okay, now you are going to 
play another round of the computer game.  
Do you remember how to play? [Wait for child’s response.] Right! You watch the 
screen very closely and you say ‘Animal’ if the picture is an animal or you say 
‘Plant’ if the picture is a plant.   
Okay, remember to watch the screen very closely. Ready, set, go! [Press enter]. 
[If the child says ANIMAL, press A. If the child says PLANT, press P. Make sure the 
child remains focused on the screen and stays on task. At the end of the game, the 
screen will say END COMPUTER GAME PART 3.]  
PICTURE SET 6 
Okay, now I have some more pictures for you to look at on the computer. [Press 
Enter. Randomized picture set 3 will play.] 
HOW I FEEL 
 [Take out the How I Feel worksheet] Now I want to ask you, how did those 
pictures on the computer screen make you feel? I have the “How I Feel” photos 
like the ones from earlier that I’d like you to look at. Do you remember what you 
are supposed to do with the “How I Feel” sheet? ...Right! Now, can you point to 
the thermometer that matches how much the pictures made you feel 
[happy/sad/angry etc.]? [Repeat process for each emotion photo selected.] Thank 
you. 
AWARENESS CHECK 
“So, you remember the computer game we’ve just been playing? Now we’re 
going to do something similar. You’re going to see some fuzzy images and some 
real pictures will flash very, very quickly in between them. I want you to tell me 
if you can see what the real picture is, okay? Do you understand what you’re 
going to do? Tell me. Right, you’re going to see if you can see what the pictures 
are between the fuzzy images. There will be around 10 of these for you to look 
for. [Start the priming check image series. Note down what the name the images as 
being.] “Alright, we’re done with the computer games now, so let’s move the 
story telling table and work on some coloring until your mom is done. She 








Appendix J.  
Demographics 
What is your annual household income?  
$29,000 or less 
$30,000 to $49,000 
$50,000 to $74,000 
$75,000 to $99,000 
$100,000 or more 
 








Highest level of education you have obtained:  
Some High School 
High School/GED 
Some College (less than 2 years) 
Associate Degree 
Bachelor's Degree  
Master's Degree   
Professional Degree or Doctorate Degree  
 
What is your occupation? __________________ 
 
Highest level of education your child’s father has obtained: 
Some High School 
High School/GED 
Some College (less than 2 years) 
Associate Degree 
Bachelor's Degree  
Master's Degree   
Professional Degree or Doctorate Degree  
 
What is your child’s father’s occupation? __________________ 
 










If you are currently in a romantic relationship, how long have you been with your 
current partner? 
___Months  ___Years 
 
Your ethnic and racial background (please check all that apply): 
American Indian or Alaska Native 
Asian 
Black or African American 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
White 
Hispanic or Latino 
Other: ____________________ 
 
Your child’s ethnic and racial background (please check all that apply): 
American Indian or Alaska Native 
Asian 
Black or African American 
Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander 
White 
Hispanic or Latino 
Other: ____________________ 
 
What is your child’s month and year of birth? 
__________Month     ______ Year 
 
What grade is your child in? ______ 
 
Please list the age and sex of all the people who live in your household and indicate 
each person’s relationship to you and to your child. Please include yourself and your 
child in this list. 
 
Age Sex Relationship to you Relationship to your child 
___ ___ _______________ _____________________ 
___ ___ _______________ _____________________ 
___ ___ _______________ _____________________ 
___ ___ _______________ _____________________ 
___ ___ _______________ _____________________ 






Table of IAPS Numbers Used as Fear-Inducing Stimuli and Descriptions of the 
Photos 






1050 Snake striking 
1051 Snake showing fangs 
1052 Snake striking 





1113 Snake striking 
1114 Snake striking 







1300 Dog showing teeth 
1302 Dog showing teeth 
1304 Dog showing teeth 
1525 Dog showing teeth 
1930 Great white shark 
1931 Great white shark 






Appendix L.  
IAPS Numbers Used as Happy/Excitement-Inducing Stimuli and Descriptions of the 
Photos 
2650 Boy holding ice cream cone 
5450 Space shuttle launch 
5470 Astronaut in space 
5480 Fireworks 
5621 Sky diving 
5623 Wind surfing 
5626 Hang gliding 
5910 Fireworks 
7250 Birthday cake 
7330 Ice cream sundae 
7340 Chocolate ice cream 
7390 Popcicles 
7400 Chocolate bar 
7405 Cupcakes 
7410 Chocolate candies 
7430 Chocolate candy bar 
7508 Ferris wheel 
8021 Skiing 
8030 Slalom ski jump 
8031 Skiing 




8200 Water skiing 
8208 Surfing 
8490 Roller coaster 
8492 Roller coaster 







Appendix M.  
Table of IAPS Numbers Used as Neutral Stimuli and Descriptions of the Photos 
6150 Electrical outlet 
7000 Rolling pin 
7001 Buttons 
7002 Towel 





7012 Rubber bands 




7026 Picnic table 
7032 Shoes 
7034 Hammer 
7040 Dust pan 
7041 Baskets 
7045 Zipper 
7057 Coffee, glasses, and newpaper 
7058 Dice and newspaper 













Appendix N.  
Emotion Labeling Task Materials 





Children’s Behavior Questionnaire (CBQ; Rothbart et al., 2001) 
Below you will see a set of statements that describe children's reactions to a number 
of situations.  We would like you to tell us what your child's reaction is likely to be in 
those situations.  There are of course no "correct" ways of reacting; children differ 
widely in their reactions, and it is these differences we are trying to learn about.  
Please read each statement and decide whether it is a "true" or "untrue" description of 
your child's reaction within the past six months.  Please rate how true or untrue each 
statement is of your child. Use the following scale to indicate how well a statement 
describes your child:  
 
 l extremely untrue of your child 
 2 quite untrue of your child 
 3 slightly untrue of your child 
 4 neither true nor false of your child 
 5 slightly true of your child 
 6 quite true of your child 
 7 extremely true of your child 
  
If you cannot answer one of the items because you have never seen the child in that 
situation, for example, if the statement is about the child's reaction to your singing 
and you have never sung to your child, then circle NA (not applicable). Please be sure 
to mark a number or NA for every item. 
 
1R. Is not very bothered by pain.  
2. Becomes quite uncomfortable when cold and/or wet. 
3. Is quite upset by a little cut or bruise. 
4. Is bothered by light or color that is too bright. 
5. Finds rough materials uncomfortable, such as wool against his/her skin. 
6R. Is not very upset at minor cuts or bruises. 
7. Is bothered by bathwater that is too hot or too cold. 
8. Is likely to cry when even a little bit hurt. 
9. Becomes distressed when hair is combed. 
10. Cries when given an injection. 
11. Is bothered by loud or scratchy sounds. 
12R. Hardly ever complains when ill with a cold. 
13R. Is not afraid of large dogs and/or other animals. 
14. Is afraid of burglars or the "boogie man." 
15. Is afraid of loud noises. 
16R. Doesn't worry about injections by the doctor. 
17R. Is not afraid of the dark. 
18. Is afraid of fire. 
19. Is very frightened by nightmares. 




21R. Is rarely frightened by "monsters" seen on TV or at movies. 
22R. Is not afraid of heights. 
23R. Is rarely afraid of sleeping alone in a room. 
24. Gets nervous about going to the dentist. 
25. Sometimes prefers to watch rather than join other children playing. 
26R. Is comfortable in situations where s/he will be meeting others. 
27R. Seems to be at ease with almost any person. 
28. Gets embarrassed when strangers pay a lot of attention to her/him. 
29R. Acts very friendly and outgoing with new children. 
30R. Joins others quickly and comfortably, even when they are strangers. 
31. Is sometimes shy even around people s/he has known a long time. 
32. Sometimes seems nervous when talking to adults s/he has just met. 
33. Acts shy around new people. 
34R. Is comfortable asking other children to play. 
35R. Talks easily to new people. 
36. Sometimes turns away shyly from new acquaintances. 
37R. Seems completely at ease with almost any group. 
 
Please check back to make sure you have completed all the pages of the 
questionnaire.  Thank you very much for your help! 
 
Note. Item number with and “R” indicate that the item was reverse coded for scoring. 
The Discomfort subscale is items 1-12. The Fear subscale is items 13-24. The 





Coping with Children’s Negative Emotions Scale (CCNES; Fabes et al., 2002) 
In the following items, please indicate on a scale from 1 (very unlikely) to 7 (very 
likely) the likelihood that you would respond in the ways listed for each item. Please 
read each item carefully and respond as honestly and sincerely as you can.  
 
1. If my child becomes angry because he/she is sick or hurt and can't go to 
his/her friend's birthday party, I would: 
a. send my child to his/her room to cool off  
b. get angry at my child  
c. help my child think about ways that he/she can still be with friends (e.g., invite 
some friends over after the party)  
d. tell my child not to make a big deal out of missing the party  
e. encourage my child to express his/her feelings of anger and frustration  
f. soothe my child and do something fun with him/her to make him/her feel better 
about missing the party  
 
2. If my child falls off his/her bike and breaks it, and then gets upset and cries, I 
would: 
a. remain calm and not let myself get anxious  
b. comfort my child and try to get him/her to forget about the accident  
c. tell my child that he/she is over-reacting  
d. help my child figure out how to get the bike fixed  
e. tell my child it's OK to cry  
f. tell my child to stop crying or he/she won't be allowed to ride his/her bike anytime 
soon  
 
3. If my child loses some prized possession and reacts with tears, I would: 
a. get upset with him/her for being so careless and then crying about it  
b. tell my child that he/she is over-reacting  
c. help my child think of places he/she hasn't looked yet  
d. distract my child by talking about happy things  
e. tell him/her it's OK to cry when you feel unhappy  
f. tell him/her that's what happens when you're not careful  
 
4. If my child is afraid of injections and becomes quite shaky and teary while 
waiting for his/her turn to get a shot, I would: 
a. tell him/her to shape up or he/she won't be allowed to do something he/she likes to 
do (e.g., watch TV)  
b. encourage my child to talk about his/her fears  
c. tell my child not to make big deal of the shot  
d. tell him/her not to embarrass us by crying  




f. talk to my child about ways to make it hurt less (such as relaxing so it won't hurt or 
taking deep breaths).  
 
5. If my child is going over to spend the afternoon at a friend's house and 
becomes nervous and upset because I can't stay there with him/her, I would: 
a. distract my child by talking about all the fun he/she will have with his/her friend  
b. help my child think of things that he/she could do so that being at the friend's house 
without me wasn't scary (e.g., take a favorite book or toy with him/her)  
c. tell my child to quit over-reacting and being a baby  
d. tell the child that if he/she doesn't stop that he/she won't be allowed to go out 
anymore  
e. feel upset and uncomfortable because of my child's reactions  
f. encourage my child to talk about his/her nervous feelings  
 
6. If my child is participating in some group activity with his/her friends and 
proceeds to make a mistake and then looks embarrassed and on the verge of 
tears, I would: 
a. comfort my child and try to make him/her feel better  
b. tell my child that he/she is over-reacting  
c. feel uncomfortable and embarrassed myself  
d. tell my child to straighten up or we'll go home right away  
e. encourage my child to talk about his/her feelings of embarrassment  
f. tell my child that I'll help him/her practice so that he/she can do better next time  
 
7. If my child is about to appear in a recital or sports activity and becomes 
visibly nervous about people watching him/her, I would: 
a. help my child think of things that he/she could do to get ready for his/her turn (e.g., 
to do some warm-ups and not to look at the audience)  
b. suggest that my child think about something relaxing so that his/her nervousness 
will go away  
c. remain calm and not get nervous myself  
d. tell my child that he/she is being a baby about it  
e. tell my child that if he/she doesn't calm down, we'll have to leave and go home 
right away  
f. encourage my child to talk about his/her nervous feelings  
 
8. If my child receives an undesirable birthday gift from a friend and looks 
obviously disappointed, even annoyed, after opening it in the presence of the 
friend, I would: 
a. encourage my child to express his/her disappointed feelings  
b. tell my child that the present can be exchanged for something the child wants  
c. NOT be annoyed with my child for being rude  
d. tell my child that he/she is over-reacting  
e. scold my child for being insensitive to the friend's feelings  





9. If my child is panicky and can't go to sleep after watching a scary TV show, I 
would: 
a. encourage my child to talk about what scared him/her  
b. get upset with him/her for being silly  
c. tell my child that he/she is over-reacting  
d. help my child think of something to do so that he/she can get to sleep (e.g., take a 
toy to bed, leave the lights on)  
e. tell him/her to go to bed or he/she won't be allowed to watch any more TV  
f. do something fun with my child to help him/her forget about what scared him/her  
 
10. If my child is at a park and appears on the verge of tears because the other 
children are mean to him/her and won't let him/her play with them, I would: 
a. NOT get upset myself  
b. tell my child that if he/she starts crying then we'll have to go home right away  
c. tell my child it's OK to cry when he/she feels bad  
d. comfort my child and try to get him/her to think about something happy  
e. help my child think of something else to do  
f. tell my child that he/she will feel better soon  
 
11. If my child is playing with other children and one of them calls him/her 
names, and my child then begins to tremble and become tearful, I would: 
a. tell my child not to make a big deal out of it  
b. feel upset myself  
c. tell my child to behave or we'll have to go home right away  
d. help my child think of constructive things to do when other children tease him/her 
(e.g., find other things to do)  
e. comfort him/her and play a game to take his/her mind off the upsetting event  
f. encourage him/her to talk about how it hurts to be teased  
 
12. If my child is shy and scared around strangers and consistently becomes 
teary and wants to stay in his/her bedroom whenever family friends come to 
visit, I would: 
a. help my child think of things to do that would make meeting my friends less scary 
(e.g., to take a favorite toy with him/her when meeting my friends)  
b. tell my child that it is OK to feel nervous  
c. try to make my child happy by talking about the fun things we can do with our 
friends  
d. feel upset and uncomfortable because of my child's reactions  
e. tell my child that he/she must stay in the living room and visit with our friends  
f. tell my child that he/she is being a baby  
 
Scoring and Subscales 




1. Distress Reactions (DR): Mean of 1B, 2A*, 3A, 4D, 5E, 6C, 7C*, 8C*, 9B, 10A*, 
11B, 12D. 
2. Punitive Reactions (PR): Mean of 1A, 2F, 3F, 4A, 5D, 6D, 7E, 8E, 9E, 10B, 11C, 
12E. 
3. Expressive Encouragement (EE): Mean of 1E, 2E, 3E, 4B, 5F, 6E, 7F, 8A, 9A, 
10C, 11F, 12B. 
4. Emotion-Focused Reactions (EFR): Mean of 1F, 2B, 3D, 4E, 5A, 6A, 7B, 8F, 
9F, 10D, 11E, 12C. 
5. Problem-Focused Reactions (PFR): Mean of 1C, 2D, 3C, 4F, 5B, 6F, 7A, 8B, 
9D, 10E, 11D, 12A. 
6. Minimization Reactions (MR): Mean of 1D, 2C, 3B, 4C, 5C, 6B, 7D, 8D, 9C, 
10F, 11A, 12F. 
Supportive: Mean of EE, EFR, PFR 
Harsh: Mean of DR, PR, MR 
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